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Transformation to a Market Economy and Changing Social Values in China, Russia, and Eastern Germany

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**TRANSFORMATION TO A MARKET ECONOMY AND CHANGING SOCIAL VALUES IN CHINA,
RUSSIA, AND EASTERN GERMANY**

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

But enough! enough! I can't take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where *ideals are manufactured*—it seems to me it stinks of so many lies.

F. Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals* (Nietzsche 1967:58), First Essay

As a social change, the sudden collapse of communism¹ should well be remembered as one of the most formative events of the 20th century. As a political transformation, it caused an initial rush of euphoria within the 'victorious' West and a wave of hope followed by disillusionment for hundreds of millions in the newly 'democratic' sphere. As an economic transformation, its effects were even more tangible, for they implied changes within everyday life through the shift from a centrally planned to a market economy. The rules, opportunities, and challenges presented by the basic categories of work and consumption changed practically overnight for a considerable proportion of the world's population. Yet, this event became only an obscure specialization of sociological inquiry. This disappointment is sharpened by the fact that there is, of course, a vast history of sociological thinking about the connection between economy and sociality. Durkheim and Tönnies, Weber, Marx and Polanyi, and Simmel, to name a few, spent their careers on related questions. We teach their ideas in our universities as our 'classical theory,' yet when the collapse of communism occurred before our eyes, the event, for the most part, was not translated on a wide scale into research questions in relation to these ideas it so obviously applies to. To frame it another way, while there is a history of discussion about economic change, specifically in connection to what might loosely be defined here as individualization of human sociality, a contemporary application of these thoughts to capitalism is nearly absent. This absence is odd in light of the recent collapse of communism, presumably giving us the opportunity to empirically explore such ideas.

This project jumps into the gap outlined above by examining whether the economic transformation to capitalism has generated tensions within the sociality of subjects who

¹ I use the term communist, as opposed to socialist, to describe the collapsed Eastern Bloc regimes as well as to describe the unfulfilled ideology which they claimed as their aim. I make this choice primarily to avoid causing confusion through a back and forth usage of both 'socialism' and 'communism' when referring alternately to formerly existing regimes in reality and the ideologies they professed. Besides this, I will assume the readers are well aware that my use of the word communism for describing regimes does not imply that those regimes actually had yet achieved, or in certain cases even sincerely sought, communism. Moreover, use of the 'socialist' term would both rob the term 'communist' of all meaning and simultaneously conflate collapsed authoritarian Soviet socialist regimes with West European democratic market socialist regimes (Roberts 2004). Therefore, the 'communist' label will be applied throughout this work.

experience it through making them more self-oriented, materialistic, and rationalistic. For the task, I have chosen three very different post-communist locations (Shanghai, China; Moscow, Russia; and Leipzig, Eastern Germany) and propose that - in light of their profound differences across nearly every dimension - a hypothetical similarity of growing self-centeredness in the last 15-20 years in all three should be linked to their other similarity, the fact that they each experienced a recent transition from centrally planned to capitalist free-market economic culture.

The pursuit of this research requires the binding of two overarching themes, those of economic culture and sociality. Specifically, the extent to which the new economic structure as a cultural form impacts intimate sociality will be investigated. This occurs through the medium of the concept of values. Values are the cognitions which persons use to prioritize and order their behavior. They are neither mere cognitions nor mere behavior, but rather the exact intersection of where mind and action meet. This values conception allows room for both agency and structure, as values are not merely simply handed down hierarchically, but are formed by individuals' perceptions of and reactions to concretized values within cultural systems. This key concept, like others in the dissertation, will be fully elaborated upon within Chapter 2. In the meantime the argument will now be focused in two ways: by describing capitalist economic culture as favoring a certain set of values, and second, by describing an alternative set of values related to sociality.

ECONOMY AS CULTURE

As a system of organizing life, the economic structure exerts a cultural pull as might a religion, a place of origin, a hobby, a type of work, or a socioeconomic status. That such a system exerts a patterned impact on people's *economic* behavior is obvious, but cultures also have latent effects on behavior beyond their formal areas of influence, as Weber (2003) famously demonstrated in showing how religious asceticism laid the groundwork for capitalism. If different economic systems indeed favor patterned sets of behaviors and ideas, a cultural influence, what then is the specific essence of capitalism as an economic system upon the personality? Does it induce profit-oriented thinking to the detriment of other forms or rather a 'warm' calculation? Does it open people to embrace opportunities or lock them within restraints? Does anything of Weber's protestant ethic remain in relation to economic life, or, as he commented, has calculative rationality become liberated from its moral roots and become an iron cage dominating other spheres? Such questions about the essence of capitalism have been of great interest for the last 150

years. Yet, these were originally framed in terms of ‘where are we going?’ or ‘what are we becoming?’ since they were asked in the midst of impending change. Today, curiosity about the nature of capitalism hits closer to home, mixing threateningly with the questions, ‘who are *we*?’ or ‘what have we become?’ Ironically, we are so imbedded within a capitalist world that the concept of capitalism ceases to have meaning for some. Many have questioned its usefulness at all. Others perceive it only in moral opposition to communism and as profoundly intertwined with other modern mantras in celebration of the West, such as ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy.’ Yet capitalism nonetheless has a very real dimension to it. It, alongside the other social forms within which we live, structures the way we work, the way we rest, the way our life courses play out. It beckons us, through its hegemony, to be with it or against it. Although easy for us nowadays to forget, there have been other ways of organizing economic life, such as the hunter-gatherer society, the socially-embedded ancient barter markets of Polanyi (2001 [1944]), or the centrally planned economic system. In such economies, persons lived and worked in entirely different ways. If each economic culture is peculiar and unique, in which ways is capitalist culture formative in patterning personalities? Or, to put the issue functionally, with the shift from socialist to capitalist economic systems, different types of actors are required to allow the new system to function in a way different from the previous one (Kupferberg 1999:171). But how does this happen?

The recent capitalist economic transformations in the former U.S.S.R., Eastern Block, and even China, are the ideal places to look in order to answer this question. There, in a fraction of a lifetime, transformations from one economic system to another have occurred, allowing us to investigate the possible influence that capitalism may have exerted upon the population in each of these societies (See also Outhwaite and Ray 2005:2).

Of course, readers may immediately object that there is no unitary capitalism, that capitalism has its many varieties (Hall and Soskice 2001). The notion of ‘varieties of *capitalism*’ does imply a conceptual coherency to the concept of capitalism in contrast to something else. Why else would the term ‘capitalism’ retain any use whatsoever? That ‘something else,’ within this study, is the centrally planned economy. Even Hall and Soskice differentiate between the two ideal types of the coordinated versus the liberal market economic system as a spectrum across which capitalist systems tend to be organized. Similarly, I erect two ideal types of the planned economic system and the capitalist economic system and chart the movement of three societies, China, Russia, and Eastern Germany, towards the capitalist ideal. In so doing, of course, differences in

capitalist types of course emerge and are interpreted – especially the differentiation between the Eastern German welfare-state and the Russian and Chinese liberal market types – as per their impacts upon social values. Therefore the construction of ideal dichotomies not only is already implied within the varieties of capitalism approach but also does not negate the elaboration of real differentiations between the ideally constructed poles. The definition of capitalism used in this project will be elaborated upon within Chapter 2.

SOCIALITY

To reasonably analyze the impact of capitalism upon all values among post-communist countries would be unfeasible here. A filtering mechanism is needed to help decide which values are important for a particular analysis. Many scholars focus on the impact of economic growth upon *political* values, specifically those values which mesh with liberal and democratic ideals, and thus, preoccupied with notions of a 'new world order' and the inferiority of alternative systems of organization, such work tends to support the dominant system. Aside from these debated political consequences, this project concerns itself with the *social* ramifications of the transformation of the centrally-planned economies toward the free-market model.

The capitalist transformations² initially raised great expectations both within these countries and abroad. Such expectations arose largely because, even within the intimate social sphere, communist rule was often marked by terrible poverty, by the ideological devaluation of family and individual lives in favor of work and the state, and by instruments of state repression that invaded personal lives and degraded the worth of the individual (Shlapentokh 1991). In other words, “communist rule had huge costs – not only materially, but also in terms of human happiness” (Inglehart 2000: 218). These apparent realities of the communist dystopia only lead to one expectation from the transformation to capitalism: the replacement of communism should cause not only a boon in human happiness, but also a resurgence of social life within these countries. This did not occur.

The failures of the planned post-communist *political* and *economic* transformations have led one specialist to note, "Eastern Europe can provide everyone with a sufficient

² The term 'transformation' is preferred over 'transition' within this dissertation, since the capitalist and planned economic models are perceived as conflicting ideals. Thus, in this ideal state, they are profoundly unlike one another, and the social change between them should be seen as rather closer to a total metamorphosis than to a minor shift from one like thing to another. Thus, readers should interpret 'transition,' where it may occur in this text, as rather a stylistic convention to avoid a repetitive use of 'transformation.'

amount of pessimism, regardless of whether they come from the East or the West, from the left or the right" (Kovacs 1994:xii). Yet to put these obvious economic and political policy failures aside, there are at least two reasons to doubt the fulfillment of the high *social* expectations mentioned above. First, conversations with persons from former-communist countries often turn nostalgic and pessimistic when discussing changes in social relationships, friends, family, and social engagement over the past 20 years. Many lament the alleged decay of family relationships and friendships due to the rapid growth of materialism, job opportunities and working hours, and moving abroad. Scholarly assessments have come upon similar findings. For example, Kupferberg's (1999:24) report in 1999 on the post-communist societies was that "the overdeveloped private sphere has run into a state of coma. It has not totally disappeared, but it has lost most signs of life." He claims that "A big silence has crept into the overdeveloped private sphere, including families that previously held together. Now there is really little one can do to help each other [sic]" (Kupferberg 1999:25). Such reports raise the hypothesis that post-communist persons may have come to devalue the social sphere during the years of the transformation. Aside from these direct reports on declining relationship quality, popular perception and empirical evidence both indicate increased rates of crime in most transformation countries (Lotspeich 1995; Luneev 1999:75) and increased suicide rates in many, such as Russia (Outhwaite and Ray 2005:61).

However, these two phenomena, changing social values and social disorder, have been inadequately integrated in analyses describing post-communist transitions. In contrast, this study posits that both of these changes can be linked to the reintroduction of a capitalist economic structure. Post-communist social disorder, such as high crime rates, is explained if the free-market transformation led to the other phenomenon, weakened social values, and thereby undermined the informal social control which depends on these values. In other words, the conjunction of reports of weakening relationships and rising crime give us a hypothetical Durkheimian explanation: anomie has arisen because post-communist persons have come to care less about the relationships which morally bind them.

Other-centeredness, and a worry about its possible decline, is the sociality of interest here, and it is also the historical decline of this sociality which constitutes the "individualization" of interest in this project, especially to be focused upon within Chapter 2. This sociality is the dependent variable of choice both because of the informal social control concerns noted above and because of its central importance in sociological theory. Intimate sociality is combined with the capitalist economic culture – the main independent

variable of interest - into the key research question: might capitalism exert a cultural pull on the personalities of its subjects so that they become less social?

CRITIQUE OF UTOPIAN MODERNIZATION

The above research question is rooted solidly within a traditional sociological critique of the social consequences of economic change, one that counters normative-optimistic modernization claims currently in vogue in the this research field. Indeed, sociology founded itself on the study of human sociality - especially challenges to it - during an era of profound change. Yet now contemporary sociological thinking, which has been tainted by the euphoria of the de facto cold war victory of the West, could benefit from an opposing view of civilization's impact, specifically its economic impact, upon this sociality. In contrast to what *should be* its core concern with human sociality, much of sociology has been influenced by paradigms from economics and political science, and as a result, with the collapse of communism, sociologists have asked, 'how can we make this capitalist transition more effective?' and 'how can we help increase economic growth?' Instead, sociology *should have* asked, 'What is the meaning of capitalism, especially in regard to human sociality?' and looked at the data. This has not occurred. One observer laments that "no one has bothered to study the phenomenon in question:" the fate of the intimate and private sphere in a post-communist setting (Kupferberg 1999:24). The potential of paradigm critique presented by pursuit of certain questions has been stunted by the celebration of 'modernity' brought about by the collapse of communism. In other words, the contemporary social sciences, exemplified through approaches to post-communism such as 'transitology,' have become engrossed in technocratic fetishes over the operational efficiency of Giddens' (1990:53) "careering juggernaut" of modernity instead of attempting to discern its design, intent, and direction. Many classical thinkers stood in the juggernaut's path, while today's oil its gears.

Critique is embraced here not as an end in itself, but because modernization approaches on the topic of values have biased scientific inquiry. This dissertation, in proving the positive impact of capitalist culture upon intimate social values, embraces a critical empirical approach as an antidote to modernization thinking on the economy and sociality question.

CHAPTER LAYOUT

Chapter 2 describes this dissertation's theoretical standpoint in earnest, through first elucidating the twin umbrella concepts of empirical modernization and individualization.

Thereafter, the utopian variant of modernization is presented as a source of bias in the research field, especially seen through transitology research and utopian individualization approaches. Thereafter, contrasting individualization approaches are described, including the utopian, the critical, and those claiming that 'nothing has changed.' To conclude, the dissertation's individualization viewpoint will be described in depth as a connection between the concepts of values, informal social control, and economic structure. In so doing, relevant literature is introduced as necessary. By the end of this chapter, the reader will have been exposed to the hypotheses of this project and their origins.

Chapter 3 familiarizes the reader with some of the relevant cultural and historical dimensions of the three cases of this study: China, Russia, and Eastern Germany. In turn, within each case, the pre-transformation constellation of intimate values, economic transformation, and post-transformation sociality indications are described in order to provide an initial context with which to judge this dissertation's findings. While it is hardly possible to provide adequate detail on cases which are so different across so many dimensions, I have nonetheless attempted to provide some of the key points. In depth background material on each case should be sought elsewhere.

Chapter 4 describes the operationalization of the research question, research methods, case selection techniques, and analysis strategy for both qualitative and quantitative components of the study. For readability reasons, enough information is provided to describe the core of the project, while certain details have been rather located in the appendices.

Chapter 5 provides the qualitative findings for the Chinese (Shanghai) case, based on interviews conducted in Shanghai comparing businessmen with their fathers. These are arranged according to the dimensions of work values, family values, materialism values, and other values, and are backed with quotations and information from the interview data. The findings, as presented in this chapter, are intentionally raw, or 'pure,' as their fuller interpretation and analysis is embarked within a comparative context within the later chapters 8, 9, and 10. Chapters 6 and 7 similarly report the qualitative findings for the Russian (Moscow) and Eastern German (Leipzig) cases, respectively.

Chapter 8 integrates the qualitative results from the three cases together. It presents Shanghai, Moscow, and Leipzig interview findings alongside one another in order to allow more direct comparison and contrast.

Chapter 9 presents quantitative data in order to determine whether similar value gaps arise as within the qualitative findings. Specifically, intergenerational and occupational

comparisons are analyzed. The quantitative data are not treated as superior, as a test of the qualitative, but rather as additional sources of information about value tensions.

Chapter 10 is the most important of the dissertation, in that it brings the results alive through presenting mechanisms through which they appear to have been produced. In particular, conscious adaptation, ideological conflict, cognitive dissonance, and intergenerational changeover are presented as potential mechanisms of value change.

Chapter 11 concludes the work by highlighting key results, clarifying potential misinterpretations, discussing weaknesses and strengths, and discussing praxis.

CHAPTER 2. INDIVIDUALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION

This is civilization. Formerly, men worked in the open air only as much as they liked. Now thousands of workmen meet together and, for the sake of maintenance, work in factories or mines. Their condition is worse than that of beasts. They are obliged to work, at the risk of their lives, at most dangerous occupations, for the sake of millionaires. Formerly, men were made slaves under physical compulsion. Now they are enslaved by temptation of money and of the luxuries that money can buy.

M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj (Indian Home Rule)* (1946:26)

The economic transformation from a planned to a market economy may have resulted in the individualization of values, one feature of which is declining sociality, so that, as a result, the relational foundations of informal social control were undermined in the post-communist world. This claim integrates the three concepts of informal social control, values, and structural economic change. While the anomic results of the devaluation of the social sphere are not directly measured here, they are nonetheless presented as one of the core theoretical origins of the hypothesis more directly dealt with in this dissertation, that the transformation to capitalism resulted in a decline in other-centeredness among post-communist citizens. The above individualization claims are situated in relation to modernization in two ways. First, at the empirical level, individualization arises as a direct result of modernization processes. Second, at the normative level, these claims function as a counterthesis to the more utopian strands of modernization thinking.

This chapter elaborates on the theoretical grounding of this project, one nested within a conjuncture between modernization and individualization concepts. To begin with, the empirical - as opposed to the normative – components of modernization will be introduced. This chapter argues that modernization represents long term patterns of social change which culminate in various forms of individualization. In contrast, utopian modernization promotes an optimistic view of these changes; transitology is one body of literature falling within this category. Individualization is fundamentally ambivalent and thus can be portrayed in various ways. However, some modernization approaches tend toward solely optimistic interpretations of individualization, thereby resulting in an incomplete picture. In contrast, the critical-empirical approach of this dissertation presents evidence for a particular association between an aspect of modernization, capitalist economic culture, and one of the negative consequences of individualization, declining valuation of intimacy,

thereby challenging idyllic modernization claims on the issue. Specifically, the foundational theoretical argument of the dissertation will be laid out as a connection between informal social control, intimate social values, and the economic structure. The dissertation's hypotheses arise from this setup.

CENTRAL CONCEPTS

'Empirical' Modernization

Modernization at its core is a collection of types of long-term social change, a set of patterns of development, a contrast between the distant past and today. This distinction between the "modern and traditional" is *the* key distinction in the modernization paradigm (Schelkle and Krauth 2001:21). This modernization is one that is not inherently normative; based on such empirical observations alone, one could either praise 'development,' pine for the past, or adopt no explicit stance at all regarding whether modernization is good or bad. This 'empirical' modernization, one accepted by this study, contrasts with a normative-optimistic modernization tendency visible within values research. This utopianism will be considered in depth later. For the moment, modernization is introduced as an empirical phenomenon.

Modernization may be split into a variety of sub-dimensions. These are each interrelated, but necessary to nonetheless distinguish analytically in order to meaningfully progress. Principally industrialization, urbanization, technological development, the development of capitalism, bureaucratization and rationalization are the most recognized forces of modernization. However, the principal modernization of interest in this work, functioning as an independent variable, is that of capitalist economic development, to be greatly expanded upon later in the chapter. These various forms of modernization, among others, represent specific aspects of social change, and thereby potential factors whose effects upon a particular dependent variable we may wish to measure.

Individualization

The above-mentioned modernization of society, through the patterned sub-processes it represents, may have caused the individualization of society (See van der Loo and van Reijen 1992). Hareven (1990:215) concurs, noting that the "study of family has provided important linkages between individual lives and larger social and economic processes such as industrialization, technological change, urbanization, and business cycles." The individualization of values arises from many historical processes of modernization, one of which is the structural economic change of interest in this work.

In broadest terms, the dependent variable of interest in this research is encapsulated by the term individualization. Despite the fact that individualization theory - embodied by the work of key thinkers such as Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman, and Anthony Giddens - can be interpreted as quite illusory and fractured, the core idea is that individuals become increasingly differentiated over historical time. Individualization proponents tend to agree that individuals today are more independent, self-driving, privately oriented, and less traditional than in the past (van der Loo and van Reijen 1992:160). Within the field of values research, individualization is often represented through the individualist-collectivist dimension, as Hitlin and Piliavin (2004:376) report (citing Markus & Kitayama 1991, Triandis 1995). This individualist-collectivist dimension is used to observe the cultural results of the individualization process.

Depending on normative and thematic approaches, many 'individualizations' may be described. Within the spheres of work and creativity, for example, individualization is marked by increasing differentiation and expanded degrees of 'uniqueness' between individuals. If one rather looks at individualization in terms of locus of control, important may be the historical process of the development of a form of internal control, as per Norbert Elias (1979 [1939]), or of expanded responsibility of the individual in planning his/her own life, meaning both greater steering potential and risk, as per Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002). In addition, we may look at individualization as the development of enhanced forms of self-expression, which may have political repercussions as per their pro-democratic impacts (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet a different arena, relationships and intimacy, is the focus here, one that refers to individualization as the adaptation of traditional forms of relatedness, which then are replaced by something new.

The split within individualization literature between utopian and critical approaches should be highlighted. Utopian approaches tend to exaggerate positive aspects of individualization, while the critical focus on the pessimistic. The analysis conducted in this project is rooted as a response to the flaws of optimistic individualization thinking, and the greatest source of this utopian bias is a particular sort of modernization thought.

UTOPIAN MODERNIZATION

Modernization is more than an empirical approach for interpreting social change. Its extreme adherents also adopt a normative stance which celebrates modernity over the past. The normative 'modernization' approach is an implicit bias within most contemporary research on capitalism at large, and its implicit influence upon a wide variety of themes,

including individualization, cannot be underestimated. Above all, within this approach, the benefits of the free-market system are solidified into a mostly unconscious zeal, one that was likely unwittingly forged by the ideological battleground of the Cold War. Nonetheless, while science claims value neutrality, extreme modernization adherents promote the benefits of the capitalist system in the same way they tout other political jargon, such as 'freedom' and 'democracy.' The normative-optimistic strands of modernization theory suppose that, not only is capitalism a powerful unifying mechanism, but it is a mechanism that brings positive 'development,' which is the assumed panacea for all problems. A helpful description of this modernization is the following:

The process of 'modernization' has mostly been described from a 'positive' point of view, that is, stressing the social gains and achievements as one enters modernity such as greater personal autonomy, respect for human rights, increase in welfare and prosperity, balance of power, the right to speak openly and criticize one's own government, the duty of the party or coalition in power to step back if a majority votes against it, etc. (Kupferberg 1999:175)

Within utopian modernization, all positive personal traits are rooted in capitalism, while negative ones stem from outside the capitalist core, either as communist, or creatively, as an underdeveloped form of capitalism, such as 'adventure' or 'pirate capitalism.' Even corruption originates from outside the capitalist sphere, a sphere that is assumed to be moral and just. At times this modernization focus is overt, but mostly it remains tacit, yet evident either through its inability to question the system at hand or through its contributions to the functionality of the capitalism. In both cases, the optimistic streams of modernization theory foster illusions about the nature of the economic system.

An example of the dominance of such thinking on the economy-sociality question is Viviana Zelizer's work on the sociology of money. A look at her book titles offers a glimpse of her aim: *The Social Meaning of Money*, *Pricing the Priceless Child*, and *The Purchase of Intimacy*. In all respects, she demonstrates the timeless imbeddedness of economic exchange within social context. She eloquently demonstrates how economy and sociality are interwoven so that they are ultimately indistinguishable. While there is no ground to substantially criticize her empirics, her interpretation of them is more questionable. Since economic activities are manipulated and formed by social processes, she argues, there ceases to be justification either for what she calls the "hostile worlds" (Zelizer 2005) approach of classical social theory or for serious acknowledgment of the moral qualms of the persons she writes about. In other words, the mere fact of coexistence negates the focus upon tensions and conflict. This particular logical jump is a blurry one.

A slave will work all day in ways that shape bondage to one's own benefit, leaving slave-like existence perfectly embedded within social relations. The slave will be lazy when possible, collect scraps of food and raw materials for later barter, and collude with fellow slaves in order to minimize and ease work, trick captors, and maximize one's own joy as much as possible. Thus, the slave greatly manipulates his/her own economic activities, which then in turn do not perfectly resemble the economic theories purporting to explain them, but nonetheless, he/she works 18 hours a day, walks in chains, is whipped, receives little to eat, and is emotionally disempowered. Does the slave still have grounds to believe in "hostile worlds?" Of course, Zelizer's important act of highlighting the social context of economic activity *does not* mean there is no possible conflict between those two spheres. Nor does it negate the legitimacy of individual protest, whether unconscious through moral dilemmas or conscious through resistance.

Transitology

The grandest example of the normative and utopian elements of modernization harnessed in scientific form is presented by the transitology paradigm. This body of literature focusing on the post-socialist transformations can be broken into two major spheres. On the one hand is the transitology that serves as a technocratic 'how-to' manual for implementing transition, which is contrasted with a "pure" academic interest in transition (Tökes 2000). This first type can be readily dismissed as "*hubris*" because of the unstated, yet profoundly manipulative qualities of the ideology it promotes (Tökes 2000). Others have more pleasantly labeled this hubris as "the neo-liberal discourse of radical reform" (Bönker, Müller and Pickel 2002:5). An example of such research is the monograph aptly entitled *Successful Transformations?*, which nicely explains the aims of this genre:

With the collapse of communist power in central and eastern Europe in 1989, the great question for economic policy became the best means to ensure a 'successful' transformation of the various countries of the area into 'modern' market economies. A 'successful' transformation would be one that enabled the country to create a new economic system, to ensure rapid and sustainable economic growth so as to reduce, and ultimately to overcome the gap with the advanced countries of western Europe and, above all and most conclusively, one that led to acceptance as a developed market economy by the world's financial institutions, by governments and by intergovernmental organizations (Myant et al. 1996:1).

Many books, however, even have a less abashed celebration of the Western economic model, employing, alongside "success," lingo such as 'being ahead' or 'catching up' with the transformation:

*Although most transition strategies are based on a three-pronged approach - liberalization, institution building, and macroeconomic stabilization - countries have, in practice, adopted distinctive reform agendas and achieved varying degrees of success. Whereas some countries have moved decisively **ahead** with their transformation, others are making a steady effort **to catch up**... (Blejer and Skreb 2001:3 [emphasis added]).*

Related accounts of post-socialism even refer to present day moral decline in these societies as a "cancer" growing as a vestige of the past:

*sociologists would therefore profit by studying the origins of this moral erosion, how it **grew like at cancer**, and gradually forcing society to its knees. When you travel around in Eastern Europe today, this is precisely the impression you get: it is a society that has barely survived. It has been through a long bout of illness and is only now recovering" (Kupferberg 1999:30 [emphasis added]).*

Yet this is *not* the impression observers 'naturally' get when travelling in Eastern Europe. Keeping with the same 'sickness' rhetoric, one could also imagine the opposite of the above, that the post-communist states are like the unfortunate American Indians who have overcome their head colds only to have acquired smallpox seeded from the blankets of their white Army doctors. For this variety of modernization thought, anything but capitalism is a disease eating away at present possibilities of success. Yet, like all good doctors, transitologists are reminded to maintain at least a small degree of sympathy for their 'patients:' "one should not turn a blind eye to what is often subjectively felt as deprivation by at least *some* of the participants" (Kupferberg 1999:175 [emphasis added]).

To continue on transitology as 'hubris,' Grancelli (2002:97) has cited Stephen Cohen's (1999:42f) apt recognition of the Orwellian knowledge produced by transitology, including:

*the worst industrial depression of the twentieth century has been called **reform**; "a decreed market, featuring contract killings as the supreme form of litigation, has been called a **free market**"; the decimation of the highly educated and potentially entrepreneurial Soviet middle classes has been called the **creation of a middle class**; and, finally, the disguised form of Russian authoritarianism that has presided over all this is called **political reform**.*

Transition literature only very rarely attempts to focus on real people. Kupferberg (1999:10), one of the few exceptions to the rule, describes the point well: "Whereas most theories of transformation assume that what is transformed are structures or institutions, I

argue that transformation is fundamentally about people, that is, individuals." This social psychological dimension of the transformation process has been conspicuously underemphasized in transformation literature as a whole and nearly ignored by transitology.

Aside from the openly normative transitology, the other 'pure' academic category focuses mostly on the institutions and gears of political and economic transition, on questions of efficiency. The social sphere is woefully neglected. The primary drive of most, even Tökes' 'purely' academic transitology literature is to attempt to learn the proper sequences and factors required for 'successful' transition toward capitalism and democracy.³ Again, the focus is on the mechanisms and efficiency of transitions, often from an institutional perspective. One example, indeed a progressive one, of this literature may be the edited volume by Burawoy and Verdery (1999), entitled *Uncertain Transition*. In fairness, the editors spend much energy critiquing those who interpret the collapse of communism as "the final victory of modernity's great achievements," but the volume's focus on institutions, political actors, economic policy, and the meso-level workings of the economic transformation severely neglects both the intimate sphere *and* the macro-levels, and thus serves, despite the authors' intents, as a how-to manual for analyzing the operative contours of the political and economic machines. For example, they regard the following as adequate questions:

Why does the Russian economy continue to decline year in, year out, while the Chinese economy continues to grow? Why has the Polish economy done better in some respects than the much acclaimed Hungarian and Czech models? (Burawoy and Verdery 1999:15).

Within this ethnographic-technocratic mix, the effects of the economic transformation on real everyday people - not persons as abstract actors, classes, or elites - are cloudy, as are the cultural characteristics of the systems in transition. We are left with what feels like a fatalistic and mechanical process, with institutions and elites reified in a realm separate from both personal and from generalized overarching meaning. Transitology does not touch the field of personal values because it rather dissects transformations through another language, one divorced from both persons and meaning, so that, in the end, it remains 'useful' to modernization, even if, as in Burawoy and Verdery's case, they may intend a critique.

³ Capitalism and democracy are analytically confounded, as are the planned-economy and totalitarianism, by many utopian modernization approaches.

CONTRASTING INDIVIDUALIZATIONS

Individualization as historically altered forms of intimate relatedness is depicted often according to a utopian scheme inherited from the particular form of modernization thinking described above. This dissertation attempts to neutralize this bias by focusing on more critical aspects of individualization.

Utopian Individualization

Utopian modernization logic, which has built its own subfields such as the transitology described above, has also seeped over into individualization investigations. Many scholars depict the link between capitalist modernity and changing intimate relationships as solely positive. This strand of individualization tends to view long term change in relatedness in terms of enhanced tolerance of persons toward others, increased equality between persons in relationships, and a broadened role of choice since individuals may choose their relationships to a much greater extent today than in the past.

Much contemporary literature on family change and sociality demonstrates this utopian bias. Gillies (2003:15) calls this literature the "democratisation" group, as it claims that "social life has freed people from the fixed, constrained social roles of the past, allowing them to create new, more fulfilling relationships based on mutual satisfaction rather than contractual obligation."

Of the prime individualization thinkers, Giddens' (1991; 1992) conceptualization of individualization is the least ambivalent. His notion of the 'pure relationship' reveals the potential in modern liberated forms of interaction, which, now freed from traditional restraints, can finally be launched through the choices and mutual trust of the participants. The pure relationship:

refers to a situation where a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfaction for each individual to stay within it. (Giddens 1992:58)

Giddens however, does not give much attention to the negative side-effects of enhanced reflexivity and the liberation of the individual from ascribed relations. Rather than on the dissolution of the old, he focuses more on the emergence of the new, the 'self-project,' together with its multitude of emergent resources.

Other prime representatives for utopian individualization would be Alex Inkeles and David Smith and their seminal work, *Becoming Modern* (Inkeles and Smith 1974). It is based on an investigation, drawing on survey data, into the growth of the "modern

personality" within six developing countries (Argentina, Chile, India, Israel, Nigeria, and Bangladesh). Therein, the authors identified a growth in personality traits that suit individuals well for work within the modern economy. The authors' clever notion of the factory "as a school" in forming personality is one with broad resonance in explaining how factory-favored values become disseminated within individuals, and this concept has been monumental in overcoming the Freudian assumption that values are only disseminated during the youth (Inkeles and Smith 1974:9). However the problem emerges when one discovers *which* values the authors call 'modern.' For them, these include the openness to new experiences and to change, likelihood to hold opinions about distant or abstract subject areas, awareness of the diversity of attitudes and opinions, orientation toward the present or future as opposed to the past, belief in the ability to dominate the environment, orientation toward planning and organization, the trusting of strangers, a belief in meritorious reward, an openness to education and learning new things, and, most revealingly, a greater respect toward the dignity of others (Inkeles 1983:36-39). The problem is that each of these modern values is presented as positive and enlightened, naturally contrasting with an implicitly traditional and barbaric past. This becomes most obvious when reviewing the 'modern' "dignity toward others" trait.

The current major proponents of the optimistic values individualization thesis are Ronald Inglehart and members of his World Value Survey (WVS) group. The WVS, in collecting data in 5-year intervals from over 70 countries, is far more ambitious than even the *Becoming Modern* data collection effort. In this regard, this survey, while far from perfect, is certainly a monument within comparative data collection. Data aside, it is again the politics that are problematic. A political scientist, Inglehart supposes that individual values change through the two primary mechanisms of scarcity and socialization. The scarcity hypothesis proposes that individuals tend to value resources which are in short supply to them; prosperity tends to lead to post-materialist values emphasizing non-materialism, communicativity, and tolerance, while poverty spurs the opposite. The socialization hypothesis implies that the implanting of values takes place primarily during the youth and these values change relatively little throughout adulthood. Furthermore, according to Inglehart, fundamental value change takes place primarily through cohort replacement. He predicts that, "after a long period of rising economic and physical security, one should find substantial differences between the value priorities of older and younger groups; they have been shaped by different experiences in their formative years" (Inglehart 2000:221). As a result, Inglehart claims to be able to explain the decline in

traditional and survival orientations and the rise of secular and self-expressive orientations, the latter two of which he supposes, of course, to be good. Some problems with this model will be demonstrated, and alternatives will be suggested.

The first flaw of this approach is its normative bias. This modernization of personality process is said to be driven primarily by economic development, which culminates in enlightened 'postmaterialist' values, while economic stagnation and decline revert personality structures back toward the imagined anti-sociality of the past. Through all available means, blame for the bad is reassigned away from the capitalist economy, while the good springs directly from its loins.

Second, Inglehart's socialization hypothesis is incapable of explaining the mechanism through which values may quickly change in times of rapid transition, such as for the former-communist countries, because it assumes values to remain somewhat static after socialization is complete and provides no means for their later modification. In contrast, it is suggested in this dissertation that socialization is not the only mechanism of value change. The economic structure is also capable of modifying the values of individuals through their *reflective adaptation* to the environment which it creates.

Third, the scarcity hypothesis may not always be as important as it is suggested. To begin with, China, Russia, and Eastern Germany have had varying, even opposite, levels of economic prosperity during the transition but apparently remarkably similar shifts in social disorder and social values. The transformation to capitalism may have affected people's social values in post-communist societies in a roughly uniform way, regardless of economic success or failure.

Fourth, the Inglehart model proves unable to explain social disorder in post-communist countries, perhaps because it assumes value changes associated with economic development to be positive. In contrast, if one focuses on basic social values, there are indications that these are deteriorating. As will be explained later, this social devaluation may weaken mechanisms of social control that depend upon relationships to function, thus explaining rising deviance and other forms of social disorder.

As a final critique, the Inglehart paradigm appears to ignore some of the negative consequences of economic development that are apparent even in the World Values Survey data. Ghana, for instance, is materially quite poor but has nonetheless one of the highest mean ratings of life satisfaction in 2000 (2004). This suggests that Ghana's definitions and interpretations of life satisfaction have little to do with material well-being, but are rather determined by social (relational) well-being. Arguing in a similar manner, Ahuvia (2002)

argues that economic development leads to subjective well-being only by creating individualistic cultures where personal happiness is valued more than social obligations. These findings and explanations would be difficult for the Inglehart paradigm to follow, since it assumes material well-being and strong social values to be linked from the outset.

The Economic Conditions Fetish

Optimistic accounts of individualization, like Inglehart's, tend to explain the impact of the economy upon the individual through varying economic *conditions*. In other words, and as depicted in the 'family stress perspective,' the thesis is simply that economic stress is a precursor to family stress, while prosperity alleviates such stress. One relevant formulation of this idea may be found in a study on family stress during the post-communist Czech transformation (Pechacova et al. 2000). This study demonstrated how a family's perceived economic pressure caused increased marital instability. Families grew unstable as a direct reaction to economic crisis. On the other hand, *positive* economic conditions, such as success or wealth, are presumed to affect relationships in the opposite direction. In any case, local economic conditions are the most often-assumed cause of value change in post-communist countries. This concern with economic conditions, while containing elements of truth, is not the whole story, and it tends to eliminate an investigation into the economic culture. With sights on economic conditions, the economic system itself is invisible, and the only thing of concern is material poverty or wealth, since wealth is considered, within these paradigms, as the ultimate value. Moreso, the existence of 'wealth' provides a de facto legitimation for the capitalist system, since it, presumed as good, claims to provide an answer to its own effect, the spread of poverty. Therein, the answer to the problems of capitalism is simply more capitalism, as economic growth cures all.

An example of the economic conditions focus within literature on family and relationship change is Glen Elder's *Children of the Great Depression* (Elder 1974). A place where Elder excels, in contrast to other 'economic conditions' literature, is his focus on the *process* connecting economic change to social and psychological effects, an often neglected aspect (Elder 1974:8). Furthermore, Elder shows the "individuation" that arises – the non-historical differentiation of an individual from others through the development of a unique personality – due to economic deprivation (Elder 1974:120). His focus on intimate sociality is thereby also laudable. Yet Elder recognizes that "scarcity alone says far too little about the context in which it occurred" (Elder 1974:274). In other words, what are the historical circumstances, the political conditions, and the economic culture within

which scarcity is nested? These are equally important as the all too common focus on economic conditions alone. What is called for here is a focus, in lieu of conditions, on economic *structure*.

A „Post-Communist” Personality?

Even when excessive focus on economic conditions is overcome, structural accounts are often biased in favor of the dominant economic paradigm. Such a structural explanation for changing values is adopted by Xiaoying Wang (2002). She notes the rise of a dark "post-communist personality" within both Russia and China characterized by high levels of hedonism, egoism, and a lack of discipline. However, her analysis is led astray by a misinterpretation of Max Weber (2003), for she notes that the above personality is a far cry from the ascetic ideals which Weber links to the birth of capitalism. This is precisely the problem. The asceticism which spurred the early formation of capitalism in Europe was contextually and historically nested; there is no expectation that capitalist systems always need or require asceticism to grow or survive. Furthermore, even in Europe, capitalism was catalyzed, according to Weber, by religious asceticism *only* in its initial phases by a value affinity, and he suggests that this non-economic core was in danger from the hardening of the iron cage of rational calculative values. Furthermore, the contemporary essence of capitalism has mutated in ways no longer reminiscent of its Weberian moral roots. Weber's thesis did not foresee the importance of the consumer class within late capitalism; it is consumerism which drives modern profits, and the consumer personality is thus produced as a necessity of the modern capitalist system itself. Of course, discipline is still required for certain specialized tasks: investment, strategic planning, calculation of profit, and the creation of new markets, for example, yet these tasks are today fragmented and differentiated as 'work' across many different persons, from the level of management to that of the CEO. Thus, even the successful capitalist today must be only *partially* disciplined and ascetic within limited spheres at work; in other realms, he or she may, and perhaps should, revert to a consumer mentality. Therefore, a modern reading of Weber recognizes that capitalism involves at least dual stages of development and dual class mentalities (capitalist and consumer). Yet Wang notices only the mismatch of the "post-communist personality" with the original Weberian ideal, and as a result, she blames this personality not on the capitalist present, but rather on the communist past. Corruption and negative personality traits, she argues, arise from the *incomplete* development of capitalism, one that, in China, is tainted due to the mixture of communist politics and capitalist economics. Thus, Wang is insightful in looking beyond the typical 'economic

conditions' argumentation in relation to values, but her focus on economic structure places blame only on the communist past. In contrast, it is argued that her negative “post-communist” personality is largely a capitalist one; it *also* has roots within the capitalist economic culture itself.

Critical Individualization

The shortcomings of the utopian individualization approach reinforce the need to explore the possible negative consequences of shifting values. While optimistic strands of individualization tend to focus on tolerance, equality between relationship partners, and choice, the critical strands turn this argumentation on its head. Thereby, individualization is ambivalent and involves a paradox whereby individuals acquire their own space and freedom at the cost of greater feelings of abstraction and anonymity (van der Loo and van Reijen 1992:162). Therein, tolerance equates to indifference, equality within relations implies the diminishment of social obligation, and the expansion of choice yields excessive individualization, narcissism, hedonism, and the growing preponderance of weak ties. Excessive choice culminates in relationship instability.

Prime thinkers embodying a more somewhat more critical individualization approach are Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's (2002) ambivalent account overcomes the optimism of utopian individualization by highlighting the risks that individuals face in the world of choices, primarily alone. Nonetheless, they argue against a depiction of this condition as purely negative:

Any generalization that seeks to understand individualized society only in terms of one extreme or the other – autonomy or anomie – abbreviates and distorts the questions that confront us here (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002:7).

Yet the Becks (2002:7) make a crucial contribution in acknowledging, in rare form, the negative consequences of individualized society.

Because of its dominant focus on the more pessimistic implications of individualization, Bauman's (2001) account is valuable as a counterforce to opposing theorizing. Bauman highlights the modern individualized situation as a dilemma, symbolized by the Tantalus myth, whereby persons in the modern world vainly yearn for a community that is lost. Thus, for Bauman, individualization is a personal predicament in which individuals long for an intimacy their societies can no longer provide. The approach in this dissertation should be seen as closest to Bauman's because of his focus on the elusive longing for sociality of the individual, only here the sociality of interest is an intimate and close sociality, one centered on face-to-face interaction, as opposed to

Bauman's comparatively more distant, or abstract, community. Bauman's community is a conglomerate of persons de-centered from individual members; it refers to a more detached feeling than that of the face to face bond. Despite its affinity with the critical individualization approach of this dissertation, Bauman's work, like that of the other prime individualization theorists Giddens and Beck, suffers from a lack of empirical evidence, and the theorizing itself has been unfortunately murky enough to arouse only limited interest in this theme within sociology.

This research project picks up on this particular individualization strand and tests an aspect of it. Out of the possible critical foci of individualization, the one chosen here is the devaluation of intimate socialization, an historically enhanced self-centeredness corresponding to diminished communicability. This process could be better described as 'de-intimization,' for this would better emphasize the critical dimensions of the shift. Indeed, as will be described in the section on informal social control, this shift is not positive alone. De-intimization, the specific form of critical individualization pursued here, means that aspects of intimate sociality, as expressed at the face-to-face level, are devolving simultaneous to economic development.

Critical theory is described below as the normative underpinning of the empirical investigation into de-intimization described above. Thereafter examples of scholarly work falling within the critical individualization paradigm are described and critiqued. Thereafter the ground will have been laid for the subsequent introduction of the dissertation's theoretical core, the link between social control, social values, and economic structure.

Critical Theory

This dissertation contrasts the mostly tacit utopian ideological accounts of individualization with an ideological counterforce, a critique linked to Weber's rationalization hypothesis. Moreso, this critical counterthesis is tested with empirical data, allowing the reader to decide for him- or herself.

While ideological in the sense of purporting to negate another ideology, the 'critical' approach of this dissertation is not ideological in the positive sense. It resists modernization claims without claiming a unitary explanation itself. The mantra here is 'also capitalism,' not 'only capitalism,' in opposition to the utopian "never capitalism" on questions of placing blame for processes which may be perceived as negative, such as a rise in egoistic values.

Stemming from a flavorful mix of Freud, Nietzsche, Hegel, and Marx, the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory is known for its pessimistic account of capitalism and modernity. Within the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) suggest, in a Weberian (2003) manner, that rationality itself may be a root of domination and injustice, and the capitalist economic system uses this rationality in order to subvert everything according to its whims, using such mechanisms as the manipulations of the culture industry, which serves, in a gloomy turn from Marx, to limit the possibilities of the working classes from ever realizing their true position and interests. In terms of personality, the capitalist economic system is associated with authoritarianism and subservience: a herd-mentality. A hallmark of Horkheimer's approach is to criticize the status quo in ways that are fundamentally in opposition to the ideal strands of contemporary modernization theory. Where modernization sees progress, classical critical theory sees regress.

The value of the critical approach in this dissertation is its parallel attempt to argue in ways aligned in opposition to the utopian tendencies of modernization theory within the value change question. However, there are still differences from a 'classical' critical approach, if one may be construed. First, critical countertheses are put forward here as hypotheses to be tested; the reader will be provided with evidence to substantiate, and where appropriate, repudiate, truth claims. Second, unlike the Marxist roots of critical theory, and in line with Horkheimer and Adorno, a viable political or practical response to the outlined crisis will not be explicated. Connecting knowledge with action requires more space, and faith, than available here. Although of grave importance, this normative level requires another sort of thinking.

Examples of Critical Individualization Approaches

A focused literature has looked, to some degree, at the society-personality linkage addressed here. Melvin Kohn (Kohn et al. 2002), for example, looks at personality change during the very period in question, the post-socialist transformations. Apparently motivated by Durkheimian concerns, he wishes to determine whether or not personalities are *stable* during the transformation years. In other words, a Durkheimian approach may attempt to determine to which extent the change in social structure equates to instability in personality. Kohn's research, while intriguing, does not speak to the core of the problem because it mostly bypasses the question of the directionality of the personality change at hand. In other words, with capitalism and communism conceptualized as abstract and neutral systems in regard to sociality, whereas they are in fact economic cultures pulling

personalities in particular directions, a mere focus on stability of personality is not enough if we do not know the direction in which personalities are changing. Are they becoming more egocentric or altruistic? Are they becoming more materialistic or postmaterialistic? Kohn's work does not appear to yet answer these questions although it provides much insight into the overall stability of personality during economic change. In addition, it is an exceedingly rare example of concentrated comparative work on personality and the post-socialist transformation, a work apparently untainted by excessive optimism in relation to modernization. This dissertation attempts to fill the directionality gap displayed by Kohn's research. Where personalities become instable, what might be the direction of change?

Another relevant work, albeit a more classical one, concerned with the topic at hand is Norbert Elias' *The Civilizing Process* (Elias 1979 [1939]). Elias eloquently argues how, since the middle ages in Europe, there has been fostered a growing emphasis on internal emotional control that replaced more external constraints, exemplified through the state's seizure of the monopoly over physical force. Thus, the process amounts to a "civilizing" effect, in which an inborn barbarism is alleviated by a morality provided by development of the modern economic and state apparati. At first glance, Elias's findings might appear to challenge this study's hypotheses, since here modernization is equated with declining sociality, while Elias links the same with increasing internal control. However, there are several grounds on which to reject such an interpretation. First, as Elias notes, there are many civilizations, and each of them implies different types of restraints or shame, but these civilization-specific restraints vary as do fashions. In other words, they are largely arbitrary, and many are without moral content; as such, they say little about intimate sociality. On the other hand, there are some restraints which are not arbitrary, as they embody a communicative meaning, and in most of these cases, the communicative content of Elias' manners develops in a direction toward greater repression of communication and greater silence. For example, he documents increasing control over topics of conversation, gesticulations during conversation, proper modes of addressing persons of different class; each of these amounts to a restriction of communication. Even some of his, at first glance, 'neutral' manner developments, such as the transition from eating from communal dishes to that of each person eating from his/her own dish, must be seen as a an individualization of social relations.

Furthermore, it is hard to imagine that Elias' central thesis is valid, that shame and internal control are inventions of civilization. In order to back this claim, he forwards a

Hobbesian view of nature wherein the past was dominated by physical force alone. An obvious objection to this is that, within the historical record, the use of physical violent force has hardly decreased over time, and the rate of violent crimes committed by individual persons in 'civilized' societies has drastically increased over the past few centuries. This has led Bauman (1999:12-18, as cited by Outhwaite and Ray 2005:176) to name the 'civilizing process' a myth, as he argues that "violence, genocide, and the Holocaust were made possible by the formal bureaucratic procedures of modern societies." Such an argument is in line with a critical-theoretical standpoint as well, which shows civilization as a system of *increasing* external and internal totalitarian domination, stemming from rationality itself and its spawn within social structures (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Apart from this objection, however, one can also challenge the Elias thesis by continuing to trace the existence of informal controls indefinitely back in time. Elias shows us the development of manners surrounding the use of eating utensils, for example. Therein, when only knives and spoons were in use, he shows, it was considered 'barbaric' to put the knife in one's mouth. As forks were introduced, it became then improper to hold meat at all with the hand. The list goes on, but we can also imagine the existence of such informal controls as far into the past as we prefer. The following 'stone-age' habits may have also have, at one time or place, aroused shame: eating with a stick instead of with a spear, eating off the end of the spear instead of with the hand, placing one's meat on the dirt instead of on a rock, the inability to verbally articulate well, the telling of a boring story around the fire. Even chimpanzees have been shown to use 'utensils,' sticks, in order to scoop insects from hollowed trees; this and the recent discovery of other *cultural* distinctions between primate groups of the same species necessitate some form of internal regulation to maintain them. All of these, and infinite other potentialities, demonstrate that *all* groups develop cultural criteria for proper behavior, and more importantly, this culture is at least partially internally held and regulated by the individual through self-control. Elias' assumption of a Hobbesian state of nature would have us believe that, 10,000 years ago, there was no patterned behavior at all, except for the habitual use of, and threat of, force. This myth is easily displaced by referencing what we know of the complex cultural content of hunter-gatherer societies.

Therefore, we should interpret Elias' findings not in a way that equates civilization as a rise in informal control in general, but rather that this control is extended into new spheres as they are created by new technologies and formulated by new differentiations within social groups. This latter point alludes to the origin of these restraint fashions within

groups at the top of the social hierarchies, such as within the royal court, then within the new aristocracy, and then the bourgeoisie. Some of these are clearly arbitrary fashions functioning to differentiate insiders from outsiders, but others have implications for the functioning of the economic and other social systems. As the capitalist system grew in dominance, those restraint fashions which were useful to it would tend to be maintained, while others may be cast aside. For example, the development of shame and internal controls regarding such topics as stealing and the questioning of authority likely were bound together with the proper functioning of, and development of, capitalism, as has been argued regarding the nuclear family form. Along these lines, Elias demonstrates the importance of certain types of self-control among the bourgeoisie in sexual and marriage patterns, toward the better functioning of business (Elias 1979 [1939]:186). Is the growth of communicative restraints simultaneous to the facilitation of trade and business a coincidence?

The Elias contention that a formalized external control gave way to an informal and internal moral compass is highly contentious, especially when compared with literature concerned with social control theory. For example, the concomitant historical growth in *external* legal, bureaucratic, police, and media controls over individual behavior as economic development progresses suggests that Elias was, in his interpretation, flat-out wrong. The tension in his argument becomes clear when he attempts to 'explain away' the growing fashion of the bikini bathing suit during his day, which he describes as due to, not a weakening of modesty and the sexual revolution, but rather as made possible by the high level of mass restraints, which make the bikini non-threatening in the first place (Elias 1979 [1939]:187). His argumentation would have to bend in quite creative directions in order to explain the 'sexual revolution' in the 1960's and the arrival of the pornographic age today. Within a 1978 interview, he admits plainly that the "return to nudity" during that period "poses questions" that remain open (Fontaine 1978). In any case, a useful modification of the Elias argument is to demonstrate, not the rise of overall internal control simultaneous with empirical modernization, but rather that civilization implies the rise of internal control and restraint within certain spheres, among them economic life and communication.

Another well-known study often equated with the critical individualization genre is David Riesman's (Riesman, Glazer and Denney 2001) *The Lonely Crowd*. Therein, the authors described the historical shift in American society from the dominance of the traditional personality to the inner-directed, and eventually to the other-directed personality

in America. The key problem with the book lies in its conceptualization of three types. Essentially, it relies on an inner versus outer-directed dichotomy of personality types, with an archaic tradition-oriented type preceding it, but this "traditional" type presumably inherits its values and rules from thin air, as it is neither inner- nor other-directed. Subsequent thinking, for example regarding the individualist-collectivist dimension, rightfully identifies traditional societies as more other-directed, with persons in advanced societies being more self-directed. The proper distinction, in other words, is rather between *other and self* than between *outer and inner*. Riesman had confounded these concepts. The book's under-conceptualization of the traditional and of inner and other-directedness make its main claim, the decline of inner-direction and rise of other-direction, opaque. It lamented the decline of inner-directedness caused by the growth of mass culture and associated this with a decay in American society's individualism. In this light, the study should be contextualized within American history as a worry over the decline of the frontier type, the rugged yet moral individualist. Yet the main point, especially when applying the Riesman study elsewhere, is that this moral individualist is a facet of the American myth, one perpetuated as a celebration of the free market spirit. The pioneer spirit still lives today in the businessman, we are told. It is claimed as the mythical source of both profit and morality, but it rather functions according to the former, and the latter is designed to soothe allegations and worries of immorality produced by the capitalist culture. This tacit level of ethnocentrism spills over in the following passage:

*Inner-directed men were able, for a relatively brief historical period, to act as if the Chinese, Indians, Malaysians, Africans they encountered were radically different from themselves (and from each other); they could act this way because they were obviously so much superior in power and hence, in many encounters, **in poise as well**. If they were missionaries they might ask of the others, even in the heart of darkness, that they learn to act like white men; and - astonishingly, as it now seems to us - millions sought to do so and were converted, **impressed by the rectitude** as well as the power of their captors and models. It has now become difficult for **thoughtful Western men**, not encapsulated by prejudice and ignorance, to take their own cultures and practices as absolutes; they cannot, by merely willing it, take them with deadly seriousness - in fact, the current wave of talk about the American Way of Life is a propagandist's vain defensiveness against this very discovery (Riesman, Glazer and Denney 2001:xlix-l [emphasis added]).*

Stated differently, sensitivity about the historical domination of Western culture might, as a side effect, be derailing us from discussion of the "discovery" of the core - which he seems to claim to be actually superior to alternatives - of our Western culture. The "poise" and

"rectitude" of "thoughtful Western men" is bound inextricably to Riesman's idealized inner-directed frontier type. It is less an analytical category than an ideological one.

Not so surprisingly, Riesman's types become inverted when removed from the American bias of frontier morality in which they are found. Riesman's inner-directed type, characterized by moral direction and guilt, should be better labeled as other-centered, since he/she inherits those moral regulations from his/her intimate relationships. In contrast, Riesman's "other-directed" type, characterized as amoral, anxious, self-gratifying, and instrumental in relations, is actually the self-centered type more commonly referred to within individualist-collectivist literature and within this project. Most damning, however, is the Lonely Crowd's near complete inability to explain how these types emerged. The authors comment, for example, that "Historical and cross-cultural investigation would be necessary before one could better understand how inner-direction came about - and why it may now be disappearing" (Riesman, Glazer, and Denney 2001: xlviii). Precisely on this point is where this dissertation inserts itself: explaining how specific sociality orientations become distributed within particular populations during a social change.

Other scholars have produced intriguing critiques of the modern economy in relation to individualization. Richard Sennett's *Corrosion of Character* (1998), for example, links the modern American capitalist economy to forms of impersonality, heartlessness, and immorality because of the conflict between the conflicting demands between work and family. In a similar vein, Bellah's *Habits of the Heart* (Bellah et al. 1985) argues that American individualism has become excessive, resulting in moral decay and anomie.

Denial of Individualization: „Nothing has changed“

There are also those who contest individualization in society, despite which dimensions are highlighted, as empirically overrated. Graham Crow (2002:2-7), for example disagrees with the claim of declining solidarity in individualized society, noting, for example, that many versions of the "loss of community" perspective have rested on shaky ground, such as the "dubious" claim that the "historical record supports a pessimistic interpretation of social change in which social relations in the past are treated as having been somehow better than they are now." He thereby supports reviving the Durkheimian connection between individualization and solidarity in the form of organic solidarity, thereby critiquing "romanticized notions of informal relationships" (See also Frazer and Lacey 1993; Lee and Newby 1983; Crow and Allan 1994; as cited by Crow 2002). In a similar vein, within her informative review of sociological work on families and intimate relationships, Val Gillies (2003: 16) also criticizes this "breakdown" or "demoralization"

perspective, a criticism that she equally applies to the utopian hypotheses, arguing overall that "the concept of *social change* in personal relationships is profoundly overstated [emphasis added]." Her critique hinges on the "theoretically tinted lens" and "politically grounded versions of the truth" that inform each of these social change narratives. In contrast, she argues that "personal values and practices of trust and caring have remained *relatively stable over the years*, reflecting ingrained identities and power relationships" (Gillies 2003:16 [emphasis added]).

On the one hand, Crow and Gillies' objections are partially understandable, given that both utopian and apocalyptic discourses make steady use of individualization argumentation. Weymann describes key elements of the apocalyptic discourse:

*Environmental problems, raw material shortages, the poisoning of food, earth, water and air, unusual diseases and epidemics, economic decline, the aging and shrinking of the population, **decay of morality and values**, violence, psychopathy and **anomie** . . . (emphasis added, own translation, Weymann 2008, forthcoming: section 1.1)*

Therein, negative aspects of individualization are depicted as cornerstones of a "demographic apocalypse" whereby individuals take precedence over society, and children are an economic burden (Weymann 2008, forthcoming: section 1.4). On the surface, the 'conservative' undertones of such discourse may strike readers such as Gillies and Crow. On the other hand, while acknowledgement of the political content of these approaches may ring true, this does not negate the real material- and empirical content being addressed. Optimistic approaches forward a positive interpretation of the development of social relationships in support of a really existing modern economic and cultural system, while critical approaches cite viewpoints in opposition to this system. The fact that both of these discourses exist says nothing about the correlation of these data to a potentially perceivable reality. More fundamentally, Gillies' assertion about the stability of personal relationships "over the years" becomes more absurd as any sort of reasonable historical timeframe is inserted; at the extreme, to claim that ancient hunter-gatherer societies and our techno-urban virtual modernities espouse basically the same social relations demonstrates the lack of conceptual reach of this 'everything is the same' approach. Finally, a 'continuity' approach serves to only strengthen the status quo by failing to recognize either it or possible alternatives. Critique is thereby located superficially within the existing structure of society, thereby undermining attempts to reach beyond it. 'Nothing has changed' helps to ensure that 'nothing *will* change.'

DE-INTIMIZATION AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

As described above, the aforelaid dissertation investigates the field between the twin concepts of empirical modernization and individualization. The specific individualization of interest is a critical one, reacting against the optimistic strands of individualization thought. Now that this wider field has been described, the task is to focus upon the finite theoretical approach holding this work together. This framework explores a version of the critical de-intimization above in its relation to the capitalist economic culture, and the genesis of the idea to connect these two aspects within the post-communist world has arisen through social control theory.

As noted in the introduction to this work, there are widespread indications of skyrocketing crime rates within post-communist countries. Rooted in Durkheimian derivative theories, such as social control theory (Hirschi 2002), especially China-focused criminologists have tried to explain enhanced crime rates during the transition period through the decline in communal values (Liu and Messner 2001; Lu and Miethe 2001). Especially prevalent are rising rates of juvenile delinquency (Feng 2001; Grant 1989; Rojek 1989), which have been alternatively explained by rising materialist and individualist values, and the decay of the traditional sphere. Such research has spurred thinking within this project in similar directions, the essential argument being that the post-communist economic transformation may have precipitated the rise in individualist and egoistic values, thereby undermining the relational control that previously undercut deviance. Therefore, the notion of social control will first be presented, followed by the social values which such control requires to function effectively. Finally the role of the capitalist economic culture is presented as the feature that may have modified those values. Thereafter, the hypotheses of this research are laid out.

Social Control

The concept of social control, although rooted in Durkheimian social integration notions, was introduced within Travis Hirschi's (2002) central text, *The Causes of Delinquency*. The usefulness of the theory is in explaining deviant behavior, and it does so by formulating how social behavior is normally controlled by the society and its institutions. Hirschi breaks social control down into four forms: the direct, the indirect, the internal, and that of needs satisfaction. Needs satisfaction is not of relevance here, since it refers more to a motive for deviance than a mechanism through which deviance is regulated. Regarding regulation of deviance, which is Hirschi's principal contribution, it is

helpful to see that his direct control represents *formal* means of behavioral regulation, and his indirect and internal control represent the *informal* variety.

This differentiation of social control into the formal and the informal is of key importance. Formal social control is exacted through abstract and distant institutions, such as the police and the law. Its means of correcting for norm violations and influencing pro-normative behavior tends to be external, direct physical force. In contrast, informal social control is exacted through close and intimate institutions, such as family and friends, and critically, the source of its behavioral influence on the individual is internal, through an individual's very own emotions, feelings, and moral frameworks. These two forms of control are generally seen as in opposition, and it is widely accepted that informal social control is more effective in preventing deviant behavior. Informal social control works through intimate, face-to-face, connections with other human beings, through language, through eye contact, through visual cues, through our close and emotional bonds with the 'other.' Thus the concepts of intimacy and distance, even more so than 'informal' and 'formal,' display the essence of the foundation of moral order.

Leaving formal social control aside, and deepening the introduction into informal social control, it becomes clear that such intimate control is the foundation of moral social integration itself. When we socialize our children, it is our intimate connection to them, and their emotional bonds to us, which allows the facilitation of the normative structure at every turn. Our decisions to socialize our children would not be made if they had no value for us. Their decisions to listen to our messages would not be made if they did not value us. Even the automatic response of a baby to the mother's cues is actualized by the emotional bond. The older child's decision to actually follow a message received necessitates some sort of valuation of the message-provider. Importantly, the maintenance and punishment of violations of these norms also require intimate receptivity on the part of all parties. At every step, a high valuation of the process of intimate communication and the other is a prerequisite toward maintenance of moral order. This dissertation investigates whether the market economic structure may cause these valuations to break down.

Social control argumentation has, of course, a classical history. For instance, if capitalist economic development is indeed one part of a broader movement from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* (Tönnies 1988 [1887]) and one accepts the validity of this historical transformation in social structures, the question arises of the effects of this shift on social solidarity. Tönnies' analysis notes that different motives (albeit not necessarily

conscious) of action on the part of individuals inform these two phases. In *Gemeinschaft*, individuals are motivated by an essential will to contribute to society, while in *Gesellschaft*, they view society instrumentally, through an arbitrary will. Note the connection here between social order and individual orientations toward the society; this is precisely the starting point of the present dissertation. On this point, Durkheim's (1933) take is similar, as he notices the dissolution of a mechanical solidarity based on likeness, collective knowledge, functional simplicity, and the intimate interdependence within traditional social groups, such as the family. He predicts this solidarity's replacement by organic solidarity, one based on the division of labor, and ultimately, corporate social integration. However, if solidarity is defined, as done here, from a perspective that emphasizes normative control as linkages and interdependence between human beings at the face to face level, Durkheim's organic model, characterized by the division of labor and abstracted interdependence, has clearly failed to crystallize into real face-to-face solidarity, a point which Tönnies would likely agree. Tönnies' focus upon actors' orientations toward society allows for a more pessimistic outlook than Durkheim, since it is exactly those orientations which undergo transformation. Instead, Durkheim's focus is a functional one, on solidarity, and since a functional equivalent can always be imagined (in this case, organic solidarity), his prognosis is notably more optimistic. This dissertation situates itself more closely with Tönnies, both in its assignment of interpersonal motives as a fundamental feature of social organization, and in its darker prognosis when those motives and orientations sour.

The historical disappearance of Durkheim's classical mechanical solidarity, as one might predict, is linked to historical developments in social control. Industrialization-era social disruptions brought to light the inadequacy of traditional methods of maintaining order. The devaluation of social relationships as a result of urbanization, technology, capitalist development, and rationalization resulted in a high degree of normlessness and deviance. The deterioration of traditional family life and mechanical solidarity during these times undermined traditional informal control, resulted in social disorder, and were responded to by the state through the establishment of formalized control through police and laws. It is no coincidence that the first modern police forces were established by Britain in 1829 as its industrial revolution was entering full swing. The establishment of the police could be seen as a formal response to rising deviance as a result of deteriorating informal social structures. Thereby, social control theory explains the historical conjuncture between social disorder and the onset of economic change in the form of rapid

industrialization and economic development. It can also explain the social disorder found today in post-communist societies.

It is not suggested that social disorder, such as high crime rates, is caused only by capitalism. Rather, it is argued that capitalism may be one of many contributing macro-level modernization-related factors. Capitalism's contribution to normlessness occurs through the effects that it may exhibit at the individual level upon social values.

Values

Social disintegration may be actualized through the role of the advanced free-market economic structure, as a major ordering mechanism, in weakening social norms through transforming traditional social values, causing those values to increasingly reflect a market structure that is characterized by growing rationalization, individualization, and material aspirations. Value change is the major mediator between economic structural transformation and declining normative power over the individual. Particularly, intimate social values are the foundation of the informal social control presumably uprooted by capitalist economic culture. This section describes this key concept of values in depth.

What are the "values" referred to here? Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) provide a thorough and thoughtful literature review of the values concept and its potential for sociology. Within their article, they attempt to answer several important questions about values. Some of their questions will be repeated, albeit with slightly different answers.

What are values?

A value is a theoretical construct representing the cognitive structure which makes possible a particular set of behaviors. In other words, values are where behavior and cognition meet. Values are the mind's prioritization of particular behaviors at the moment before a decision is made based on that prioritization. Thus, values are a necessary concept in showing us the origin, within the mind, of behavior.

As a general definition of values, Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987:551), as cited by Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) is a useful one. They define values as "(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance." More simply stated, values should be seen as the individual's prioritized internalization of social norms used to guide his/her behavior. Within this definition, the ambivalence in points (b) and (d) should be noted, in that values can concern "behavior *or* events" (emphasis added) and they may guide "selection *or* evaluation of behavior *or* events"

(emphasis added). These ambiguities point to a critical point about values which again should be made explicit: they contain a cognitive *and* a behavioral dimension. They are neither merely cognitions (attitudes) nor mere behaviors. This dual application of the concept of values to both cognitive settings and their outcomes requires a conceptual differentiation. For this purpose, the concepts of activity and latency will be used to describe the extent to which values are expressed in behavioral outcomes. An active value is more often expressed, while a latent value still resides in the mind but is less often revealed in behavioral outcomes.

Values are nested within individuals and should be contrasted with norms, which are at the group-level (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:361). Values can be seen as internalized norms. Furthermore, values are different from attitudes, which are rather positive or negative evaluations of specific social objects (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:360-361). Values are both higher in priority and greater in abstraction than are specific attitudes or opinions (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:361).

This thesis focuses the values concept upon *social values*, which are those values that emphasize and prioritize social relationships and face to face communication between individuals. These values are called 'social' not in a generalized or normative sense, but rather because they emphasize the most fundamental mode of sociality, face-to-face interaction, because it is this mode that forms the core that underlies the informal social control described in the previous section. Thus, this social values construct relies on the primary relationship as its central component, one that Carol Gilligan has called the "concrete other" in contrast to the abstract other (Ingram and Simon-Ingram 1992:xxxviii). In contrast, *non-social values* prioritize the self, materialism, or other non-social spheres or activities.

Furthermore, there are different modes of valuation, which give values different means of coming into being. Corresponding to a rational-calculative mode of valuation, we have both instrumental values, focused on the means of attaining a particular end, and terminal values, which focus on the ends themselves (Rokeach 1973). Indeed many persons do not apply values according to this rational approach (Schwartz 1996, as per Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:365) and pragmatists tend also to reject this means-ends assertion as unrealistic (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:364). This problem can be overcome through an additional category of valuation. In other words, many values are held intrinsically or innately; they are unquestioned, uncalculated valuations of particular ways of living without a premeditated reason to existence. They are seen as intuitively valuable.

Where do values come from?

In their article, Hitlin and Piliavin (2004:368-378) provide many sources of values. They briefly mention the possibility that biology and evolution may program us with sets of inborn values. In addition, race and ethnicity may provide values, for example, through particular “symbolic identities” (Waters 1990, as per Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Gender differences in values have also been illuminated; for example, Beutel and Marini (1995) have demonstrated how men score as less compassionate and more materialistic than women. Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) also focus a variety of socio-cultural characteristics and how they, within the literature, have been shown to affect values. Social class, occupation, and education are included in this category, as well as family characteristics, such as inter- and intra-generational influences. Immigrant status, age cohort, and religion are also shown to be important source of values (Hitlin & Piliavin 2004:375). National and demographic roots of value change have been explored as well, and a variety of cross-national studies have been undertaken, but surprising is that, despite the variety of sources of values that has been cited, there is still a noticeable gap. Left out of values research is the effect that economic structures have in imprinting values. Certainly the economy itself, alongside its progeny, class and occupation, provides a certain pull in regard to the values found in its subjects. Inglehart (2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000) might be seen as approaching this problem through his embracing of the scarcity concept, yet as already noted, scarcity is less a question of economy itself than of economic conditions. In contrast, this work’s focus on capitalism as a cultural system investigates economic structure.

Finally, Hitlin and Piliavin mention another key source of values; that they may be supplied by political ideologies (Maio et al. 2003, as cited by Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Obvious applications of this notion for this dissertation are state and cultural supply of ideologies which emphasize or de-emphasize a particular “value identities” (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:382). A key issue for us here is the extent to which capitalism and communism have produced their own conflicting ‘value identities.’ This task will be tackled empirically and discussed in earnest within Chapter 10.

How do such ‘sources’ of values relay their ‘product’ to individuals? This question tends to be highly underdeveloped in the literature. All that Hitlin and Piliavin provide in terms of how values actually arise is the concept of adaptation to social and political circumstances (Schwartz and Bardi 1997, according to Hitlin & Piliavin 2004: 379). This adaptation concept, while critical for understanding value change, is nonetheless blurry and

insufficient. Adaptation must be better described and made more concrete. Additional mechanisms are needed which transfer values between the society and individual, with working components both at the macro- and cognitive levels. Such mechanisms will be elaborated upon within Chapter 10.

Shortcomings of Value Research

One of the major weaknesses of most value research is the lack of empirical attention afforded to the *process* of valuation (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). This dissertation attempts to shed some light on this issue, since its principal method of qualitative interviews offers clues as to how valuation occurs.

A further challenge of values research is that “values operate at the level of individuals, institutions and entire societies” at the same time (Hitlin and Piliavin 383). The approach of this dissertation begins at the individual level, looking primarily at values within their fundamental seats within individual minds. Later, the production of values at the cultural and social levels will be addressed in terms of how these are then transmitted back down to the individual.

Hitlin and Piliavin make (2004:384) four suggestions for future values research. First, it should link social structural variables and individual values. This dissertation does this by searching for possible links between capitalism and values. Second, the authors search for the mechanisms by which values are transmitted across generations, as well as how they remain stable. This dissertation engages in intergenerational study capable of exploring this question. Third a temporal dimension is needed; this project incorporates temporality through focusing on social change, with a distinct emphasis on long- and short-term workings of individualization. Fourth, the authors suggest a focus on value variations within social groups. This study does this through elucidating a set of mechanisms of value change. Thereby, individuals’ values differ according to their differentiated exposure to these various factors. While groups may tend to accumulate patterns of values according to their similar influence by the same factors, this does not prevent the emergence of heterogeneity. Nonetheless, while this project also has tools that enable it to perfectly well explain within-group heterogeneity, it is the surprising emergence of partial value homogeneities *across groups* that are in other ways so different – in line with the most-dissimilar case approach – which makes this study noteworthy.

“Social” Values

Although much work (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart 2000; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987) deals seriously with the research of *values*, a focus on the *de-intimization* of values has been rare. Inglehart’s interest in values has been primarily political, while Rokeach’s values tend to represent psychological ideals; both scholars’ research has limited application for questions of intimacy. In contrast, Schwartz’s notion of values includes more relevant dimensions. The Inglehart discourse, which is based on the World Values Survey data, outlines broad trends of value shifts resulting from economic modernization, such as individualization and the growth of secular-rationalism (Inglehart and Baker 2000). However, this value shift is described as a positive event and ignores the possibility of negative side-effects. This optimistic review of modernizing values is possible because the Inglehart paradigm is concerned only with the political dimension of value shifts, specifically the connection between economic development, post-materialistic values, and democracy. Inglehart sees “materialistic” values only as a gateway to the post-materialistic values that he views as critical for the development of democracy. In this approach, he does not engage in a full exploration of materialism and consumerism at the psychological level and the social consequences, such as normlessness, of shifting values. In contrast, Rokeach’s (1973) values represent psychological ideals, terminal values such as ‘a comfortable life,’ ‘wisdom,’ ‘courage,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘equality,’ and instrumental ones such as ‘broad-minded,’ ‘logical,’ and ‘intellectual’ (Rokeach 1973). Rokeach’s ideal psychological traits have little to do with the notions of sociality central to this dissertation. In contrast, Schwartz (1992; 1994; Schwartz and Bardi 1997; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987) deals with philosophical ideals such as egalitarianism and harmony, which are relevant to the sociality questions here. For example, he posits oppositions between self-oriented and other-oriented values. Unfortunately, Schwartz (1994) does not actually apply his powerful tools to the communist-capitalist sociality question, but rather opts for an investigation of the political value specificities in Eastern Europe during the early transformation years (Schwartz and Bardi 1997).

Economic Structure

Within this study, values function as the parallel, at the individual level, of economic structure. This section outlines the specific ways in which capitalist economic culture presumably impacts the sociality of values.

A common misperception arises from the terms capitalism and communism. Both call us to envision the political poles characterized by the cold war and the long political struggle preceding it. As a result, we find it difficult to differentiate the different components of each system, the political, the cultural, and the economic. Except where noted, the use here of these terms calls up their economic significance, also encapsulated by the concepts market economy or centrally planned economy. The argument here thus does not refer primarily to the political components that were historically associated with these terms, but rather has to do with the market and communist *economies* as opposing economic structures. Therein, this project looks at the effects of these economic systems upon their subjects, the consumers and workers who function within them. Thus, 'common-sense' distinctions are used which translate into real-life differences in the lives of millions of persons between the *before* and *after* of the market transformations. These definitions are that the market economy distributes its goods and assigns its prices freely according to market exchange principles, and thus through private property it favors and encourages profit maximization among individuals. In contrast, the centrally planned, or communist, economy distributes through centralized state control.

Historically, the freeing of prices, opening local currency to free exchange, and exposure of local businesses to international markets brought huge shifts in the lives of the persons being investigated. These changes, brought about by the transition from the planned to the market economy, meant transformations in two spheres: work and in goods. Work became less secure, with greater potential variety, a growth in service sector jobs, a greater income-gap within different jobs, and greater *potential* pay. In the meantime, goods arrived in much greater variety, in a greater price range as well; here the flood of the arrival of luxury goods is also important. A distinct, black and white, shift in the real lives of millions upon millions of persons occurred as a result of the transformations to the market economic system. These changes, especially in goods and work, were *real* and necessitated reactions from those subjected to them. This fact both justifies the dichotomous distinction between the two economic systems – surprisingly doubted more often than it should be – and the goal to determine the effect that the said transformations had upon the values of their subjects. Interestingly, while this dichotomy between economic systems is often attacked where it appears within critiques of capitalism, it is rarely doubted in literature touting capitalism's benefits.

The two points just made in regard to capitalism, that the main interest here is its economic components and that the transition toward it has real effects on persons, also

clarify the inclusion of China as a capitalist case. Although it has a totalitarian government which still calls itself communist, any visitor to China will remark that its consumer sector is even more capitalist than that of Germany, whose domestic economy is heavily taxed and regulated according to 'pro-family' principles. Although its banking and construction sectors are still heavily state-influenced, the everyday urban Chinese citizen works, shops, and lives in a world driven by market principles. Doubters are encouraged to take a trip to Nanjing Street in Shanghai or to Wangfujing in Beijing, where, if the hyper bustle of economic life fails to convince them otherwise, efforts on paper would certainly fail as well.

Furthermore, the concepts used here, such as capitalist- and communist economic culture, should be seen as ideal types against which reality is being compared. They are conceptual steering mechanisms that, of course, do not perfectly fit a blurry world. The success of the analysis will demonstrate to which extent these ideal types were apt within this particular context of research.

Capitalism and Sociality

The transformation to a market capitalist economy entails shifting value systems that cause social relationships to change. Yet capitalism has long been a suspected culprit behind the deterioration of human social life.

Marx, for example, argued that through commodification, social relations are reduced to exchange relations (Marx 1978), implying that social values may be weakened or destroyed when relationships and individuals imply quantifiable economic costs and worth. Therefore, from Marxism, we can take, first of all, a hypothesis placing the economy and human sociality at odds with one another. Of course, this is not unique to Marx, and can be found in Durkheim's early distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity, within Tönnies' 'arbitrary will' underlying *Gesellschaft*, in Simmel's (1995) pondering on the leveling effects of money, and within a host of Marx-influenced thinkers, such as Polanyi and members of the Frankfurt School of sociology. The core idea here is that human sociality, within the advanced capitalist economy, becomes commodified and subservient to economic exchange (Marx and Engels 1978). Marxism also paints for us a *character* for capitalism. Whether or not it was true or false, this is the same symbolic language that was possessed by post-communist citizens during the transformations. The communist system handed these symbols to its citizens, they were digested, rejected, and interpreted in various ways, and it is worthwhile to see how people adapted to the capitalism for which they had already constructed a symbolic meaning. Of course, this is

not to say that capitalism has no objective content. As described above, it implies a mode of economic exchange that is worlds apart from the centrally-planned economies it superseded.

Karl Polanyi, in his book *The Great Transformation*, has covered the relationship between capitalism and human sociality extensively. To Polanyi (2001 [1944]), gain and profit are alien and unnatural to human relations and played no part in governing markets before the 19th century. Polanyi describes the land-enclosure process within English history as an example of the forceful uprooting of the peasantry as part of the development of capitalism. In this way, human beings are converted into a 'fictitious commodity,' labor, only through stripping them of their previously existing social relationships. Thereby, social relations become 'embedded' within the economy. In contrast, market exchange in early societies was governed by social relations, rather than by profit (Sahlins 1971). A few economists support Polanyi's doubts about the sanctity of profit motives in ancient market economies. For example, the economic historian Moses Finley (1973) demonstrates how many of the modern principles of "economy," such as labor, production, capital, investment, income, circulation, demand, the entrepreneur, and utility, were totally non-existent in ancient times, even within ancient Greece and Rome, and such concepts were actually untranslatable from English into Greek and Latin as late as 1890. He asserts that there were no "enormous conglomeration of interdependent markets," "extreme division of labour," nor "absence of household self-sufficiency" in ancient times; in contrast, ancient markets were characterized only by a "few isolated patterns" (Finley 1973:34). Some scholars, such as R. Firth or Smelser, reject Polanyi and Finley's assumptions as historically inaccurate (Humphreys 1969). Despite the debate, there is an important contribution within Polanyi's ideas. Even if there was no 'pure' social economy prior to industrialization compared with the modern-day 'pure' market economy, there is certainly a spectrum that human economic systems can be located on, and as time has passed they have become more and more profit-based and less social. Polanyi shows us the historical direction in which our economic systems have moved along this spectrum. Within this model, capitalism, in its shift away from socially-based toward profit-based economic structures, represents the epitome of de-intimization. This point is similar to making a Braudelian (1977) distinction between capitalism and a market economy. Braudel shows that market exchanges have always existed, but capitalism as the epitome of market exploitation arrived only later in history, and its initial growth was gradual.

Max Weber, of course, is also a prime figure in relation to the question of affinities between economic and non-economic values. Misunderstandings of Weber's *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PE)* (Weber 2003) twist him into being an apologist for the 'humanity' of capitalism, despite his sober and infamous prophesy of the iron cage of rationalization. The iron cage prophesy should *not* be viewed as an odd moment of misgivings at the climax of a piece dedicated to demonstrating the religious roots of the values underlying economic power. Rather, it should be seen as the dialectical result of the said analysis: if modern capitalist values were solidified partially through religious beliefs, how is it that they have come to entrench themselves secularly within such a short period so that they begin to function as a cage? In other words, Weber is providing us with an interpretation of one aspect of the birth of capitalist values, the fact that they were originally intertwined with religiosity, *in order to* ask us a serious follow-up question: why have these values become so inhuman despite these roots? He then recommends a follow-up study, in which capitalism itself is seen as an independent variable, in order to examine its effects on spiritual and human values. This study pursues a similar aim by investigating whether capitalism and the calculative rationality it entails – now liberated from its non-economic roots – do harm to the non-economic and intimate social values that, although they may have catalyzed its growth, now become its objects of manipulation. Of course, the topic of interest here is not religiosity proper, the values with the original Weberian affinity with capitalism, but is rather the intimate social values that – together with religiosity – form an ideal-typical non-economic sphere so often theorized to be under threat from the modern economy.

Hypothesizing the Capitalist Effect

As discussed above, under review is the value transformation that emerges as a result of the shifting economic structure and culture. It is proposed that market economy development may lead to value shifts through a variety of mechanisms actualized primarily through the individual's reflective adaptation to the economic environment. 'Structural economic transformation' refers to the effects of shifting from a planned to a market economy on the *consumer/citizen* who is aware of the structure of that economy. This shift implies a stronger connection between supply and demand, freer (although not lower) prices and availability of goods, and more freedom of economic activity than within the previous planned system. As supported above, this structural shift may have several effects upon individuals' social values. How may the new capitalist economic structure have impact individuals' values?

Heightened Material Aspirations

First, (H1) increased economic competition in an environment of greater potential economic gains leads to *heightened material aspirations*, and such aspirations may lead to a higher valuation of work (although not of the laborer him/herself) and a corresponding devaluation of non-work activities, such as socialization within the family. Also, these aspirations would increase the value of entrepreneurialism, materialism, and competitive consumerism at the expense of less-materialistic and more cooperative modes of living. Psychologists have correlated the role of such "materialist value orientations" with poor relationship quality, such as through relatively shorter and more conflicted friendships and love relationships (Kasser, Ryan, Couchman, & Sheldon 2003:19). Other researchers, based on the research of Shalom Schwartz, have noted the tendency of conflict between material and collectivist values (Burroughs and Rindfleisch 2002). In addition, there is the Durkheimian danger of anomie resulting from hedonism and aspirations that may spin out of control (Kupferberg 1999:179).

Colonization of Everyday Life by Rational Calculation

Second, as detailed earlier, (H2) the economic environment *increases the frequency of rationalized cost-benefit analyses within the life world*, therefore promoting rationality over more social and intuitive forms of decision-making, especially in the realms of child-bearing and marriage choices, as evident in plummeting birth and marriage rates in new free-market societies. Similar rationalization argumentation may be inferred from Simmel's (1995) *Philosophy of Money*. Simmel elaborates on how money impersonalizes relationships and inserts rational exchange values and profit-calculation into the social sphere. According to Simmel:

this fear of contact seems to me to stem largely from the steadily deeper penetration of a money economy, which more and more destroys the natural economic relationships of earlier times (though this work of destruction has not been fully completed). Money is placed between man and man, between man and product, as a mediator, as a general denominator into which every other value must be translated, so that it can be further translated into other values (Simmel 1968 [1896]:79).

In fairness, Simmel's account of the effects of money is not merely negative, as it assigns to it enormous potential of liberation as well. Yet this freedom comes at a price:

One can thus explain why our own time - which on the whole, in spite of all that still remains to be realized, possesses more freedom than any other before - seems to find such little joy in that freedom (Simmel 1993:68)

Yet Weber (1984) has also demonstrated this rationalization trend in his analysis of peasants in East Elbian Germany during the early industrial revolution. He indicates that the act of profit calculation was slow to dominate the peasants' thinking, thereby illustrating a differentiation between pre-industrial and industrial rationalities. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the rationalization theme also appears prominently at the end of the *Protestant Ethic*, whereby the rational-calculative core of capitalism comes to be a form of domination, one that forms a dominant process driving history toward a particular end (Weber 2003). With this in mind, the power of rationalization to infiltrate into other spheres of life and dominate them is also a central theme within the Frankfurt School, especially within the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). This rationalization focus, of course, parallels other arguments, such as Habermas' (1989) "colonization of the lifeworld," Marx's (1978) "commodification of workers," or the related "commodification of relationships" (Gold 1985). Psychologists have also identified this effect, one that they label as the "bleed over" of materialist values into interpersonal relationships (Kasser et al. 2003:20). Specifically, persons with "materialistic value orientations" are more likely to use their friends, to possess Machiavellian personality traits, and be more likely to complete (Kasser et al. 2003:20-21). In other words, materialistic values are not conducive to warm relationships. The common theme is that the insertion of rational calculation within the new economic environment reversed prior emphases on social bonds. Yet there is disagreement about the long-term endurance of this rationality-sociality opposition. While for Marx, it may be overcome through the abolition of the exploitative economic structure by an energized proletariat, Weber, Horkheimer, and Adorno suggest something more sinister, that rationality itself is dominating by nature, and as a result, capitalism is more likely to become more entrenched than collapse due to its internal contradictions. It is a system of domination, and while it certainly causes forms of resistance, it also has means of co-opting its subjects, veiling its intents, and 'digging in.' Rather than Marx's historical materialism, which drives toward the end of a dialectical resolution of class-conflict, for critical theory there is a conspiracy of rationalization and other forces of modernization which coalesce into the results of continuing domination. While this dissertation sides with the critical view of rationalization in line with the *Protestant Ethic* and the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, it focuses on the primary problem as one not of domination but rather one of de-intimization away from a core sociality.

Habermas (1989a) provides us with the language used here, wherein rationalization and bureaucratization affect social relations by “colonizing” them with alien forms of logic. Abstract and legalistic bureaucratic frameworks can negatively affect social life through replacing the logic of the lifeworld with their own (Habermas 1989a). An example of this from Hareven (1990:240) is that, in America since the 1920’s, institutional and legislative changes have contributed to the fragmentation of the family’s functioning as a collective work unit through the implementation of anti-child labor and mandatory school attendance laws. The result of this is that family functions were passed on to other institutions. This loss of the family’s collective control over its members’ work implies colonial replacement by bureaucracy of the family’s social influence over its members. Habermas’ lifeworld concept is a valuable one in that it establishes a sphere of action that is governed by intimate sociality and communication alone, one that can be damaged by outside “colonial” influences. The relevant logical extension of the Habermas argument regarding the colonization of the lifeworld is that social relationships are also colonized by capitalism through the insertion of profit motives and cost-benefit analyses where there were previously none, a process he calls “monetization” (Habermas 1989a:356-373).

Exploitation

Third, as a visible representation of the valuation of economic capital over social relationships, (H3) *individuals may have great incentives to exploit these relationships for the sake of economic gain* (e.g. Repetti 2002). The parallels of this hypothesis with Marx are straightforward, in that the existence of private property allows a struggle over the means of production and accumulation of wealth, allowing a ruling class to exploit the others for gain. The possible extent of this exploitation would have been less in previous times because of lesser potential rewards (because of the limited accumulation potentials of individuals within socialist economies) and aspirations. As a result, because of these limited incentives and rewards, social relationships during the communist era could not have been purely instrumental or exploitative, despite their usefulness in accumulating scarce goods.

Media and Cultural Production

Fourth, (H4) *advertising and other cultural messages conspicuously try to influence people to adopt more materialistic lifestyles* (Kasser and Kanner 2003:3), which leads to a neglect of competing social spheres, such as family and communication. This process leads to an “internalization” of culture from media and advertising (Kasser et al. 2003:16) and bears relevance to Horkheimer and Adorno’s discussion of the “culture industry”

within *the Dialectic of Enlightenment*, wherein culture reinforces individuals' objectified locations within the economic system and removes any hope of their revolt against the system (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The apparent anti-social and materialistic nature of capitalism is plain knowledge for much classical sociological theory, such as Marxian, Polanyian, and Simmelian strands, yet contemporary sociology, especially the idealistic corners of the modernization and individualization fields, rejects or ignores this hypothesis. Therefore, contemporary studies have not conducted an adequate investigation into social value change as a mediator between free-market transition and deteriorating normative power over the individual. The links between economic change, value change, and a decline of social values are due to be investigated through contemporary comparative studies. Post-communist countries are the ideal places in which to engage in such research because the reintroduction of the free-market offers a unique opportunity to observe the effects of capitalist development upon individuals' social values.

It is not suggested that social values have deteriorated across post-communist societies in a perfectly identical manner because of structural economic change. Of course, specific national and local value shifts have been affected by forms of ideology and culture, whether through open government action, such as China's advocacy of materialism among its subjects ('get rich first!'); through the ideology of government regimes, such as the welfare state in Eastern Germany; or through cultural ideologies such as Confucianism or variants of Christianity. These political and cultural influences are expected to mitigate or enhance shifts away from social values.

CHAPTER 3. BETWEEN THEN AND NOW: BACKGROUND

Assuming that readers do not intimately know the recent histories of China, Russia, and Eastern Germany, especially regarding their transformations from socialism to capitalism, these will now be briefly summarized on several accounts critical to the thesis here. This information will be delivered first for China, followed by Russia and Eastern Germany. A history of family and intimate relations prior to and during socialism will be summarized for each country, followed by a short economic history of the transition period.⁴ Thereafter, a collection of findings on intimate relations during the transformation period is provided.

CHINA

Family and Intimate Relations in ‘Planned-Economic’ China

Communist rule failed in its initial stages, as a transformation, to completely dislodge the core of traditional Chinese values. One ethnographer notes, based on his 1986-87 fieldwork in a northern Chinese village in Hebei province, that, "it soon became clear to me that under Communist rule family life had hardly undergone total transformation" from traditional structures based on late imperial family organization (Cohen 2005:77,79). Of course, impacts on family organization could still be seen alongside these continuities, such as through major restrictions on family size (Cohen 2005:80) as a result of the one-child policy. This unique aspect of Chinese families should be highlighted, as the one-child policy means that each Chinese child receives the undivided attention of two parents and four grandparents; as a result, Chinese speak of growing egoism among the youth, as they develop into "little emperors."

Furthermore, while by 1986-87, property relations within families had maintained much of their traditional flavor (Cohen 2005:81-84), marriage customs had changed, such as through the growing frequency of "love" marriages as opposed to arranged marriages (Cohen 2005:86-87). Customs in family living arrangements had also changed, with brothers increasingly opting for obtaining their own homes rather than living together, and household sizes tending toward simplification and conjugalism, coupled with weakening inter-familial solidarity, parental authority, and de-hierarchization of the wife and mother-

⁴ The economic transformation periods of the three countries vary somewhat due to historical reasons. China began its economic reforms shortly after Deng Xiaopeng's assumption of power in 1978, although the most important economic developments only occurred in the early 1990's, roughly parallel to the East German and Russian transformations.

in-law relationship (Cohen 2005:118, 145, 148-149). Interesting, Cohen (2005:148) also reports how this breakdown of traditional familial ties is exacerbated by "growing consumption-oriented individualism and the popular culture nourishing it." This later observation hints that the driving force behind these developments is not so much communist political rule as it is the rapid pro-capitalist changes that have come to light as a result of the open-door policy since 1978.

The Post-1978 Economic Transformation of China

Following the passing the Mao era, Deng Xiaopeng is credited with the major economic reforms that have taken place in China since 1978. Especially over the past 20 years, the scope of Chinese economic development has lifted hundreds of millions of persons out of poverty, and thus, the Chinese economic 'success' contrasts sharply with Russia's collapse and Eastern Germany's stagnation during their transformations.

Deng Xiaopeng and his supporters intended to utilize the economic powers of the market to further the material foundations for further socialist ends (Meisner 1999: 452). As a result of Deng's "open door" policies, China's foreign trade nearly doubled between 1978 and 1988, and it quadrupled again over the following six years (Meisner 1999: 457). Importantly, the transformation was instituted by Deng at the level of the individual through slogans such as "getting rich is glorious," which were intended to blatantly twist socialist values in a new direction (Suliman 1998a:xv). All in all, China's economic transition is set apart from others by its caution and gradualism, symbolized by Deng Xiaopeng's notion of 'crossing the river by feeling for stones' (Suliman 1998b:24).

During the first economic transition phase, involving the de-collectivization of agriculture from 1979 to 1984, China decided to begin linking farmers' payments to their output, thereby canceling the system of the "people's commune." In addition, large amounts of grain were imported in order to lift the burden on farmers in regions with poor agricultural output. At the same time, however, the prices of agricultural products were increased in order to raise individual motivations to produce more. The maximum allowed size of private plots was also increased in order to spur private farming (Meisner 1999: 454). As a result, agricultural output increased enough to nearly satisfy the domestic demand for food and clothing, while also spurring rural incomes and consumption (Meisner 1999: 454; Shi 1998: 4).

The second stage of China's economic reforms, lasting from 1984 to 1992, involved a new focus on urban areas. The government aimed to reinvigorate medium and large-sized state-owned enterprises, both through increasing managerial responsibility over enterprise

output and limiting direct government intervention, and later by the introduction of competition mechanisms between enterprises (Shi 1998: 6-7). Key to success was the promotion of the notion of enterprise profitability and the state's attempt to "smash the iron rice bowl," which promised lifetime job security, and establish a flexible capitalist labor market through expanding contractual labor (Meisner 1999: 472; Werz 2007). An improvement of the market system was also implemented, with a partial reduction of the planning and pricing of goods and services. In addition, this second stage of reforms also included a reduction of state monopolies for purchasing commodities, the reform of tax systems so that state-owned enterprises paid taxes rather than delivering all their profits to their government, and a reform of the banking system (Shi 1998: 6-7). The urban reform program and the rural marketization reforms together brought in "spectacular industrial growth and intense social disruption" (Meisner 1999:473).

The third and final stage of Chinese economic market reforms was initiated in 1992, as Chinese authorities embarked on accelerating the growth of their contradictory "socialist market economic system," embodied by Deng's famous remark, "It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice." From this point on, the intent was to make the market economy within China the fundamental means of distributing resources. By 1994, market-determined pricing systems had been established, and commodity markets, financial markets, labor markets, real-estate markets, and technology and information markets had been developed (Shi 1998: 6-8; Werz 2007). In 1998, China continued with its long economic reforms by deepening its privatization efforts (Werz 2007).

Post-Transformation Social Values in China

Recent studies have found that family values are under stress in modern China. Chu and Ju (1993a) found that by the early nineties, Chinese parents had become less authoritarian in their child-rearing practices and less controlling over negative behaviors, such as drinking and smoking. These authors also found indications of the fading of the traditional Chinese value of filial piety, especially among young parents. Another more recent study has also indicated a decline in filial piety in China (see Yan 2003). More broadly, a recent ethnographic study has found the disappearance of traditional dinner table customs, which have previously functioned according to filial piety and hierarchical principles, among young persons in Beijing (Jura 2004). However, in an opposing view, research in 1997 suggested that, at least at that time in Baoding, a mid-sized city near Beijing, such a finding on the decay of family obligations was premature (Whyte 1997).

There is a finding of enhanced work values in modern China. Froese (2007), for example, in a comparative survey of elite university students in Shanghai, Tokyo, and Seoul, found that the Shanghai students were even more career and occupation oriented than their peers in Japan and South Korea. Citing Egri and Ralston (2004), Froese also notes that an overall rise in work values has been observed over time in China.

In addition to a rise in the value of work, other scholars (Chu and Ju 1993b) report the expansion of material aspirations, even in the early years of the transition, and they point out the link between these untenable aspirations and the rising level of family disputes about money. These scholars allege that money plays a greater role in undermining social relationships which used to be based on shared traditional values and are now governed increasingly by instrumental concerns. Other scholars confirm the alleged shifts toward both individualistic and materialist values today in China (Lu and Miethe 2001:109; Rojek 2001) as a result of the recent market transitions.

Related to the growing material aspirations, Smith (1991:47) has also found that "the instrumentality of the *guanxi*⁵ system" has become more important than ever in the time of the post-Mao reforms. Perhaps this finding of heightened instrumentalization is also linked to other research citing the rising importance of friendship. For example, Chu and Ju (1993a:102) find that urbanites in the early transition period in China were already developing more relations outside of the kinship structure. They state that this growth of social networks outside of traditional kinship has led to the erosion of the quality of social relations, putting these in "a state of ambiguity" (Chu and Ju 1993b). Indeed the decay of traditional authority and growth of friendship networks appear to be linked:

Those heavily exposed to Western cultural influence not only tend to rely on friends rather than relatives for financial help, they are more inclined to argue with elders when they disagree. This behavioral pattern would not be tolerated under the kinship system. Interestingly, those individuals are far more likely to be consulted by others in the role as "opinion leaders," as if what they have learned from Western cultural programs in the mass media has some instrumental value in the new changing social and economic environment (Chu and Ju 1993a:102).

Each of these changes outlined above is in line with Xiaoying Wang's (2002) "post-communist personality," characterized by a lack of discipline, nihilism, expanded hedonism, and materialism among China's younger generations (See also Ci 1994, as cited by Wang). However, other scholars doubt these findings, noting there was already evidence of many of these personality traits on the rise before the recent transformation,

⁵ *Guanxi* means informal ties, weak ties, or literally, "connecting ties."

even since 1949, including declining dependency, conformity, modesty, self-suppression, parental centeredness, and self constraint, together with rising values of autonomy, individual achievement, and hedonism (Smith 1991:41). Furthermore, Tsai has pointed out that, despite their high degree of political connectedness, media consumption, and economic involvement, China's entrepreneurs still trust their families and friends most (Tsai 2002:89).

RUSSIA

Family and Intimate Relations in Soviet Russia⁶

In order to frame this analysis, it is necessary to first briefly introduce the historical context of the Soviet family before seeing how it may have changed after the fall of the U.S.S.R. On the one hand, the Soviet state was highly anti-social and espoused policies that were destructive for families. Shlapentokh (1991) describes how the Russian family in Stalinist times lived under three immense pressures. First, state ideology, not the family, was the chief determinant of social values, and these values both emphasized public life over private life and work over family. Second, the Soviet state before and through Stalin's reign existed in conditions of stark material poverty. According to Shlapentokh (1991), this poverty exacerbated the low-priority of family life because the poor living conditions within Soviet homes and communal apartments of that era provided little incentive to spend time with the family within them. The third and most direct pressure exacted by the Soviet state against the stability of families was that it pitted family members against one another in its mechanisms of repression. Stalinist intelligence services set children against parents, wives against husbands, and neighbors against each other by encouraging them to spy on one another. This sort of treachery, woven into every-day life by the state made family life tense (Shlapentokh 1991). These pressures on the family were apparently great because people reportedly "devoted little time and energy to their families" (Shlapentokh 1991:267). Another researcher, Malysheva (1992), has dubbed the Soviet person of this era "Homo Sovieticus," a human being "completely deprived of its social roots."

On the other hand, the Soviet family became a sanctuary from the state, a place where state ideology could not intrude. Under the strain of the above pressures, family members relied more upon one another. As Shlapentokh (1991:267) puts it, "when faced with the

⁶ Much of this and the following section on Russian families are adapted from an article "The Lost Years: Assessing Family Change in St. Petersburg, Russia, between 1983 and 2003," which was published in the *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, Spring 2007.

Stalinist leviathan, the Soviet people turned to their families for protection against the horrors of everyday life.” Similarly, Malysheva (1992) called family “the only place of expression and resistance in a spiritual vacuum.” Furthermore, the pressures that affected Russian families especially in Stalin’s time weakened considerably at the latter end of Soviet rule, to the benefit of the family. The ideological collapse entailing the failure of communist ideals and the declining authority of the state, the improvement in living conditions, and the decline of repression allowed family life to “re-emerge” (Shlapentokh 1991:269). Kupferberg (1999:22-23), in speaking of this "overdeveloped private sphere" across the socialist world remarks that:

People stuck together, they helped each other. They had to, there was no one else to lean on. Not only for purely materialistic reasons, I believe, although this of course also played some role, but for emotional reasons as well (in real life these two motives were hopelessly intertwined). Psychologically it is impossible to live in a society where no one trusts anybody.

This strengthened private sphere is typically seen as a direct response to a lack of trust between public institutions and their citizens. Typical of a Western bias - stemming from individualized culture - against intimate relations, yet also revealing something of the lost private sphere of Soviet times, is Kupferberg's (1999:23) warning:

*Now such clinging to personal relations should not be romanticized. The need for human warmth and mutual trust was real enough, but the overdevelopment of the private sphere as the haven of this feeling was an **abnormal** phenomenon. We know of similar tendencies in the Southern part of Europe which are more 'familistic' in their institutionalized value structure than further north, but the overdevelopment of the private sphere in the communist countries was something unique, something **unheard of** [emphasis added].*

The private sphere, according to the above scholar (Kupferberg 1999:23), who spent time in the Soviet Union starting in 1978, "meant much more for the Eastern Europeans than for any Western European nation, including the Italians." Kupferberg's disparaging tone nonetheless continues to reveal much about the private sphere in the Soviet Union, where primary relations "became a value in themselves, the highest value. The tendency was to make a cult of the private sphere, to live for it and in it and forget about the rest" (Kupferberg 1999:23-24).

This post-Stalin re-emergence of the importance of Soviet family life was apparently short-lived, for signs of family decay and of a greater Russian social deterioration were obvious by the late 1980's. Descriptions of Russian families in the eighties and in the years afterwards often use the mantra of “demoralization” (Malysheva 1992; Shlapentokh

1991). This demoralization did not reach a critical mass until it was catalyzed by the total loss of popular trust in socialist reality and ideology with glasnost and perestroika in the 1980's. By the moment of the collapse of the U.S.S.R., the decline of the family was fully visible. For example, in 1991, Shlapentokh (1991) called the demoralization of Soviet society and the erosion of social bonds the main threat to the Russian family. He notes that many Soviet writers of this period decried the "loss of prestige of family in society," "the devaluation of the family," and "the collapse of the family" (Shlapentokh 1991:272). Malysheva (1992) was no exception and argued during this period that the demoralization of society was causing the demoralization of the family and would lead to a subsequent rise in crime, alcohol consumption, drug use, prostitution, runaways, and divorce rates.

The Post-1990 Economic Transformation of Russia

The economic crises of the 1990's provide the context within which the family change of this period should be viewed. Russia's initial transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy entailed at least five significant aspects. The architects of this transformation called it 'shock therapy,' and while it certainly caused a shock for the population, whether or not the economic changes were 'therapeutic' lies in the eye of the beholder. These reforms initially caused a fall in living standards of nearly all parts of the population (Komozin 1993).

First, in January 1992, prices were freed from their artificial fixed levels, causing massive inflation. Second, the government had to balance its budget. It instituted an austerity plan which made large cuts to almost all public welfare programs, such as health, education, pensions, and social services (Malysheva 1992). Third, the Ruble was opened up to international trade, and its drop in value made it even harder for Russians to deal with inflation. Fourth, privatization was implemented. What was supposed to be a transfer of property to workers and managers instead became a sale of state property to government cronies at well-below market prices (Koliandre 2001). This "sale of the century" (Freeland 2000) created a new class of Russian oligarchs who became rich by stripping state enterprises of their assets, resulting in a loss of enterprise efficiency (Stiglitz 2002:144). Fifth, the inefficient Soviet industrial economy was subjected to market forces with paralyzing consequences. 80 percent of the Soviet economy fell somewhere within the military industrial complex. The subjection of these industries to market pressures caused a partial industrial collapse. In 1992, the country's GDP decreased by 14.5 percent from the previous year. In 1993, the decrease was 8.7 percent, and in 1994, 12.7 percent. The decline of the rate of industrial production was even greater: 18 percent in 1992, 14 percent

in 1993, and 21 percent in 1994 (Polozhevets 2001). The human result of these GDP downturns was, of course, unemployment.

To make matters worse, in addition to the shock therapy characterizing Russia's initial market transformation, more economic trouble occurred in 1998. Partially because of the Asian crisis of 1997, international speculation, and falling oil prices, Russia's currency collapsed in August of 1998. The ruble lost 75 percent of its value almost instantly, and as a result, the government defaulted on its foreign debt. In addition, people's purchasing power evaporated, wiping out the emerging Russian middle class, and this problem was compounded by the collapse of businesses and high unemployment. Banks also failed during this time, as the Russian stock market, where the main index had grown five times larger between 1995 and 1997, lost 93 percent of its value in half a year (Meier 1999; Polozhevets 2001).

Since the 1998 crisis, the Russian economy has begun to recover, with Russia in the midst of solid economic growth, hoping to double its GDP in 10 years. It has also been removed from the list of 'hyper-inflationary' economies (International Bank of St. Petersburg 2002).

Post-Transformation Social Values in Russia

Given the consensus that family decay had already begun by the moment of the Soviet collapse and that radical changes were brought about by the decade of economic collapse and recovery which followed, it is fair to ask how the Russian family might have fared during this roller-coaster ride after the collapse of socialism.

There is a small literature indicating the decay of family life in Russia. On the one hand there is much evidence for declining fertility and rising divorce rates (Vannoy et al. 1999), out of wedlock births, and single parent households (Klugman and Motivans 2001). On the other hand, Russians report that the quality of their existing relationships has deteriorated as well (for the St. Petersburg case, see Swader 2007).

Regarding changing demographic trends, partially because of rampant consumerism and the resulting drive of many to accumulate wealth and material goods, Shlapentokh (1991) argues that fewer people seek marriage in Russia. This negative effect of consumerism on the family formation process implies a deterioration of the value of social relationships compared to individual economic goals. Here, there is an alleged shift toward individualistic and materialist values (Shlapentokh 1991; Swader 2007). On the issue of materialism, observers note the growth of consumption, luxury lust, and money's

place in terms of imbuing power in modern Russia (Neidhart 2003). Neidhart (2003:203) explains how "the collapse of the command economy has transformed the *homo-sovieticus* into a *homo-economicus*. The Russian's life has become immensely demanding- full of choices, insecurities, traps, and temptations."

Another reason for an apparent decay in family life is the widespread demoralization alluded to above. For example, entrepreneurs and managers may have converted their values from collectivism to individualism (Grancelli 2002:109) because they identified the previous system as one of corruption (Kharkordia 1994:423, cited by Grancelli 2002). Likewise, Kupferberg (1999:29) refers to a "moral rot" across Eastern Europe as a whole during the transition years, but is careful to note the roots of this malaise within the previous communist regime. Neidhart (2003) is less subtle on this demoralization question, noting the rising of the "anything goes" mentality, captured vividly in the title of his chapter 9: "Mafiosi and Prostitutes: The New Role Models."

EASTERN GERMANY⁷

Family and Intimate Relations in the GDR

Mayer (2006:16) notes two common observations about socialist-era families in East Germany. First the close family served as a counterweight against state and party control in socialist times. Second, families were also an important resource for the acquisition of scarce goods and services during those times. His expectation is that, since families would be less directly affected by institutional disjuncture, they would remain to be useful during post-communist times. In contrast, Diewald and Lüdicke (2006) also attend to this question of the fate of social networks due to their changing functions during the transformation years and come up with a different response. They note that East Germany was less individualized than western societies because of material shortages and the comprehensive control exercised by the state over public life; thereby, they describe GDR social networks as close-knit communities formed on the basis of ascribed characteristics, rather than being based on choice and achievement (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:191). Thereby, the authors expect the East German networks to become liberated and modern, that is 'individualized' with the transformation.

Another observation concurring with the existence of strong intimate networks in the GDR is that private social relations during the post-1971 Honecker era were able to

⁷ In most cases, this dissertation uses the term 'Eastern Germany' rather than 'East Germany' because it refers to this geographic area of Germany both before and after unification, when East Germany (the GDR) as a nation ceased to exist.

develop into an intimate "social niche," so long as persons toed the ideological line in public (Uhlendorff 2003:219). Grix (2003:270) describes these 'social niches' in more depth, noting they were made up of face-to-face primary groups: "The society of niches, which embodied the ultimate in retreatism from state politics, was made up of atomized individuals who had close, trusting relations with family members, relatives, friends, work colleagues and other acquaintances," and this society functioned "as a safety-valve with the majority of east Germans using their niches to escape and retreat from the tedious party propaganda and over-politicized daily life of communist society to pursue activities that made their lives more bearable." This enforced retreatism, comments Grix (2003:271), "actually encouraged the creation of both strong informal social networks built around families, friends, acquaintances and so forth, on the one hand, and networks and patron-client connections in the barter economy, on the other, through which scarce goods/services could be procured." In a balanced fashion, Grix attributes the close social relations during GDR times not only to barter networks, but also to their being built around social motives themselves, not merely instrumental ones. Diewald describes GDR social networks according to the two above concepts, the "niche" and "Vitamin B" ("B" for *Beziehungen*, or "connections"), in addition to the label of "collective," which he describes as implying not only social control, but also, at the personal level, warmth, understanding, dependability, solidarity, and humanity (Diewald 1995).

It has been alleged that the combination of a malfunctioning economy and the suppression by the police state of intimate private lives caused a sharp distinction between close trustful relationships and weak instrumental ties (Völker and Flap 2001, as cited by Diewald and Lüdicke 2006). A competing hypothesis, however, emphasizes a more encompassing community orientation comprised of solidarity and emotional warmth (Schlegelmilch 1995, cited by Diewald and Luedicke 2006:194). This is confirmed by evidence showing that, despite the socialist state's use of the firm as a site for control of the population, East Germans were more likely to search for collectivity and camaraderie in the workplace, *even through* discussing sensitive personal and political issues (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:194). These data suggest that the East Germans were less individualized, in the sense that they were more likely to turn to their parents, friends and colleagues for support in personally difficult situations; this is interpreted as a higher willingness to help among social ties (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:197). The same authors conclude that, "this again underpins the argument of a more widespread community orientation supported by the more comprehensive pattern of the employee's social

integration at the workplace in the GDR” (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:196). They explained this heightened valuation of personal ties at work as due to values of communal work, long working hours, the multifaceted role of the firms, the low levels of status and career competition, low pressure to work harder, and a lack of workplace insecurity. Meanwhile, strong supportive family relationships within the GDR reflected the higher frequency of familial living arrangements, more time spent within partnerships and families with children, a narrower generational gap, and fewer alternatives to become acquainted with others outside official channels (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:198).

Regarding respect of elders, it has also been argued that East Germans, during GDR years, were more likely to speak to their parents about personal difficulties than West Germans. This is said to be due to the fact that “advice from older people gets less devalued than in faster changing societies,” and this is “caused by the slower pace of social change and individualization in the GDR” (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:198). This information suggests that strong family orientations in Eastern Germany were able to become nested during socialist times. The strength of GDR family values in contrast to weaker valuations of work is well-documented (Huinink and Wagner 1995:145).

Apparently, however, within the 1980's, there were already signs within Eastern Germany of a burgeoning individualism, perhaps spurred by growing material resentment. In 1984, Ramet (1984:89) remarked:

Ironically, individualism has never flourished in Eastern Germany as much as today, whether one looks to the withdrawal and consumerism of the working and middle classes, or to the rejectionism and headlong assertive individualism of those youths caught up in the East German rock scene.

Meulemann's (1996:131-132) data support Ramet and demonstrate an early and rapid growth in independence for children as a goal of parental upbringing between the years of 1967 and 1990.

The Post-1989 Economic Transformation of East Germany

Economic and monetary union between the two Germanys occurred on 1 July 1990, while political union was made official on 3 October 1990. The East German transformation was unique from other post-communist states in that it amounted to "unification through system transfer," whereby the institutions from the west were transferred to the East, with the expectation of achieving quick restabilization (Flockton, Kolinsky and Pritchard 2000:3). This advantage of the GDR's transformation, compared to others, was that the others "had to repair their sinking ships while still at sea, whereas the

GDR was retrofitted in the FRG dry dock" (Offe 1997:151). The psychic results of the unification upon East Germans however, were less successful than this beneficent colonization suggests. One group of researchers noted:

*A decade on, there is no east German sense of **Wir sind wieder wer** - 'we are somebody again' - which had buoyed west Germans in the mid-1950s in their bid for normalization (Flockton, Kolinsky and Pritchard 2000:4).*

This perhaps results from the limited ability of the colonized to take part in the reformation of their own society (Offe 1997:151-2).

Yet the starting point for many describing the East German post-socialist transition, as Goedick (2006) noted, is nonetheless that of a "friendly takeover;" or friendly colonization. This distinguishes the East German transformation from nearly every other post-communist country. Eastern Germany's *Sonderweg* ('special path'), implies transformation and integration at the same time (Kupferberg 1999:129), although the manner in which it occurred is less ideal than the name might make it sound. Despite the fact that Article 146 of the West German Constitution suggested the adoption of a new constitution upon unification, the ruling parties decided instead to transfer the West German institutions and legal structures directly to the east (Goedicke 2006:45). As a result, East Germany did not follow the typical neo-liberal prescription of release of currency controls and removing state subsidies (since huge subsidies were given by the West), and many East Germans experienced alienation and frustration at the "Machiavellian" manner in which the transformation was imposed upon them by West Germans (Goedicke 2006: 63-64). This is a likely cause for a uniquely Eastern German demoralization, that of the 'colonized' as opposed to that of the 'vanquished' in Russia. This demoralization was heightened by a sense of having been tricked by the previous regime. Kupferberg describes how when East Germans came to "get a look" at material life in the West, they realized they had been fooled by socialist claims of superiority (Kupferberg 1999:164)

Already by the 1980's, there is a consensus among scholars that there was an economic crisis in the GDR, for reasons such as having to supply the USSR with raw materials, high consumption and low economic performance, and excessive welfare entitlements (Mayer 2006: 32). Upon reunification, the steps of reforming this 'failed' economy, in order to match it to the West German model, were three-fold: macroeconomic stabilization, institutional reform, and privatization (Goedicke 2006: 46).

The GDR governments abolished central control of prices in the spring of 1990. In July of that same year, the monetary and economic union of the two Germany's became

activated, thus introducing the Deutsche Mark to the east. Bad for the competitiveness of GDR enterprises but good for E. German consumers was the abnormally high exchange rate of GDR marks for the Deutsche Mark, effectively revaluating the East German currency upwards by 300 to 400 percent, thus functioning to sever trade with the GDR's former partners (Goedicke 2006: 46).

By 1994, the work of the German privatization organization, the *Treuhand*, was completed. In all, it had privatized 53 percent of East German firms, while 13 percent were reprivatized, 30 percent were liquidated, and the rest were transformed into other types of ownership. Its deficit as a result of this work was 230 billion Deutsch Mark and many jobs (Goedicke 2006: 49, as per Bruecker 1995b:326).

Remarkable in the East German case was the huge influx of funding it received from its West German benefactor. One estimate is that, between 1990 and 2003, 980 billion Euros in public resources were transferred from the West to the East. No other post-socialist country received nearly as much external support in its transition (Sachverständigenrat 2004: 466, cited by Goedicke 2006:51).

Despite the rosy outlines of this economic story, there is also a darker side. The former East German "employment society" was destroyed, with nearly 90 percent of workplaces being eradicated in industries such as textiles and clothing, 80 percent destroyed in agriculture, and over 50 percent disappeared in industry. In the early 1990s, Eastern German unemployment was near 30 percent, while, as of 2000, 57 percent of persons aged 18 to 59 had been unemployed at least once since 1990 (Dennis 2000:96-97). Overall, East Germany's shock therapy reduced its labor force by a third (Mayer 2006:9). One of the greatest populations affected by the unemployment of *Wende* was that of women, of whom 82 percent worked in the East in 1990, compared with only 56 percent in the West in 1989 (Dennis 2000:99). The feelings of the East Germans, from losing the previous state-sponsored security, and now being subjected to market forces, was as "being thrown into the cold water" (Eppelmann 1993, as cited by Kupferberg 1999).

It appears as if the Eastern German communist state had shielded east Germans from the uncertainties of Beck's *Risk Society* (1992), so that unification meant the incorporation of a great deal of modern risk, in the guise of unemployment, for example; this "risk society" is one their western counterparts had already experienced for much longer and is a great departure from the "employment society" of the former GDR (Flockton, Kolinsky and Pritchard 2000:5-7). Thereby, the sudden collapse of the GDR regime came as quite a

shock, in particular since it was unique in providing a quite high socialist standard of living (Kupferberg 1999:3).

The Eastern German economy today is still in a rough condition. It has problems with productivity levels, huge public debts, and poor domestic demand caused by enduring mass unemployment (Goedicke 2006). It continuously suffers from its lack of economic resources and its thorough deindustrialization as a result of economic 'reforms' (Goedicke 2006: 64).

Post-Transformation Social Values in Eastern Germany

In addressing social values in post-unification Eastern Germany, some observers note the remarkable continuity in values between the two eras. Kupferberg, for example, says Eastern Germany still possesses the values of an older Germany, as the values of modesty (*Bescheidenheit*), mutual help ethics towards neighbors, and collectivist and egalitarian ideals still prevail. In contrast, this lifestyle no longer exists in Western Germany (Kupferberg 1999:180). Nonetheless, he notes that East Germans had difficulties in adjusting and experienced "culture shock" during the transformation period, likely because they still "have one foot in the previous system" (Kupferberg 1999:131, 183).

The clash between old and new values in Eastern Germany is made clear by phrases such as "a wall in the head," the "battle for moral supremacy between two collective identities," talk of the "slowness of Eastern adjustment to Western behavioural patterns," worries of "anomie" in East Germany, and talk of the "lost generation of youngsters" (Hessel et al. 1997, cited by Flockton, Kolinsky and Pritchard 2000:17). Evidence of a different self-perception is that, in establishing the social identity of the East Germans near the transition time, a 1992 poll demonstrates that "East Germans regard themselves as more friendly towards children, more modest and less greedy than the self-confident and arrogant westerners" (Dennis 2000:93).

Research indicates an individualization of families in Eastern Germany, in that the population, upon transition, enacted a drastic postponement of first birth to older ages due to increased labor market options, educational participation, and stronger career options (Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2006:188-189). On the other hand, family relations between parents and children have remained relatively stable in E. Germany after the transition (Diewald et al. 1995:337; Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:202). It is also alleged that close families became closer and more important for personal recognition and informational purposes. This is the "moratorium" hypothesis, in which close relations before 1989 served as a coping resource after 1989 (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:199,205). On the other

hand, relations with siblings and more distant relatives allegedly weakened (Diewald et al. 1995:337). Interestingly, family relationship health tends to be negatively correlated with work, as Diewald and Luedicke (2006:206,209) found that emotional closeness in relations with children *increased* for the unemployed and downwardly mobile. In contrast, for siblings and extended family relations, there was a high risk of diminishing emotional closeness for the upwardly mobile, which the authors interpreted as due to diverging life paths (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:206-210). However, this may equally be due to the growing materialist and individualist values more directly possessed by the upwardly mobile, which in turn lead to the devaluation of family.

Certain sources predicted that friendship networks should widen and families should shrink as a result of transformation (Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:199). Yet measurements do indicate a deterioration in relationships with friends and acquaintances as well between 1989 and 1993 (Diewald et al. 1995:337; Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:202). In addition, the previously strong workplace relationships enjoyed by GDR citizens were apparently devastated because of the disappearance of low competition and high job security (Diewald et al. 1995:337; Diewald and Lüdicke 2006:213). Both of these, the deterioration of workplace and friendship networks were found to be most exaggerated among the older cohorts. Other studies point out that the shrinking of friendship and workplace ties occurred mostly because people mostly “stuck to their old relationships with people they had long known and trusted” (Völker and Flap 1995: 105, as cited by Diewald and Lüdicke 2006).

Shifts toward individualistic and materialist values are indicated today in Eastern Germany (Keddi et al. 2003; Uhlendorff 2003). Meanwhile, other research (cited by Huinink and Kreyenfeld 2006:175) suggests that, after unification, new leisure and consumption options, supply of hedonistic fulfillment (Linde 1984), and the overall “increase in choice” (Zimmermann 1989) may have played a role in the postponement of family formation (Beck-Gernsheim 1997; Münz and Ulrich 1995; Sobotka, Zeman and Kantorova 2003), amounting to the downturn of family values as a result of expanded materialism and consumerism.

In relation to expanded materialist values, Kupferberg has noted the growth in consumerism and private consumption ideals in Eastern Germany after the transformation (Kupferberg 1999:5). Uhlendorff (2003:216) reports similar findings using an example from one of his informants: "Mr. B. had to get used to his son's requests concerning his clothing - which has to be produced by certain companies: 'It is no longer enough to have a

good pair of trainers. It has to be a leading brand.' His son does not want to wear other things any more." 'Mr. B' then laments "To struggle against material desires, to take up arms against them, does not get you anywhere. You can't change the situation by changing the individual, you have to change the outside conditions." This informant had also experienced the lack of respect the youth have for the older generation:

His son reproaches him some time ago: 'If you had learned something useful, you wouldn't be in this situation now.' Mr. B. had 'put his hands in his pockets and said: 'Son, you just can't understand this yet.' (Uhlendorff 2003:217)

Uhlendorff (2003:218) also demonstrates how increased unemployment threats and work pressures leave less time for focusing on family and education. He further notes how teacher-student relationships were more intimate during GDR times (Uhlendorff 2003:218). Education of children is now much more individually oriented as well, according to an East German single mother interviewed by Uhlendorff (2003:213):

In former times, she says, one was guided and directed. One had only to put a cross on a form to determine what a child was to do within or outside of school. Today one has to find one's own way, to make one's own plans, to think about it and organize it. Now, she tries to pass this mentality on to her son.

However, this respondent also notes that educators and teachers should be taking a greater role than they are. Thus, her emphasis on autonomy for herself and her son can be seen as a response of the failure of the system to provide the necessary guidance. Another informant within the same study remarks, "In former times everything was straightforward and clear, today one has to fend for oneself." She also notes how the moral standards have degraded: "During GDR times one taught one's child not to lie. Today, however, one has to fend for oneself and sometimes one has to resort to a white lie in order not to lose face" (Uhlendorff 2003:214). This is just one example of a trend in the "regression of moral educational standards" in the GDR (Uhlendorff 2003:219). Other research has noted stricter moral sentiments and greater moral conformity in the East compared to the West, as measured by the recognition of institutions of marriage and family and of recognition of moral restrictions; important is that the East has seen a demoralization between 1990 and 1995 in the sense that its levels of morality have regressed towards those of the West because such morality is no longer useful in the new society (Meulemann 1996:364; Meulemann 1998).

One reason for this moral decline and associated heightened individualism is that both may have served as a form of risk management, a career planning strategy, one that results,

however, in a "reduced commitment to marriage based families and a postponement (or even avoidance) of child bearing" (Flockton, Kolinsky and Pritchard 2000:6). Kupferberg describes the result of this transformation of intimate relationships well:

The transition to a Western society is a transition to a society where most social relations are treated like contracts.... Becoming accustomed to this new way of doing things can be extremely exhausting. Basically it is a learning process, often a very tough one, and there is little you, as my friend or my mother, can do to help me. I have to do it on my own. This is the background to the state of coma within personal relations I have sensed lately (particularly in East Germany, where the transformation process has been most dramatic).(Kupferberg 1999:25)

As a result, "the previous "speech communities" that were all encapsulated inside the private sphere have ceased to function, and "the citizens have yet to produce or become accustomed to speech communities of a different kind, focused around instrumental, task-oriented issues, rather than heavily emotional ones, based exclusively on trust" (Kupferberg 1999:25-26).

Another study has compared, in 1991-2 and 1997, West- and East German mother-child interactions and found that Eastern German mothers were more likely to address their children, within a game-playing scenario, as authority and educational figures, while their West German counterparts, out of insecurity regarding their authority, focused more on cooperation and playing with their children. As a result, the eastern German children reacted by individuating through challenging their mothers, while the west German children adopted more cooperative and understanding approaches, although this often amounted to a clever manipulation of the mothers' insecurities (Schuster 2000:204-205).

Finally, other research (Kirchhöfer 2003) has uncovered the ways in which time structuring has unraveled in the East, thereby catalyzing the individualizing effect. This study has indicated the ways in which children structured their time differently before and after the transition. Individual family members, because of growing uncertainties, came to differentiate their routines with one another, for instance spending less time together during meals or other joint activities. In addition, time structures became more unpredictable, with school activities no longer coordinated with other institutional - such as work - activities, colleagues meeting less often, and the divergence of individual peer routines. Partially due to the growing flexibility of parental employment, the boundaries within children's daily routines eroded, so that there was no longer a clear division between preparatory-, school-, and after-school activities. Finally, the dissolution of social control was noted: formally in that schools no longer had set pre-structured activities,

while neighborhood networks and parental interest seems to have broken down. Notable causes of these shifts were the breakdown of time discipline, relaxed time pressure, and the relinquishing of collective time.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Intimate relationships typically receive short shrift compared to other transformation topics, such as gender transformations or economic and political transformation at the level of institutions and elites. As a result, research on the specific field in question, the valuation of intimacy in these three countries, is rather scant. However, through patching together various sources, we can begin to get a picture of what intimate relations were like before the transformation and how they might have changed. This information serves as background knowledge to assist the reader's interpretation of this dissertation's data analysis.

CHAPTER 4. OBSERVING THE CAPITALISM-SOCIALITY INTERFACE

RESEARCH DESIGN

What is the fate of social values within post-Communist China, Russia, and Eastern Germany? Recalling from previous chapters, the central hypothesis is that social values become more latent with economic modernization. This will be investigated by looking for observable tensions between social values and capitalist culture in China, Russia, and Eastern Germany using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. Such tensions are the faultlines upon which value change occurs and, thus, the ideal means to investigate how it unfolds.

It is not supposed that these three societies experienced a total modernization, entailing urbanization, cultural development, industrialization, technological advances, and economic development, *only* within their transition years; nearly all of these processes clearly occurred prior to and during communist rule. Rather, the reintroduction of the free-market economy is the specific ‘modernization’ of interest here. Also, these historical developments have typically taken place over hundreds of years in Western Europe. In contrast, the post-communist transformations shrink the time span of focus, thereby allowing a unique study of the effects of the reintroduction and development of capitalism in various locations over a very short period of time.

Most-Dissimilar Cases

These three societies are chosen as the *most-dissimilar cases* among new free-market countries. Notably, China, Russia, and Eastern Germany vary radically in their cultures, languages, histories, ideologies, and centrally-planned and free-market economic conditions. However, the unifying factor is that they each experienced a near-total transformation to a market economy the past 20 years. Moreover, each may have also seen shifts in social values during this said time period. Therefore, China, Russia, and Eastern Germany are chosen not only as a few of the world’s most visible examples of neo-market-economies, but more pointedly, because their starkly different ideologies, cultural-historical influences, and levels of transition-era economic prosperity demand that their possible similarity, the presence of social devaluation, be explained.

There are, of course, many other potential causes of value change, such as the degrees of urbanization, industrialization, and technological development. In addition, states attempt to influence values through their ideologies and supporting policies, such as

China's 'one-child policy' or the values of the pro-family German welfare state. Or perhaps the styles and speeds of economic transformation themselves have led to changing values. Religions too are major sources of values and potentially may have substantially impacted social values also during the transformation era. In addition, the economic conditions during transformation may be a critical factor of difference. I can control for each of these factors in that my three cases differ across them. As a result, any finding of common values across cases is likely due to the only factor that is similar across cases, the fact of free-market economic transformation. Key differences between cases may be observed within Table 4.1.

The formidable differences in culture and history also highlight that this is indeed a most-different case design. East Germany was the most modernized of the three countries, riding the wave of European technological, bureaucratic, and rational development until it's culmination in the horror of WW II. Of course, after the war, East Germany became one of the most advanced of the USSR's satellite states. Compared to East Germany, Russia was not as modernized regarding the developments of its family, philosophical, and industrial worlds, especially considering its large underdeveloped rural regions. I consider it, at the time of the transformation, less individualized than East Germany, especially because of its sizable rural population. Chinese "progress" toward modernity was further behind the other two cases. With its huge rural populations and only recent, albeit rapid, industrialization, modernization's influence on China has come later than in East Germany or Russia. Furthermore, China experienced the disruptive and inimical Cultural Revolution immediately before its economic transformation, whereas the last large scale state-induced family disruptions in Russia were in the Stalin years, and in Eastern Germany underneath the Nazi regime. Thus, the huge variation in levels of development and individualization in my three cases also would be unable to explain a common individualization of values during the transformation period.

The cases also differ in terms of the state responses to changing values. China actively encouraged value transformation through slogans such as "get rich first" and "become the first one million yuan family." Russia's response throughout the 1990's was largely to do nothing in terms of values promotion, and the German state contributed throughout the transformation period through its regular family-work harmony ideology, typical of the social-welfare state. Thus, with three very different state responses to the values issue, one would expect that any similarity between cases is due to, not state ideology, but rather to something else, the economic structure.

Table 4.1 Comparison of Cases

Comparative Dimension	China	Russia	Eastern Germany
previous state of family development	traditional	mixed	modern
state-level family policy	one-child	initially nothing, then encourage child-bearing	encourage child-bearing
speed of transformation	slow, phased	shock therapy	colonial transplant
recent history	disruption, Cultural Revolution	slow decay and demoralization	beginning of demoralization
urbanization level	low	medium	high
industrialization	medium	high	high
techno-bureaucratic development at time of transformation	low	high	highest
Spirituality	low to medium, Confucian, Buddhist roots, growing Christianity	weak, burgeoning orthodoxy	medium, remnants of Catholicism, Protestantism survived
transformation-era economic conditions	strong growth	total collapse	near-total collapse
economic restructuring	phased, gradual	fast-paced neo-liberal shock	colonial, fast transfer of West-German institutions
external economic support	very little	little	very high (from West Germany)
initial state value response to transformation	"get rich first"!	do nothing	work-family balance (welfare state)
later state value response	reintroduced Confucian values in schools	focus on Russian family (encourages procreation)	slight shift away from work-family balance with welfare reforms

The three cases differ in their economic transformations, as was noted in Chapter 3. Russia's economic shock and collapse of the 1990's contrasts sharply with China's slow steady growth with no collapse. The East German model was different still, with a quick industrial collapse and economic restructuring under enormous West German funding and 'expertise,' thus leading to some economic growth amid massive unemployment. These three styles of transformation, shock, slow and steady, and colonial, would unlikely lead to the same value transformation, unless it was not the *style* of economic transformation at all which mattered so much, but rather the *fact* of economic transformation from planned- to market-economy.

Religion and spirituality is another major sphere of variation between my cases. While considerably less religious than West Germany because of its atheist socialist past, remnants of Christianity, both Catholicism and Protestantism, had survived the communist regime in East Germany until this day. The Soviets were even more effective at eradicating religion in Russia, although Orthodoxy has seen a strong resurgence after the transformation, albeit in the large cities perhaps a somewhat superficial one, except among the elderly. Finally, China, without a unifying religion, and even the remnants of Confucianism under assault throughout much of the Communist Party's reign, is largely atheist, although some note the functional equivalence of nationalism in providing a group identity, although not individual morals, to the Chinese People. Therefore, any similarity in values between the three countries could not be due to a common religious background.

Thus, because of the above-noted differences between the cases, it will be assumed that similarities in value change between the three cases is due to their *common* feature, that is the transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy. Furthermore, when differences in value changes between the cases are discovered, the causes will be sought among the factors mentioned above and from the specificity of the particular case.

Comparing Generations

The principal method of determining value change here is through intergenerational interviews. Contemporary intergenerational value variations are sought, and these are tapped as possible sources of social change. The assumption is that social changes crystallize into intergenerational value gaps as the younger generations adapt to, for the first time, a society considerably different from that of their predecessors (Mannheim 1952). Furthermore, each member of a generation experiences his/her new society alongside with the biological aging process; or, as Mannheim (1952:286) puts it, "any biological rhythm must work itself out through the medium of social events." Since aging

and social change are thus co-conspiring to form the shared social location of a generation, it would be brash to claim any particular gap has linkages *only* with one or the other. In other words, aging, period, and cohort effects can be analytically disentangled only through the belief that they are independent, whereas their interconnections are deeply imbedded.

Logic of the Mixed Methods Approach

This is primarily a qualitative study. There are several reasons for this, but the principal one is that values reside, before they result in behavior, in the head, and valuation is an act of cognition. Therefore, without an earnest exploration into the richness of this cognition, there is little hope at getting near the core of values. Quantitative methods, despite their ability to attempt to generalize a finding across a wider population, have a very difficult time dealing with the nature of values. This is not to say that quantitative research is unnecessary for values research, but rather that it is insufficient. There are some good indicators for social values within the WVS, and they are used in this dissertation, but there is simply too big of a gap between the strengths of the survey device and the cognitive nature of the values we want to investigate; as a result a qualitative approach is favored. Qualitative and quantitative indications will be used in a parallel way, to highlight social value gaps across time periods, between occupational groups, and between generations. Thereafter the qualitative analysis is used to uncover the mechanism of the observed growth of a new class of values.

Qualitative Contribution

This research is primarily interested in how values change, how the valuation process occurs, and how tensions in valuation emerge and are resolved. This is information best garnered from the individuals themselves, since the valuation occurs within individual minds. Furthermore, a degree of richness in collecting this information about values is required in order to maintain as close to possible the original meaning of the values within the mind. Thus, semi-structured qualitative interviews are chosen for this purpose. Through this rich information, I may triangulate what a person's values are through asking about values in a variety of ways. Secondly, informants' discussions of the tensions between their values give clues as to how 'old' and 'new' values contend with one another within individual minds. Through thick description, it may also become obvious how particular values derive from a specific cultural source, such as from religion or the market economic structure. Fourth, the respondents may offer us clues as to why their particular values have or have not changed. Finally, by comparing different groups of informants,

representing the ‘most-affected’ and ‘less-affected’ cases, we can discern a possible change vector, which indicates the potential direction of change for the overall society through revealing underlying tensions.

Quantitative Contribution

Within representative World Values Survey samples from China, Russia, and Eastern Germany, the value changes and gaps discovered within the qualitative interviews are looked at across the wider population to see if they correspond to parallel tensions between young and old birth cohorts and between new occupations and occupations favored by the old economy. This will also be approached through looking at over-time trends across different waves of the data.

QUALITATIVE DESIGN

The central idea behind the qualitative interviews in this study is to compare theoretically most-affected cases with less-affected cases. With this in mind, two categories of informants are interviewed: the “most-affected” young businessmen, entrepreneurs, and managers, and their own “less-affected” fathers.

Gender

Men are interviewed, rather than women, because they are designated within this study as the theoretically “most-affected gender.” This is confirmed by other research which indicates women tend to be more compassionate, less competitive, and less materialistic (Beutel and Marini 1995). Therefore, interviews are conducted between men and their fathers as these interviews will likely reveal the greatest contrasts and thus allow for a more vivid analysis. Within the quantitative data, gender differences will be noted across the representative sample.

Cities

Furthermore, these interviews were conducted in the most-affected cities, the most culturally “modern” and economically developed cities of each country, meaning in Shanghai, Moscow, and Leipzig.

His description better than my own, Becker (2006: 41) aptly notes that “Shanghai is where modern China took its shape.” Shanghai has always been the vanguard, foreshadowing China’s future, for better or for worse. He also notes its Janus-face qualities as the pinnacle of Chinese modernity:

Reviled in the 1920s and ‘30s as the “whore of the East” or admired as

East Asia's greatest metropolis, China owes its first modern factories, banks, schools, universities, financial markets, newspapers, orchestras, and film stars to Shanghai (Becker 2006: 41).

Historically situated as a center of early 20th Century Western economic power, the Chinese government has capitalized on Shanghai's economic history by forming it into the modern giant of China's post-Mao economic boom.

If you mention Moscow today to any non-Muscovite Russians, the response may likely be that "Moscow is not Russian." Only ten years ago, Moscow still felt like it had one foot in the Soviet past. Now, the city is packed full of oligarchs and the masses running in their footsteps, poor migrant workers from Central Asia, streets lined with casinos and strip clubs, and 24-hour supermarkets not selling food in the wee-hours of the morning but rather beer. Indeed, it hordes the majority of the country's wealth and vices and is sprawling with the new rich. In the city center, the famous grey of the Soviet past makes way for neon lights and sleek black luxury automobiles. While the reasons for resenting Moscow are obvious for most Russians, it nonetheless represents the center of contemporary Russian economic and cultural development.

In Eastern Germany, Leipzig has been chosen as the city of interest. Berlin was not selected because of its unique East-West linkages; it would have been difficult to isolate former East Berlin social life as purely socialist in the same sense that it would now be impossible to isolate it now as 'Eastern German.' Instead, Leipzig was chosen as the Eastern German city of analysis. It has an old commercial history, as host of the world's oldest trade fair, and its post-reunification business revival is marked by branches of big-name companies in its midst: Porsche, Siemens, and BMW. While certainly the major economic, technology, and business center outside of Berlin in the East, it is notably smaller and sleepier than Moscow or Shanghai. Nonetheless, it has a historical and contemporary business culture that makes it a center of economic development in the 'New Länder' (the new federal states).

Intergenerational Approach

Because values are promoted and interpreted primarily through family structures, this study used intergenerational qualitative interviews in order to attempt to gauge changes in social values. Interviews were conducted with new-rich businessmen (who have children) and with their surviving fathers. It can be assumed that the values of fathers and sons would roughly resemble each other, since fathers would be expected to socialize their sons with their own values. Differences then between the values of these generations thus

symbolize the extent to which the father's values are no longer adequate and thereby serve as a proxy for social change.

It is assumed that the businessman's father possesses the state of values closer to that which existed before the transition to the market economy. His values would have been much less affected by the economic changes than his son's because the father (now approximately 60 years old) has been socialized long ago and now has minimal involvement in the economy and therefore less adaptive value modification.

In contrast, successful businessmen, entrepreneurs, and managers are deemed to have adapted most toward the new economic system and thus most-directly reflect the new-system's values.

Sample Selection

Qualitative informants were not selected using any sort of random sampling. Rather, young informants were identified according to how well they fit with the ideal profile. Once a businessman was identified, he was immediately asked whether he and his father would be available for an interview. This ideal profile consists of the following dimensions:

Economically successful. The economic success of the young respondent identifies him as having successfully adapted to the new economy.

Aged 35-45. Informants between 35 and 45 years old would have been between 20 and 30 years old at the time of the transformation. Thus, their youthful socialization was nearly complete, and one can observe how they changed their values during this volatile period.

Married, with children. Bachelors would have different value systems than married men, and since I am interested in finding how the work sphere competes with the family, interviewing men with families makes sense.

Minimal contact with the pre-market wealth and power structures. Such a businessman has worked his way up the ladder of social mobility only within the new market-economic structures. Therefore, such structures should have had the greatest value impact on this person.

Respondents were identified through informal networking activities and the help of several local organizations. Informants in Shanghai were acquired primarily through the assistance of the sociology department of Shanghai University and the Shanghai Young Entrepreneurs Association. Leipzig informants were assembled through the assistance of the sociology department of Leipzig University and the assistance of the local *IHK* (Chamber of Commerce). Moscow informants were identified through the assistance of the sociology department of the Higher School of Economics and through personal

networking. The final profiles of the informants, of course, differ from the ideal profile because of the restrictions of the profile itself and rejections encountered through asking informants for their father's contact information in order to conduct the second interview to complete the pair. Relevant information can be found in Table 4.2, where the "L" interview numbers represent Leipzig interviews and "S" and "M" represent, respectively Shanghai and Moscow. Furthermore, each odd-numbered interview represents someone from the businessman cohort, while the subsequent even number is their own father. For example, M1 is the son of Moscow informant M2.

In total, the qualitative data being analyzed here consist of interviews with 32 informants, a total of 18 younger generation businessmen and 14 from the older generation. The younger businessmen range in age from 32 to 49, while the older were between 60 and 80 years old. Each of the informants was male, with the exception of M12, the Moscow mother of M11, since there was no surviving father. With two exceptions (S11, L7), each of the younger cohort was either married or divorced, and only one of these two (S11) has no child, whereas all other informants have children. In terms of occupation, each of the younger cohort members is a manager, an owner, or an entrepreneur. They vary considerably in terms of wealth. At the low end, M9 could be described as middle to upper middle class, while I would judge the wealthiest informant to be M5, a Moscow marketing tycoon. It was quite difficult to assemble full pairs in Shanghai because of the lack of trust of an outside foreign researcher and, in some cases, the son's desire to shield his father from embarrassment and hassle. As a result, only three of the four older generation informants from Shanghai may be compared directly to their own children. In Leipzig and Moscow, the construction of informant pairs was more successful, with five complete pairs in each city. In all cases, informants both young and old gave their consent for the interview and were assured that their data would be completely anonymized.

Table 4.2 Basic Characteristics of 32 Informants (18 businessmen, 13 fathers, 1 mother)

Interview Number	Age	Gender	Sector	Time married	child age	Vacation days per month	Previous vacation days per month
S4	72	male	former newspaperman	45 years	38, 43, 45	18	4
S5	32	male	construction design (SOE)	5 years	3	9	n.a.
S6	~65	male	industry	38 years	32, ?	8	4
S7	49	male	IT		19	2-3	2-3
			former soldier, transportation worker	50 years	49, 48	30	4
S8	72	male		10 years	11	2	4
S9	37	male	bearings production (industry)	not married			
S11	32	male	auto components manufacturing	yet	none	8	4
S13	40	male	pharmaceuticals (SOE)	10 years	9	8	4
S14	65	male	n.a.	n.a.	40, ?	8	4
S15	32	male	insurance	3 years	3	8	4
S17	43	male	service sector	18 years	18	10	rarely
M1	42	male	architecture	17 years	14	3	0
M2	80	male	retired	55 years	42, 52	30	8
M5	47	male	marketing, advertising	6-8 years	from 3 to 24	n.a.	3
M6	77	male	retired, former engineer	25 years	2	30	30
M7	n.a.	male	financial markets	9	2, 6	4-5	8
M8	60	male	science (private research firm)	35	36	8	n.a.
M9	37	male	landscape design	separated	7	8 (winter), 4-5 otherwise	8
M10	61	male	computer technologies, sales	37 years	36, 21	2	8
M11	36	male	sale of consumer products	11 years	11	6-7	8
			retired, former worker at the department of education	widowed	46, 36	30	8
M12	65	female		5 years	2, 3	4-5	2
L1	33	male	Lawyer, freelance in joint office				
L2	61	male	Steel Worker, manager	34 years	29, 33	10	5-6
L3	34	male	engineer, owner	2 years	18 months	8-9	8
L4	n.a.	male	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
L5	40	male	Advisor, information technologies	9 days	10, 16	4-6	8
			penioner, previously chemical research	46 years	45, 41, 36	30	6
L6	77	male					
L7	34	male	print company owner	girlfriend	6 months	4	8
L8	62	male	print company owner	26 years	34	4-5	4-5
L9	32	male	IT business	no	1, 6	7	8
L11	42	male	window builder, owner	19 years	13, 16	4-5	7-8
				almost 50 years			
L12	69	male	window builder, owner	years	40, 42	8-10	8-12

Odd number interviews are with the younger generation, while the even number above them is their father, if interviewed. The letter before the number stands for (S)hanghai, (M)oscow, or (L)eipzig.
n.a. Information is not available.

Data Collection

All Shanghai interviews were conducted between August 2005 and January 2006. Leipzig interviews were conducted between November 2005 and January 2006. Moscow interviews were conducted between April 2006 and July 2006. Interviews were conducted by native-speaking sociology students from Shanghai University, Moscow's Higher School of Economics, and Leipzig University.⁸ Students were trained by the primary researcher before the first interview and intermittently, as necessary. In half of the cases, the interview was conducted alone between the student and interviewee, whereas in the other half, the primary researcher was also in the room. This variation was intentional in order to determine the effect of a foreigner (the primary researcher) involved in the process. In addition, within several Shanghai interviews, additional persons were unavoidably present during the interview, usually entailing the persons who assisted as intermediaries in contacting informants.

Interviews lasted, on average, about 90 minutes (See Appendix A for respondent profile sheets and time diaries and Appendix B for Interview Guidelines in English, Chinese, Russian, and German). The following agenda was covered within the interviews:

A profile sheet was filled out which detailed the informant's age, sex, occupational sector, job position, self-assessment of income, number of years married, wife's work, number and ages of children, and whether or not the father lives nearby (for follow-up interview)

Time-based prioritization of values: at the beginning of the interview, the informant was asked to detail the structure of their daily activities in order to see how they distribute their time. First, they would estimate the number of 'free days' they have per month today and 15 years ago. Then, they were asked to detail their typical work and vacation days now and 15 years ago within time diaries.

After completion of time diaries, the interview was begun according to the guideline. Interviewers used the guideline as a general roadmap within the interview. Questions were free to deviate from those written down as long as they stayed within the general theme. Additionally, interviewers were free to pursue relevant leads as they saw fit. The first guideline topic was the 'ostensible prioritization of values:' informant was directly asked which things are most important to him, through questions such as "What are the most important things in your life?" or "Which are the moral principles which guide your behavior?"

Goal-based prioritization of values: informants were asked to name their biggest goals in life, how they imagine their lives in the future, who their role-models are, and which values they try to pass on to their children/grandchildren.

⁸ Alongside their roles as native-speaking interviewers, student assistants were also instrumental in the transcription of the interviews and the subsequent translation into English.

Changes in Values during Transition Years. Informants were asked if and why their values changed during the transformation years and also to reflect on the four materialism hypotheses. They were asked how the new economic structure has affected their values through, for example, heightened aspirations, increased cost-benefit analyses in the life sphere, through perceived material exploitation by and of others, and through the impacts of material culture, such as advertisements, TV shows, and movies.

Value Conflicts. Informants were asked whether or not their own values were in conflict, what the causes of those conflicts might be, how they justify and attempt to resolve the conflicts, and how the conflicts make them feel

Coding

Qualitative interviews, totally over 300 pages of data, were coded in two main sweeps within ATLASTI. First, they were coded *structurally*, in direct accordance with the interview guideline. Thereby informant responses may be categorized according to their parallel answers to the same questioning scheme. Second, the interviews were coded line by line *contextually*, according to specific values which became apparent despite where they were found in the interview. This contextual coding was dense, resulting in 441 raw codes across a wide variety of dimensions: timing of the particular value (whether recollections of 1990 or assessments of 2005-6), individual achievement values, materialist values, family values, work values, the value of honesty, education, politics and nationalism, perceptions of change, examples of personal value change, perceptions of value conflicts and interpersonal conflicts, et cetera. These codes were overlapping, meaning that multiple codes may be assigned to the same body of text. A complete list of contextual codes used may be found within Appendix C. These codes were later collapsed into four main families for analysis: work values, family values, materialist values, and other values.

Qualitative Analysis

Social change is measured in the interviews in three ways. First, value change is looked at within the interviews based on the informants' *personal retrospective detailing* of how their values might have changed during the transition period. Second, the father-cohort and the son-cohort are compared with one another *as groups*. Third, *direct father-son pair comparisons*, where available, are used to look at value change, inferring that the values of fathers and sons should be similar, except for the changes induced by the new environment. These three methods, incorporating both interview utterances and reference to the informants' time diaries, are used to triangulate value change in each society.

Within the analysis, to be illustrated in the following Chapters 5, 6, and 7, values are presented within larger categories. Within the data, the categories of work, family, materialism, and other values were found to be the most critical in relation to my central question of the outcome of social (face-to-face communicative) values. Why these particular categories? Work and family values arose as topics most often during the interviews, and families typically provide the informants' core primary relationships. Work has also changed considerably within the new economy and is often found in opposition to leisure values. Materialism values became a major sub-grouping because such values turn out to comprise a major area of value change, implying changes in consumption, psychological valuations of survival and luxury, and the notion of rational calculation. They are also necessary to investigate in depth because of their centrality regarding the dissertation's independent variable: capitalism. Additionally, research described in Chapter 2 demonstrates links between materialism and egocentrism. The 'other values' category is broader than others, as it is composed of informants' valuations of secondary and abstract relationships, such as with friends, coworkers, their communities and nations, religion, and morality. Within the 'other values' category, issues of exploitation of others, instrumentalization of relationships, and issues of morality are also analyzed.

Qualitative value change results will be presented in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8. The indicated causes for such changes (mechanisms) will be described later in chapter 10. Within each valuation category, father-son pair analyses will be presented where available, to be complemented by the individual retrospective reports and a comparison of generations as groups. Time diary references are also interspersed throughout the analysis, as relevant.

QUANTITATIVE DESIGN

The quantitative portion of this study's method is conducted using data from the World Values Survey (WVS), an ambitious cross-sectional multi-national collection of attitudes at the individual level collected from a large variety of nations, including the post-socialist societies under research here. The WVS group is headed by Ronald Inglehart, a political scientist based at the University of Michigan.

There are several advantages to using this dataset. First, it is virtually the only one capable of contributing to an intimate social values argument that has collected data from most post-communist countries. Second, the survey has been collected in many post-

socialist societies since 1990, allowing for cross-sectional trend analysis going back to the time of the transition.

However, this dataset is far from perfect. First, its means of measuring values is a rating rather than a ranking system. A ranking system would be superior, since it would force respondents to prioritize their values in a way that may approximate their real-world ordering of values at the moment they make a decision. Thus, for most questions, the WVS is actually measuring attitudes rather than values (see Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Also, the WVS, being designed primarily by political scientists, does a much better job of tapping political attitudes than it does the social-psychological values of interest here. Nonetheless, there are enough items capable of tapping the dimensions of interest here to justify using these data as an informative contribution to our primarily qualitative discussion.

Sample

A detailed description of the datasets used for China, Russia, and Eastern Germany can be found in the Appendix H. The sample is taken from three consecutive waves of the cross-sectional World Values Survey, collected in 1990, 1995-97, and in 1999-2001 within China, Russia, and Eastern Germany. Sample sizes for each country and each wave range between 998 and 2500 persons.

Concerning key demographic variables, a birth cohort variable was created. In order to maintain statistically adequate group sizes, equal-sized cohorts (25 percent of respondents in each) were built using the distribution of the Chinese 2001 wave as a reference for creating the cohort cut-off points, since that wave had an under-sampling of respondents over the age of 65 compared to other countries. As a result, four birth cohorts were constructed: 1902-1947, 1948-1958, 1959-1967, and 1968-1983. This breakdown allows for the measurement of these four cohorts across all three countries and across each of the three waves.

Additionally, a variable was built to differentiate those within 'new' occupational fields from others. The new occupations included respondents working in occupations *avored* by the new economy, such as owners, managers, office supervisors, office workers, and professionals. These occupations are the most rapidly growing and prestigious within the new economy compared to the manual workers, foremen, skilled workers, farmers, and others represented by the other occupations. These 'new occupations' parallel the occupations of the young businessmen and managers qualitatively interviewed within this study.

A relative income variable was also constructed from the existing income variable within the data. Within each country and wave, income was split into three equal groups: low, middle, and upper. The purpose of this was to correct for distortions due to poor income indicators within countries and to allow for more adequate comparisons between countries.

Operationalization

Operationalization of key concepts, at first glance, might look quite complicated because of the number of variables involved within the World Values Survey (nearly 200). But a number of factors allowed the quick reduction of the possible number of variables to be used, such as the poor variation of certain indicators and missing data within certain waves, certain countries, or both. Descriptions of the variables used may be found in Appendix I. The value categories of interest are the same as those tapped within the analysis of the qualitative interviews: work, family, materialism, and other values.

Work

Of the many work variables in the survey, most were rejected because they were only collected within one or two waves, thus eliminating the possibility of conducting a trend analysis between 1990 and 2000 (v83, v84, v85, v100, v97-v102). What remained was v8, which asks respondents to rate the importance of work for them on a scale of one to four. This indicator is a good one for the general concept of *work importance*. In addition, four variables were formed into a composite index representing the modern ambitious work values, corresponding to the high degree of ambition and personal achievement within the younger cohort of the qualitative analysis. The importance of job initiative, job achievement, having an interesting job, having a respected job, responsibility in the job, and that the job meets one's abilities were found to factor together within one dimension, which was labeled *non-material job expectations*.

Family

Many variables concerning the family were rejected because of remarkably poor variation (v4, v131, v234). Others were rejected because of missing waves (v124#2, v125#2). What remained were two indicators which closely represent dimensions also covered within the qualitative interviews: parents' willingness to sacrifice for children and the duty to unconditionally respect parents.

Materialism

Three variables were chosen to tap the materialism dimension. First, in parallel with a key discussion within the qualitative interviews, a variable on thrift was selected (v20), wherein respondents rated the importance of thrift as a value for children to learn. Next, two variables were chosen to parallel the non-material job expectations dimension covered within the work section. These are the materialist job expectations of the importance of *good pay* (v86) and high *job security* (v88).

Other Values

This category is broken into several sub-dimensions. The first, friendship, is well-represented by the variable v5 regarding the *importance of friends* to the respondent, on a scale of one to four. Regarding political values and activism, v7, the *importance of politics* was selected, which is measured in a parallel scheme to v5. Regarding religiosity, another topic of interest, v9 is chosen, which is also measured on a 1 to 4 scale (*the importance of religion*). More generally, and in parallel with the focus on morality within many of the interviews, a variable was found that measures *moral relativism*, whether or not respondents believe in absolute moral standards (v183). This variable was built by dichotomizing responses into those which agree with absolute moral standards and those who do not. Finally, another relevant variable with regards to how persons intimately interact with others is the *value of independence* as a desired trait within children (v15).

Quantitative Analysis

The variables above were each analyzed graphically by nation, as a trend across time, and crossed with the demographic variables of birth cohort and occupational field, in order to test whether individualization tensions are visible across the dimensions of time, birth cohort, and exposure to the economy. Where variations are apparent graphically, two-tailed T-tests are used to test for the significance of these variations (See Appendix J). Indicated value gaps are *not* provided as quantitative 'proof' of qualitative results but are rather considered as additional sources of evidence to aid in the triangulation of individualization within these cases.

CHAPTER 5. 'GET RICH FIRST!': QUALITATIVE FINDINGS FOR CHINA

...Money means only a number for me now and the process to make money is the process to manifest success. The number is indicative of the correctness of one's decisions.

...The winner is the king and the loser is the servant.

Shanghai informant, S13

VIGNETTE

40 years old, the son, S13, let's call him Yang, is a married Shanghai man with a 9 year-old son. He is president of a state-run, yet very much profit-oriented, pharmaceuticals company. His father, S14, here known as Ye Pin, is preparing to retire. Despite their father-son connection, their values have little in common.

While the elder Ye Pin attaches "great importance to the family," his son Yang, when pressed, says he "think[s] more for the enterprise and less of the family." The elder puts family first, and the younger puts family second. This traditional Chinese value of the strong role of the family seems to have missed Yang. The same can be said for the duty of respecting elders, a duty spoken of by Ye Pin, but not by his son. In fact, Yang says he had no role models during the transition era, unless you count some famous entrepreneurs he had seen interviewed on some television programs.

However, it is a mistake to say that Yang is more "modern" in every way, while Ye Pin, the father, is simply more "traditional." In terms of gender views, for example, their values are precisely the opposite as one might expect. Ye Pin, the elder, says that family-work responsibilities are balanced between he and his wife, while Yang believes in splitting responsibilities, with her being expected to accept that he has to work.

Differences between Yang and his father extend beyond work and family. His father Ye Pin possesses the traditional Chinese value of thrift and believes strongly in saving money and not being wasteful. Yang also speaks highly of thrift, but he must focus on cultivating his image for his work, which means he is more of a consumer than his father, since he is expected to wear nice suits and drive a nice car.

Finally, while Ye Pin says his generation was selfless, this is in stark contrast to Yang, who does not speak about helping others outside of his own family. Even for his own family, his contribution, as he sees it, is primarily a material one. His bigger motivation for work has been own ambition for personal achievement. Perhaps this is the reason for his lack of selflessness.

These are the key dimensions - work, family, materialism, other values - across which the Chinese generations differ greatly.

WORK VALUES

Retrospective reports in China indicate the value of work increased at the beginning of the transition, as my young informants worked to establish their own material security in the new economy. Most of the younger informants (S9, S13, S15) are still within this initial ambitious, work-centered phase of their lives. S9 is like this, highly motivated and even working on most weekends. S13, as well, is highly work- and achievement-oriented. He justifies this orientation as necessary, for it is his duty to provide for his family materially. S15, 32 years old and working 14-hour days, is also highly ambitious and work-centered, admitting that this allows him little time with his family. The ambitions of this young cohort seem tied to the amount that they could achieve and sometimes subsided either as they ran out of opportunities, as was the case for S5, who is the director of a state-owned enterprise, and who cannot rise any further, or as they achieved a degree of comfortable material wealth, as is the case with S17, who at 43 years old, thinks of retiring soon because he has already achieved what he aimed to, and has no need for more. For other informants, even though their initial ambitions have subsided, they have not made the transition to the leisurely lifestyle enjoyed by S5 and S17. This is the case with S7, who, at 49 years old and financially very successful, describes his life outside of work as “dull” and seems quite unhappy. None of his current plans involve leisure or family; rather, he aims to establish his own business, perhaps to reawaken his former ambitions. In contrast, some of the informants, such as S11, are less ambitious, and therefore less work-oriented. S11, although not married, still keeps his weekends free for his girlfriend and parents.

Retrospective reports from the older generation demonstrate, not surprisingly, a decrease in their work values over the years, since they are, for the most part, retired. S4, for example, a former newspaperman, recalls changes in his work during this period, as his job required him to increasingly visit clients in order to sell more advertisements for the newspaper, but he soon retired, so presumably did not have to change substantially according to these influences. S6 notes no changes in his work values over the years. 15 years ago, S8, a former worker in the transportation sector, worked almost every day, including weekends, and he is now retired. S14, a former factory engineer, also was a very hard worker until he retired. The question thereby arises of whether this former work-focus of the elder generation during their younger years has given way to qualitatively different work values today.

Father-son pair comparisons, of which there are three for the Chinese sample, also illustrate the enhancement of work in the younger generation. Take, for example S5 and

S6, where S5 is a 32 year old president of a state-owned construction firm. His father, S6, is a former manager in the industrial sector. While the father puts family first, and puts much emphasis on family harmony, his son mentions that his family members, including his parents, complain that he goes out too often on business. The following excerpt, echoing young Yang from this chapter's vignette, shows that S5 believes that the family is his wife's domain, while work is his primary responsibility:

Q: If you have emergent things to deal with at 6:30 [at work], will you get your daughter settled down or go directly to the company?

A: It depends. If my daughter wets the bed or falls ill suddenly, I will make arrangements for that, such as ringing someone for help. Or I will see what my wife can do and who can settle things for me. I will make good arrangements in a short time so that my wife can cope with everything successfully at home. If under some circumstances she can cope with it, I will go directly to the company.

In comparing S7 and S8 concerning their work values, it is clear that work has dominated the son's life, while the father is more balanced. The son, 49 years old and having spent much time working in Japan, has adopted what he calls the Japanese notion of 'work as family;' his company has a cohesiveness that "can hardly be described in words." Nonetheless, he seems unhappy, reporting that "for me, besides work, life is dull and I seldom go out to have fun. " In contrast, his father, S8, emphasizes that one should not only work, but should also enjoy life.

The third pair comparison, S13 and S14 from our vignette above, shows a similar trend. As you recall, the father, like the other fathers, puts family first, advocating a balance with work, and the son puts family in the second place. Thus, again the son is more work-centered than his father. Interestingly, they both enjoy the same television program, entitled "Life Fortune;" this show introduces successful persons in the new economy, highlighting their various roads to success. It is remarkable that the father and son both find this program attractive, despite their different values. Of course, the son must live these values in everyday life, while the father, a former factory engineer, is retired and may view them from a distance.

A wider intergenerational comparison of cohorts reveals similar results. The role of work, or career, dominates the lives of the working generation. S7 remarks that "Maybe the values of my generation are different from those of the previous generation. Since I am in my present position, I have to do my job well. I never have weekends and I think I have done what I should do. "

Although members of the younger cohort may have a higher drive toward work than their fathers, it is clear that hard work is also highly valued among the older informants. Despite a common focus on work, there is also a difference between the generations, with the older generation focusing more on *work as life* and *work as a duty*, while the younger generation describes work more as a career for the purpose of earning money and making personal achievements. The following are typical work valuations of the older informants:

(S8)

Work is the most important thing in my life.

(S14)

Q: Who was your biggest role model?

A: I had no role model at all. We just worked hard. That was the only principle not only for me, but all the people around me. If someone didn't work hard, he would be told by others not to behave like that any more. In fact, nobody was taking charge of you. We were very self-conscious. Working hard was the only principle that had guided me since I graduated from the university.

Similarly, many from the younger generation also expressed such a valuation of work as a way of life:

(S7)

Q: What is the most important thing in your life?

A: Work. Each day's work is almost the same for we are engaged in developing software.

(S9)

I thought the most important thing was to do my job well. No matter what I did, I should do it well. Maybe I had the idea that I might do the job all my life.

The value of hard work is also extended into the notion of 'studying hard':

(S15)

Q: Let's go back to 1990. What were the most important things in your life?

The most important thing for me was to study hard in order to go to the university. My parents were school teachers and many excellent students of theirs were enrolled at Tsinghua University, Peking University and Fudan University. So I hoped I could also... This was not only the dream of mine; it was also the dream of many parents. It was impossible for us to have other greater dreams at that time.

In contrast to the work as life or as duty approach, passages about work from some of the businessmen show something different. Work for them may be framed as career and focus on personal achievement. Typical of such passages are the following:

(S13)

But to be honest, I wanted to do some great deeds and achieve success. I began my work as a salesman and I had contributed a lot to many enterprises with one million or 10 million RMB in capital. I could give some useful advice to presidents of the companies who were not experts in their own fields so that they could reach their goals. Company X is a famous Chinese health-care products company. Though its president only attended junior middle school, he managed to develop the company into a large one. After enlarging the company, he had a strong desire for knowledge and wanted to improve himself and therefore he attended training courses in various training centers.

(S15)

Presently in my age, I attach the greatest importance to achieving my goal according to my career plan. ...Therefore, all the members of my company, including me, have a sense of responsibility. I came to this company last year when it was just founded and made an exact career plan. I hoped that I could get to somewhere in a totally new field and that what I do would be really helpful to the development of agriculture, the society, and the country. So far I still feel that our work is sacred and full of a sense of responsibility. I think the most important thing is doing my job well through my own efforts and the efforts of the company. In fact, it's not easy to do it well for no one knows how to do and we are just groping our way along.

Another interviewee links his work not to a general principle of working hard, but rather to the salary he makes from it and the expectations that arise from earning that money:

(S11)

Q: Which ideas make you work hard and improve yourself?

A: There are no specific ideas. I should work hard since I receive a salary. If you receive a salary and work carelessly, you will be fired sooner or later.

Although the notion of “career” and its relation to earning status and money is more common among the younger group, some in the older generation also have an admiration of the status aspects of career. Interviewee 6, for example, most highly admires those who are both successful in their careers in terms of prestige and who have a strong moral character:

(S6)

Up to now, I have always been impressed by those who enjoy a good reputation for their career success and for their character.

In summary, there is an agreement between generations that work is valuable, although our younger informants more readily value work instrumentally for status and money rather than as a simple duty. Furthermore, the younger generation has lost the balance between the value of work and value of family, with work tending now to dominate their value systems.

FAMILY VALUES

We find qualitative differences in how the younger and older cohorts reflect on their families, and these differences are directly connected to their valuations of work. This intergenerational variation could be summarized as the transition from 'work and family' harmony in the older cohort to a 'work then family' ideal in the younger. To clarify, 'work then family' does not imply a postponement of *family formation* as it might in Europe but rather the establishment of a family and the postponement of *qualitative participation* in family life.

To be sure, some from our young cohort of Chinese businessmen do value the family very highly. For example, S5 reports, "The most important thing for me now is my daughter. " Another informant, S9, also rates his family as quite important, although in second place behind personal achievement, in the following passage:

(S9)

Q: Which values are important to you?

A: The first value is to devote myself to the cause I love and make some achievements. The second is that family is very important so that a person's mood will be happy and therefore I value family very much. The third is how to make myself happy. That is to communicate more with friends and make more friends, which I think is very important. And those are my values.

Despite the two above cases which value family very highly, the dominant trend among the businessmen we interviewed in Shanghai is a conflict between the family and work, as illustrated in the following exchange:

(S15)

Q: Do you think some of your values are in conflict with others'?

A: Yes. Take my family values for example. I think family values are very important while my family members and friends don't think that I regard them as important. Nowadays I don't spend much time with my family members for I have little time to do so.

Other informants apparently experience less of a conflict because they clearly value work over family:

(S13)

Q: You have to show your responsibility for your work, your family and your friends. There may exist conflicts among them and if you think more of one aspect, you may think less of the other. How do you handle it?

A: I will think more for the enterprise and less of the family. My wife supports my work very much. For example, she will understand me if I can't go home to have supper with them. I think if you have a sense of responsibility, some conflicts can be resolved successfully.

In one case, Interviewee 7, who has been heavily influenced in his life by Japanese enterprise culture because of time he spent there, has very weak relations with his family and, at the same time, considers his workplace as his family, suggesting the possibility that, for him, one has replaced the other:

I have no communication with my daughter. There is a deep generation gap between us.... I value the enterprise culture, which is like a family conception. What you do is for the company. Of course, you can leave the company but we usually won't do so for the company has cohesiveness, which can hardly be described in words.

The retrospective reports of the young informants indicate, as was reported above, a phasing of high family valuations within the life course *after* the high work valuations of their younger years. Such informants tended to be highly career oriented in their youth and middle years and they transition, income and values allowing, to a leisurely “family-first” phase of their lives thereafter. This is the, perhaps, ideal pattern – in the sense that it seems to lead to an ideal outcome for them – followed by two of our informants (S17, S5). Three informants (S9, S13, S15) remain in the “career” stage of this pattern, and it remains unclear whether they will progress into the family stage or not. Another informant S7, who is 49 years old, has seemingly failed to make this transition. He no longer has the motivation of his younger years, but he also has no strong family to turn to. Instead, he describes his work as his family, since his life as dull, and his personality has seemingly dissolved within his work:

Q: What is the biggest goal in your life?

A: My personal biggest goal is connected with the company's goals for there is no use separating company goals from individual goals. The company has its three-year plans and five-year plans. In the IT industry, especially in a modern enterprise, there are no individual goals to speak of.

A final young Chinese informant, S11, is unique in that he is not yet married and did not yet have a family. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, if material insecurity is indeed

a major motivating factor, he has very low career ambitions compared to his peers; he almost never mentions his job or his goals.

It may be tempting for some readers to see the above patterns of values as natural, since the informants are in the “work phases” of their life courses; thus, a high valuation of career would be expected. However, keep in mind that each informant, except for S11, has a child, their ages ranging between 2 and 19 years old. In other words, these businessmen are *also* within the family-phase of their life courses, so why do their work ambitions trump their family duties?

In strong contrast to these businessmen, there is much less ambivalence and conflict for the older generation when they refer to their family values:

(S6)

In my opinion, family is the most important. The Chinese people always attach great importance to the harmony of family. You will feel it is a pity if you don't enjoy a harmonious family, even though you have an excellent job and earn a lot.

The other older informants also attach great importance to the family and report that this is normal for their generation. Retrospective reports from the four older informants highlight two important points: they were also highly work-oriented during their younger years, but they were not work obsessive to the extent that their family lives suffered. S14 illustrates this point clearly:

Q: How do you coordinate work values with family ones?

A: There is no big problem. Every time when I was on a business trip, I would ask my wife to spend a little more time at home. Sometimes she went to other cities or countries for business reasons, I had to spend more time at home. Usually we didn't leave home for a long time at the same time. Or even if the home was broken into by thieves, we still don't know. So if we both leave home and don't return within half a month or longer, it's not good. So we always took turns and tried to find a balance between work and family. Sometimes both of us had to be on business trip, and then I would postpone my leaving date, because the time was not fixed and could be changed. In such circumstances, my colleagues would leave Shanghai earlier than me. After I finished seeing to matters at home, I went and traveled to the place as well. We adjusted the work to the time. All of us were pure-hearted, so the work just went through smoothly.

In marked contrast to the younger generation, none of our older informants ever devalues the family, is ambivalent about family, or is conflicted about family. This fact is also emphasized within the above father-son comparisons, where in each case, the fathers were considerably more family oriented than their sons.

Filial Piety

Corresponding to our intergenerational enhancement of work at the expense of family, we sense a gap among the informants on the issue of filial piety, or respect of parents and elders. Whereas Chinese culture traditionally has placed filial relations as the core of Chinese social relations, only our older informants speak about filial piety when asked about their values. For example, in response to the question about whether any specific principles guide his actions, S6 reports⁹:

In our life, we attach great importance to the ethics and morality in a family, such as respecting and being filial to parents and the elders. So we think these aspects are very important.

This man also attempts to pass these values on to his children and grandchildren:

In general, I just educate them about the family, such as to respect and be filial to parents and to elders.

S14 reports on his filial values in a similar way:

Be respectful to parents and others. Now my children are very respectful to us. I think this is because I am very respectful to my father. They see it and remember it. Then they are also respectful to my father and me. We are respectful to each other in the family. You know, family is the smallest element of the society. If you can't manage your family well, how can you work well and manage other people?

Both of these older informants highly value traditional Chinese filial relations and try to pass this value onto the newer generations, and the second man implies that this value-transmission has been successful. However, the interviews with the younger generation show that not only do these two particular informants' sons not mention filial piety as a value, but our younger informants almost never mention filial relations. One exception is S17, who notes the importance of elders in the following passage:

However, if an old person celebrates its 90th birthday, it's impossible for you to postpone it. In this case, I will lay my work aside. As a result, I will do those things first which can't be changed.

The younger generation's near total silence on the issue of respecting elders is also noticed by some informants. S7, who himself does not seem to value filial relations, laments that his daughter and her generation are no better: "They won't express thanks to their parents and they won't learn from their parents, either. " Perhaps explaining some of the declining respect for the older generation, many in the younger generation express that they had no adequate role models during the transition years, since their parents lacked the requisite knowledge and skills to succeed. S5 notes this fact:

⁹ Interview 6, due to technical reasons, was not properly recorded. The interviewer reconstructed the interview according to his memory and notes.

Q: Who set the most important example for you in your life?

A: Do you mean when I was a middle school student or before then?

Q: Fifteen years ago?

A: Finally, you've got me to say things about 15 years ago. (He laughs.) My father was my example. However, after I entered college, I found that he wasn't above me in many aspects. In the college, I had no example to follow.

As you recall from the vignette, S13, or 'Yang', like many of the informants, took his role models from popular culture, rather than from his family:

I haven't had any definite role models. The "Life Fortune" program and the guests interviewed by the "Chinese entrepreneurs" [television programs] are all my role models. I want to combine all the strong points of every successful entrepreneur together and learn from them.

One of the exceptions is our 'social' S11, who learned much from his parents, but admits that they have perhaps become a bit outdated:

Q: What values do you learn from your teachers and parents?

A: I have learnt almost nothing from my teachers as to how to behave, but I have learnt much knowledge from them. My parents have a greater influence on me in values. And I have learnt much from them. They are farmers, honest and upright. I am honest and upright too, which I sometimes display to others.

The older informants, of course, recognize that they do not earn the respect that they perhaps believe they deserve:

(S4)

People care more and more about themselves and feel less and less responsible for the society. Take my wife and me as an example. Nobody will give up his seat to us on a bus. It was not the case in the 1950s and the 1960s when we were young. We often gave up our seats to the old. Even now, if we have seats, we still give up to those who need help such as pregnant women or women with baby in their arms.

Thus, there seems to be a tension between our younger cohort and their parents. How are their relations with their own children?

Children

It is important to ask *whether* or not parents are inclined to engage in the work of value transmission to their children, especially considering their high work valuations simultaneous to their fatherhood. Within the interviews, this issue is specifically inquired about through the question of "which values would you like to transmit to your children or grandchildren?" In every case, our older informants give examples of the values they try to transmit to the younger generations. Here are two examples:

(S8)

Q: Which values did you try to instill in your grandchildren?

A: I told them how to behave. I told them to live morally straight. Those who were studying should study hard and those who were working should work hard as well.

...Everyone should make more contributions and ask for less. I just told them such kinds of things.

...But modern social values are different from ours. Now when I talk to them, they would always say, "you lived in such a period that you are bound to undergo a hard life. Now it's time for us to enjoy life." Our values are totally different so my communications with them work little.

In sharp contrast, most of the young informants (with the exceptions of S9 and S15) do not, or cannot, name values which they would like to pass on to their children. Some informants are noticeably caught off guard and are unable to answer the question. The following exchange is a notable example of this phenomenon:

(S5)

Q: Thanks. Now your daughter is nearly three years old and she will attend preschool soon.

A: It's too early to talk about such things. She is not old enough to go to preschool.

Q: Two or three years later?

A: Yes, three years later.

Q: What values and principles do you require in her?

A: I haven't thought of such a question. You are requiring me to think of the problems of 15 years later. (He laughs.)

Q: Don't you think she should develop some values and principles from an early age?

A: I think I will let her lead a princess life for raising a daughter involves more money than raising a son. We have to find opportunities to let her broaden her mind, buy nice things for her and take her to go on holidays abroad regularly so as to heighten her horizon. Then, we will find a good husband for her. After that, we don't hold much responsibility for her. The reason for broadening her mind is for the fear that she might choose a husband who isn't suitable for her. It's the main reason for doing so.

Another pattern is that the businessmen consciously choose to not impart any specific values into their children and rather preferred to let them develop naturally and independently:

(S11)

Q: You are not married yet. When you get married and have children, which values will you instill in your children?

A: I won't instill anything in him purposely. The qualities of my girlfriend and me are enough to influence him gradually and there is no need to do so. I will let him develop and express himself freely and I won't care too much about him. My only wish is to have more kids. (He laughs.) I shouldn't spend too much time on my kid for he can develop in the direction he chooses.

In one unique case, S7 expresses the irrelevance of the question for him, for the generation gap between him and his daughter is too big. Instead, he turns inward as a reaction against this alienation between him and his daughter:

Q: What kind of values and principles will you instill in your children?

A: I don't know how to tell her those values and principles for I have no communication with my daughter. There is a deep generation gap between us. Children today have no gratitude for the family except for the sake of money. They won't express thanks to their parents and they won't learn from their parents, either.

Q: Have you ever tried to change this situation?

A: I won't do that for I am tired of this phenomenon. There is no need to do so and there is no possibility of success. It will be better to think only of myself.

In contrast to the other businessmen, interviewees S9 and S15 are unique in that they can easily answer the question about which values they would like to pass to their children:

(S9)

For children, I think the most important thing is to instill a certain value in them. That is to be open-minded to everyone and everything. If he can endure many problems, he will be sound in mind. And that's a requirement for me as well. Other values? Maybe it's being good at communication. Children should be good at communication. And they should know to show love to others and be sincere to others.

However, for S15, it becomes clear that a real-world time conflict between work and family interferes as he tries to implement his ideal values in his son:

(S15)

Q: Are these conflicts a source of anxiety or do they make you feel bad?

A: No. Generally speaking, the conflicts won't make me feel bad except conflicts in the family. I remember several days ago when I went back home, my son was very naughty so I spanked him. My wife complained, "Why did you beat him? You have spent so little time with him." I replied, "All of you are kind to him, there should be someone who is strict to him. I just spanked him and yelled at him." However, I feel guilty about spending too little time with them.

Concerning father-son pairs, S14 has successfully transmitted the value of independence to his son, but the son, S13, has not echoed the father's valuation of thrift, respect for parents, or family. In other words, he has exaggerated the message of

independence and self-realization above the other values. In another pair, S5 and S6, S5 does not know which values he wishes to pass onto his daughter aside from hoping she finds a good husband and is not a burden, despite the fact that his father has emphasized the values of filiality and hard work. Another informant, S8, emphasizes thrift and social contributions as values he has tried to pass to his children, but his son S7 has not tried to implant any specific values within his daughter 15 years ago, and now he says the gap between them is too great.

MATERIALIST VALUES

Individual retrospective reports indicate a high degree of material aspirations at the beginning of the transformation in China. S5 for example, had a high ambition to attain material security during this period. S11 also was highly materialistic at the beginning of the transformation, as he came from a poor background. Similarly, S15 says he is less materialistic now than in the early 1990's because now he "has owned what I should own." S17 notes he is less focused on material wealth now than before, since he has already accumulated a good deal of wealth, and now he is happy to "live a simple life" and focus on health and family.

Another trend is the shift from high material aspirations and low consumption to low aspirations and high consumption. For example, S17, who plans to retire early, notes that he is happy to live "the simple life," but this means retiring at age 45 and spending the rest of his life in leisure and travel. For S5, now that he has become materially comfortable, he spends large amounts of money on treating his daughter to toys. S11 also consumes a lot, appropriate to the level of his income, but he no longer has the lack of material security which drove him before. In contrast to this pattern, S13 was also materialistic at the beginning of the transition, but has not lost his material ambitions:

Q: How did you think about money and material things in the past? And how do you think about them now?

A: In the past, I had a friend in Guangdong who was the same age as me. After graduation from college, he worked as a salesman in a joint venture. He knew how to entertain himself and he had a high income. When we went to play together, he would ride a motorbike. I admired him very much and I wanted to ride a motorbike too. I told him that: "I earned 72RMB in 1988 and if I can earn 10,000RMB each year, I will be very happy." He replied: "it's very simple to earn 10,000 RMB." Later on, he went to do business as a merchant and earned several million RMB. I was very impressed by what I saw when I went to visit him in his company.

Q: His deeds impressed and encouraged you greatly?

A: It didn't play a crucial role but only influenced me gradually.

Q: Do you think more about money and material things than you did before?

A: I want to make money through my creativity and the added value created by me for the company. My current 200,000RMB annually is not my whole income. My income also includes bonuses given by the leaders according to the marketing situation by the end of each year. What I am thinking now is whether I can succeed. I think that you can get much after you succeed. "The winner is the king and the loser is the servant."

S7, in contrast to the others, indicates he has not become more materialistic with the transformation, but he complains that his daughter's generation only cares about money. Like S7, S9 says he has also resisted becoming more materialistic, although he indicates the importance of profit-oriented thinking in business in the following excerpt:

I think, in my line of business, everyone is almost the same with others and we think little about money and material things. We can meet life's basic demands and think little of our individual lives. As for the enterprises, the more the profits are, the better, which is absolute.

Important here is the split he introduces between profit-oriented thinking at work and non-materialism outside of work. Also in relation to materialism at work, S13 notes the importance of money for maintaining one's image:

I can't dress casually as I am the president of the company. I didn't pay much attention to my image in the past but now I can't do that anymore. I have to think carefully about clothes, consumption, and the brands of products. To tell the truth, I won't buy things from stands along the streets nor will I go to have dinner in a small restaurant. I think a western suit worth several thousand RMB is acceptable, but I will think it a waste of money to buy a suit worth tens of thousands RMB.¹⁰

S15 has a similar view, since, although he claims to no longer be materialistic, he adds with a sly smile that "money indeed represents success."

The retrospective reports of the older generation informants show that they have not changed at all in terms of their materialistic values. They each highly value thrift and tend to look down on the materialism of the younger generations. For example, S4 reports that "the society has become too commercialized and I'm not satisfied with it." S8 decries the effects of gambling on society, and sticks to his old values, probably because of his age and lack of need to adapt:

Even now I still stick to the traditional values such as diligence and hardworking, thinking of others before myself. One reason for this is that I am quite old now. The other reason is that there is no need for me to

¹⁰ The prices he mentions are several hundred US dollars for an acceptably priced Western suit, and several thousand dollars for a suit that is too expensive. In comparison to these prices of —Western — brand-name suits, one can buy a high quality Western-style tailor-made suit in markets in Shanghai for as little as \$50.

enjoy the high-level of consuming. To meet the basic demand of life is enough for me. These were also the traditional values I held in the past.

S6 and S14, without openly condemning the materialism of the younger generation, nonetheless have not changed their traditional valuations of thrift.

Father-son pair comparisons also demonstrate a trend of expanded material aspirations in the younger generations, which is especially notable considering the high traditional valuation of thrift in China. While S6 highly values pragmatism, thrift, and de-emphasis of material accumulation, his son, S5, seems to demonstrate an excessive focus on possessions, for example, in his purchase of toys for his daughter “every two to three days” in the following excerpt:

Q: Since your daughter is still small, she won't ask much from you.

A: No, she has high requirements and I have to buy toys for her.

Q: Do the toy costs make up a large proportion in your expenditures?

A: I think they make up a medium proportion, from 500RMB to 600RMB¹¹ every month.

Q: What is your principle in deciding to buy a toy for her? How do you decide whether to buy toys for her or not? Or you buy her toys whenever she wants?

A: Ummm... no principles.

Q: Do you meet her reasonable requirements?

A: I will meet her unreasonable requirements as well. (He laughs.) Usually, I buy her one thing every two or three days.

While S7 does not reveal much materialism in his own interview, his father (S8) seems to complain about the materialism of the younger generations and of his son and his daughter specifically:

The youngsters hold different opinions that they always consume and enjoy life in advance. When we were young, we were told to be frugal and we held the opinion that we should enjoy life after we struggled. Even now I still cannot change my mind. How much money I spend totally depends on how much money I own. I will never spend my next-month's salary. So we fall behind the young people, oh no, not the young people, we fall behind the current society and cannot catch up with it. At that time we were frugal and never spent more money than we had. What could we do if we lost our jobs? How could we pay the debt? I also worried about it. But now, the youngsters have different experiences and opinions...Now things have changed. The economic level has been improved a lot. For example, my daughter and her husband are working in Japan and earn a lot of money. My son also gets a good salary. However, I often say to them, “even when you are rich, you shouldn't

¹¹ This is approximately \$75 to \$85 per month.

spend all the money you have. You must think of the future and the resources.”

The difference between S13 and S14, our vignette pair, is less notable. Although both father and son demonstrate high thrift in their interviews, as noted above with his need to purchase expensive suits, the son does engage occasionally in high consumption for the purpose of maintaining his image.

A comparison between the generations as groups within my interviews also demonstrates the tension between the traditional Chinese value of thrift and modern consumerism and heightened materialism among the younger informants. First, it is shown that thrift remains a core value among several of the Shanghai businessmen we interviewed. However, several of the businessmen (S5, S9, and S11) did not mention thrift at all, while every one of the older interviewees spoke of it as an important value. The following is a typical valuation of thrift by the older generation:

(S4)

Nowadays, my wife and I still flush the toilet with water that we have used to do the washing. It is stressed that rubbish should be classified. So have we have done this. There are lots of newspapers in my house. We sell them so as to save resources by recycling.

Some from the younger generation also refer to thrift within the interviews:

(S13)

I will make a balance and I will take control of my consumption. I will set an example for others and seldom attend dinners and parties and therefore I don't spend too much money. ...When I worked in company X, I couldn't spend the several thousand RMB I earned each month. I don't like to waste money.

However, some businessmen do not mention thrift at all, and, among those who do, there is a noticeable tension between the traditional value of thrift and the modern value of consumerism, as was noted in an excerpt above where a smiling S15 reveals that money indeed represents success. A similar revelation is in the following excerpt:

(S9)

I am not particular about consumption, and don't have higher requirements. I think there is a link between success and consumption, but it's not necessarily always so. A person doesn't mark his success by means of consumption. I personally think success is to do what you should do well. Of course, I don't deny that sometimes consumption is a criterion for success, for example, you can go on a holiday when you have time, etc.

A growth in materialism is indicated between generations, where I have found that, for our informants, the younger businessmen are much more materialistic than their fathers.

For example, each of the older informants expresses low material aspirations to the extent that they do not desire more than they need or more than they can afford:

(S8)

I have no demand of material things. I don't regard money as so important. But there is a premise: how much money I spend depends on how much money I have. I think there is no need to save money. I'd like to spend money that I have. But I have no other extra demand. For example, my wife wants to travel to the United States, and then we went there. We could afford the costs, so why not? If we cannot afford it, there is no way for us to demand more.

In contrast, several informants from the younger group express their high valuation of materialism and wealth. The following is an example:

(S13)

I appreciate the following words said by Jiacheng Li: Money means only a number for me now and the process to make money is the process to manifest success. The number is indicative of the correctness of one's decisions.

It would give a false impression to say that all of the businessmen we interviewed could be considered "materialistic." Number 15, for example, seems to be non-materialistic in private life, but admits that money still represents success for him, and at work, he is expected to focus on profits and value money above everything else:

(S15)

I had an early start in my present field so I concern myself little about material things. However, I care about material things for my company and my business.

As shown above, some of the material and consumption pressures arise from work requirements. However, some of them arise from within the family. These businessmen consider it their duty to "provide for" their families:

(S13)

Q: Do you have any plans for going on vacation?

A: Basically, I will have a plan for each long holiday, but I didn't go out during this National Day holiday. I will go out with my family. I think as a successful man, you should be kind to your family members and make sure that they can't feel the pressure of life.

(S15)

I hope my family members will be all healthy in the future. I want to let them be happy through my efforts. For example, if they want to visit foreign countries, they can just go ahead and do what they want to do without concerning themselves about the material things.

In summary, the interviews reveal three sources of enhanced materialism among the younger generation: the necessity of consumption for cultivating a professional image, the need to focus on profit calculation within the business, and a focus on the family's material security.

OTHER VALUES

Friendships

Compared to older generation, friendship is valued more highly in the younger. It is referred to more often as an ideal among the younger generation. The older also spend time with friends, as evidenced by the time diaries, but they do not speak of friendship nearly as often as the younger as an ideal.

Typical of the younger generation is S9, who, according to his time diaries, spends a considerable amount of free time with his friends. He says one of his goals "is to communicate more with friends and make more friends, which I think is very important." S11 is also quite friendship oriented, and he drinks tea, plays cards, billiards and badminton with friends during the weekends and had a similar arrangement 15 years ago. Interestingly, S11 limits the size of his circle of friends to 5 or 6 people. His reasons for doing so seem to be over a fear of being exploited, or used, by his friends. He notes, "In our society, some people need to reach their goals by personal relationships. I like making friends but I don't like to and am not used to succeeding through personal relationships." He says, instead he makes "friends for the purpose of making more friends, which doesn't involve economic benefits or other purposes. I have many friends but few best friends." He distinguishes between two types of friendship relations: those for a common work goal and friends which do not use one another for gain. His non-instrumental friendships are initiated, he says, when it is clear someone appreciates him rather than merely wants to use him.

S13 is ambiguous in that he says he refuses to allow his friendships to become instrumentalized; he refuses to have dinners with customers, for example, because of potential conflicts of interests. 15 years ago, he says, he did this more often. Today, he rather spends much free time with his non-work-related friends, playing tennis, and eating dinner with them. On the other hand, he notes:

If you have to do business, you have to get help from others. If not, others will go to ask for your help for you can't run a business all by yourself as the division of labor is more and more obvious nowadays. For example, if a friend asks me to do business with him, I will give him a chance if he

has a good character and a strong ability. My principle of making friends is that I will surely help you if I can and you should lend me a hand when I am in need, too.

Also contradictory to earlier anti-instrumentalization claims is that he bends the rules for his friends, in contrast to his earlier claim that he does not mix business and friendship:

Yes. My friend asks me to give a job opportunity for his child. My requirement is that you should have the ability to do the job. It's just like taking an exam. You are required to score 60 to pass it. If you score 55 or 50, I will let you pass; if you score only 30, I won't let you pass. You should at least meet my requirements and conditions.

Noticeable both with this informant and the last is their sensitivity regarding the issue of exploitation and instrumentalization within friendships; they find it necessary to clarify how they are different.

Also, there are indications that work puts a stress on these intimate friendships as it did family. S15 notes that "I hope I will keep my relationships with my friends all the time. Sometimes devoting myself to work too much makes me communicate with friends less and less. But I hope I will always be able to keep my personal relations and friendship with them."

However, other informants maintain instrumental friendships that are closely tied to work and mutual gain. These instrumentalized friendships do not appear to suffer the same stress as the non-instrumental ones. S9, for example, spends much time with his friends and has no problem with using these networks for instrumental purposes:

Q: Compared with before, do you think people more often use you for money or material gains?

A: If I can make contributions to my company through my personal relationships, I will definitely do so and in fact, I have done much work for my company. Can I say it in detail? For example, in terms of assets, I will turn to my friends and long-term cooperative partners for help.

Nonetheless, S9 possesses what might be called modern friendship ideals, with mutual understanding being a key value between him and his friends.

For S17 as well, instrumentalized friendship networks are considered normal. He considers a "good group of friends" one of the most important things in his life and maintains a small group of 3 to 5 "best friends," with whom he gets along with well. His friends come from diverse backgrounds, from his community and business as well, and he views helping his friends in need as a duty:

Q: Compared to before, do you think people more often use you for material gain?

A: I'm glad to do so. We have made use of others when we started our company.

Q: Do more and more people make use of you?

A: If my friends ask me for help, I will do whatever I can.

Q: Compared to before, is it more tempting for you to think about using others for help?

A: It's the same as before when it comes to turning to friends for help. However, such kinds of situations are very rare and more and more people come to me for help.

For older informants making use of personal networks and helping out their friends is also quite normal. S4, however, notes that society has become more "merit-based," and that it is less common to obtain benefits merely through relations:

Q: Are there any relatives of friends who want to find a good job through your help?

A: Yes. It was much easier to do so in the past. Now things have changed. How good a job you can obtain depends on your ability. (He took out a CV.) You see, he has majored in sociology and graduated from Zhejiang University. He wanted to find a job in Shanghai. I once talked with [my friend,] the chairman of the sociology department in Shanghai University. The chair said an undergraduate with average ability is not well-accepted, even if he or she is from a prestigious university. So I said to my relative that he should continue his study to get a master's even a doctor's degree. One of my friends from Shanghai Institute of Social Science told me that even PhD's are still not sure to be accepted there. Later my relative found a job in Ningbo on his own.

...Generally speaking, I'm glad to help others. I often help others through recommendation. For the most part, I help others to look for good hospitals and excellent doctors.

Several informants rarely address friendship within the interviews. For two older informants, S8 and S14, they spend much time with their friends, but apparently did not feel the need to address the friendship in the interview. For another informant, the younger S7, he mentions once the importance of his childhood friends, but his time diaries reveal very little contact to persons outside of his "boring" company life. S5 never mentions his friends at all.

It is clear that friendship, in both its intimate and instrumental forms is a key value among the younger generation in comparison to older informants, who rarely mention it. However, no notable patterns between valuation of friendship and the valuation family and work can be found, except that extraordinarily high valuation of work may stress intimate friendships more than instrumental ones.

Nation

In terms of their orientation toward the country, there is an intergenerational gap between the informants. The older generation consistently speaks of the country as a whole and the importance of benefiting society. S4 remembers:

When we were young, we were very vigorous. We were vigorous for our country and hoped the country would become great. We took whatever orders the party gave. Maybe we thought in a very simple way at that time. We always hoped for a better country and a progressive society.

S8 had, and has, an equal level of idealism:

Frankly speaking, in old China, I strove for a society in which nobody would starve and be out of work. As a 20-year-old young man, I worried about the people who suffered from starvation. I joined the hunger march and anti-Civil-War march. Our biggest goal was to overthrow the social system that oppressed the people. We have fulfilled our goals today. New China has been founded and the society is better than before. Basically, China's state of being poor and dropping behind has changed, though there is still little employment. The society is much better than before although all the people are not well-off. This is my biggest goal.

Another older informant, S14, is equally nation-oriented:

Since the adoption of the reform and opening up policy, China has undergone tremendous changes in many aspects. In the 16th National Congress of Communist Party of China, we Chinese set the goal that in 2010, the gross domestic product should be doubled and an all-round well-off society should be built up.

In contrast, many of the younger generation do not orient themselves in such a nationalist way. S7, for example, notes "I want to leave this country. I can't change the situation and the only way is to get away from it." Others simply openly don't care about politics or the country, such as S5:

Q. Then what is your final goal?

A. It's the same with what I have just said. In fact, it's quite simple. I don't think of helping people frequently, nor do I think of making great contributions to the country. Many people have the same mind with me.

The biggest reason for their lack of concern about wider society again appears to be their focus on business and enterprise. S9's biggest goal in life, for example, is a competitive one, "to develop my enterprise into the best one in China."

There are exceptions to this trend. S15, for example, links his business pursuits to the nation's well-being:

Therefore, all the members of my company, including me, have got a sense of responsibility. I came to this company last year when it was just founded and made an exact career plan. I hoped that I could get to somewhere in a totally-new field and that what I do would be really

helpful to the development of the agriculture, the society and the country.

Another younger informant, S11, is quite politically and nationally oriented. As a child, he dreamed to become the vice mayor of Shanghai. Today, he still admires those involved in bettering the country:

A: I admire those who have a great influence on our state politics and economy and those who promote progress and development, such as Wu Yi (vice premier of the state department) and Wu Dawei (vice foreign minister)

Q: What do you admire about them?

A: Their comprehensive qualities: knowing what to do and how to do it safeguarding our country's benefits.

Nonetheless, S11 is an exception to a trend of the younger cohorts being less nation and society-oriented than the older generation.

SUMMARY

In summary, the Chinese qualitative findings show marked intergenerational differences across the dimensions of work, family, materialist, other values. Regarding work values, the younger Chinese generation is considerably more career and achievement oriented than the generation of their fathers, according to our interviews. This orientation appears to have been fueled by rising ambitions at the beginning of the transformation period.

This study also notes an intergenerational gap in family values among the Chinese informants, a gap strongly connected to the burgeoning growth of new work values. The said family value gap could be annotated as a transition from a 'work *and* family' outlook in the older generation to a 'work *then* family' rationality among the younger cohort. Our older informants are never ambiguous concerning the high value of family for them. In contrast, the younger persons are quite ambivalent about family, with some openly devaluing family life compared to their work goals and some experience work-family conflicts never mentioned by the older cohort. This low valuation of family also extends to the younger cohort's devaluation of filial piety *and* a comparative lack of focus on socializing the next generation.

Another value gap between generations is found across the various dimensions of materialist values. Like their fathers, the young businessmen and managers are concerned about their material security, but unlike the older generation, the younger has heightened material ambitions and consumption patterns. This is especially noticeable in the fading of the traditional Chinese value of thrift, or saving money. This value is directly under

pressure from new consumption patterns, especially arising from necessities of image cultivation, the money-focus at work, concern about the family's material well-being amid an instable economy, and from the allure of luxuries, and most of these pressures are not found within the older cohort.

The generations also appear to be different in their friendship values. While both generations appear to be friendship-oriented, according to their time-diaries, the younger generation is more vocally so, especially in comparison to their family values. In our study, some of the younger informants, when they speak of friends, also find it necessary to mention a difference between 'real' friends and friends who use one another, suggesting that some friendships suffer from excess instrumentalization. This suggests that the traditional Chinese weak ties (*guanxi*) are increasingly become instrumentalized, whereas they were previously more intimately rooted.

Regarding the valuation of even more distant others, such as the greater community and the nation, there is a large gap, again, between generations, with the older generation considerably more nationalistic and society-oriented, with members of the younger generation focused on their careers instead.

CHAPTER 6. THE 'NEW RUSSIAN': QUALITATIVE FINDINGS FOR RUSSIA

...I am comprised of two different persons. One of them is a family type. When I go back to [the city where my wife and children live], I am a family devoted person: I clean my little children's behinds, I kiss my children, I take them horse riding and tennis playing. These things bring me enormous pleasure. The other person is the Moscow one. This means lechery, the night clubs, et cetera.

Moscow informant, M5

VIGNETTE

Igor (M5) is 47 years old and lives a luxurious life as an extraordinarily wealthy marketing tycoon. He has been married multiple times and has many children. Although his business is based in Moscow, he lives both there and in another major European city, where his family lives. His father, Sergei (M6), is a 77 year-old retired engineer. The contrast between them is great indeed.

The father is non-materialistic. He speaks with admiration of contemporary writers who refuse to put materialism in the first place. His attitude toward material goods is that they should not be "turned into idols." The son, in contrast, speaks often of money, both as a means of fulfilling his "entertainment" needs, and earlier, as a necessity for taking care of the family. "Everyone would like to live a nice life," and being rich enables this, he says. While Sergei views non-materialism as an ideal value for children, Igor complains that his own son (Sergei's grandson) is completely materialistic and lazy. Ironically, Igor wants to ease his son out of these traits by inducing him to attend college through buying him a new car.

Sergei highly values honesty, and mentions it as a value he would like his grandchildren to inherit, but Igor, his son, does not mention honesty, and, by his own admission, got his start in business through mafia and criminal activity. This value gap between them seems to extend to morality in general. Sergei believes there should be moral constraints on one's behavior; it shouldn't be "live how you want to live," he emphasizes. In contrast, Igor spends his time in Moscow, away from his family, involved in hedonistic pursuits, such as, in his words, drinking, night clubs, and lechery."

Sergei and his son Igor also have very different opinions of Russia's oligarch class. While the elder Sergei despises Khodorkovskii - the oil tycoon imprisoned by Putin ostensibly for tax evasion because he "took everything valuable [from the country] and did not give anything in return," the younger Igor idolizes Khodorkovskii. In another example, Igor admires films about the Russian oligarchs, while Sergei says such films are mostly about criminals.

Finally, Igor is also more conflicted than his father. He realizes that there is a conflict between his two lives, one in Moscow and the other with his family in the other city. This is a conflict, he says, between family and entertainment needs: going out drinking and clubbing, for which "having more money is all that is needed."

The differences between Sergei and Igor exemplify the intergenerational gap in values between the older and younger generation within my informants.

WORK

Retrospective reports from the informants allude to the expansion of work-focus at the beginning of the transition. Igor, from the above vignette, notes that work came first for him during his period, while M1, another informant, refers to the growth of work as a "calling" for him during those years. The expansion of these work values, also reported by M9, is likely due to the material insecurities brought about during this period in Russia, which M7 calls "hungry and poor years." Igor, for instance describes his extraordinarily high work regimen at the beginning of the transformation years, and the effects this had upon his family:

The reason for losing my first family was that I worked a lot. I mean that I spent whole days working and the children did not see much of me. Additionally my wife stopped taking care of them and lost interest in me as well. Generally, the family fell apart. That is why currently I have limited influence on the children.

This heightened work focus appears to have continued until enough material resources were accumulated, as was the case with all young informants except for M9 and M11. M9 is not as wealthy as the others, while M11 is extraordinarily achievement-oriented and has not yet fulfilled his material and career goals. Once their material well-being was achieved, informants transitioned into a second stage of life, with some taking time out for family (M7) and others devoting their lives to leisure (M5). Some informants, such as M1, do not transition out of this work stage, even when they have enough. He rather continues to devote all his time to work without reassigning his priorities to family or leisure, for work for him brings "moral calm."

In contrast, most older informants, M6, M2, and M12, did not experience an expansion of their work values during the early transformation years, as they were retired. The two older informants who continued to work during these years also illustrate enhanced work valuations at this stage of their lives, despite their age. This is the case with M10 and M8, the latter of which is a workaholic valuing the family only "by default."

Comparing the generations more directly leads to the same result, with the younger cohorts experiencing adaptive expansion of work values in comparison to the older generation. One small piece of evidence for this is that time diary data indicate that most of the young cohort work at least one weekend day per week, as opposed to their fathers, who reported having their weekends free during Soviet times.

One father-son pair that fits the expected pattern is M5 and M6, from the vignette at the beginning of the chapter. For the father, M6, work was his "second love," behind the family. In contrast, at the beginning of the transformation, work for the son came first. Now the son is in an advanced stage of success, where the business functions on its own, but he does not spend his extra time with his family. Rather, he is torn between spending his money, which he calls "leisure," and spending time with his family.

A similar comparison may be M1 and M2. M2, the father, barely speaks of work at all, even when referring to the past. In contrast, M1, who is quite content and lives in much material comfort, works quite hard and long hours, but is ambivalent on *why* he values work. At first, he says his interest in working is for the love of the job itself, which he calls the "protestant ethic," which is related to a sense of "moral calm" which he feels while working. Later, he notes that the job is for making money, after all, and that is his primary interest in it. He speaks of work in a complex way: it is something he started to do in order to make money, for material security, and in so doing he found a sense of moral calm within, a secular "calling" in the Weberian sense, and now he sees the money as a side benefit of doing what he likes.

M11, like most from his generation, feels compelled to work a lot, both for material security and the well-being of his family, while his mother M12, although she was a hard worker in Soviet times as a single mother and sole wage-earner, is fortunate to now be a retiree supported by her son.

A contrasting case would be M7 and M8, where the son is more family-oriented than the father, and the father is a workaholic who values the family on the side. Both are similar in that they work a lot, and in order to provide for their families. The main difference is that the father had to undergo extreme adaptation with the transformation in order to rush to commercialize his new business, while the son's transition appears to have been smoother. Stronger adaptive pressures led to the father's enhanced work-orientations, thereby facilitating his success within the new economic system at the expense of his familial values.

Likewise, M9 and M10, both working, the son in landscape design and the father selling computers, report working harder since the transformation began. The son complains that he has to work on Saturdays occasionally in his present line of work, while his father works even more, having only two free days *per month*, on average.

FAMILY

Family values appear to negatively correlate with the work orientations of the Moscow informants, with the more work-centered informants the least family-centered, and vice versa. In terms of staging, as introduced in the above section on work, the older informants appear to have embraced a "work and family" philosophy, while the younger function more on a "work then family" basis, intending to delay their qualitative time spent with the family until the process of material accumulation is complete.

One pair that meets this pattern is M9 and M10. Although both of them established their own businesses during the transition, the son's family and friendship orientations became challenged:

I just recall myself in the 80s. The opinion of classmates was important for me then. But I didn't care about it after 91, as everything had collapsed. A kind of mind individualization had happened. I realized that I do not need to count on anybody; I can count just on myself, maybe partly on my parents and a couple of friends. All the rest was not important.

This "individualization" was not one experienced by the father, as he remained 'family first' during the transformation years, stating "The most important thing is the family. I cannot think of something else."

A quite similar case is the M11-M12 pair. The mother, now retired, is family-centered, in that she cares much for her son and grandson and speaks often of them in the interview. In contrast, M11 notes that his goals are:

Success, material satisfaction, influence. I am forced to say that the family comes last, but this is because of internal problems. I have such problems in my family that I need...how to say it...for the security and the well-being of my family I have to work a lot. Currently, the situation is not quite normal...

Here, even though his striving for material security is partially in the name of the family's troubles, both of these are trumped by his striving for personal success and "respect from others." Note here that the family is not actively devalued, but is rather devalued as an indirect consequence of focusing on personal achievement and material accumulation.

The M1-M2 pair is exceptional on two counts. First, the younger M1 does not appear to strive toward greater family participation even at some point in the future. Second, his father is also more individualized than other members of his cohort. The work-centered M1, whose time diaries indicate he spends very few days at home (3 per month), says this time is "enough," and appears to not be overly interested in family participation, even in the future. The reason for this appears to be his is extreme attachment to work as a source of peace and calm. In contrast, the father (M2) does speak a bit more of family, in the sense of the value of respecting elders and helping with family when he can, but his orientation, rather than being family-centered, is more toward the nation and the state of the overall society. Certainly a high national orientation is common among the older informants, as will be described below, but it usually exists alongside a more ostensibly valued family.

The M7-M8 pair is also unique in that the son is more family-centered than the father. M7, as already noted, is an exception within the younger cohort in that he remains family-centered despite his hard work. He claims this as a life-stage effect, in that he "naturally" became more family focused when he had children; this should be viewed in contrast to the claim that work 'normally' comes first at this stage of life. Nonetheless, even for this comparatively family-centered informant, he admits that his father is less a role model now than he was before. As noted above, M8, the father, is also the exception in the older generation in that he values family less highly than his son. For him, family is reduced to "a life condition":

Q. A lot of people put family values in the first place. What is your attitude towards the family?

A. It is a life condition. There are factors and there are life conditions. The impact of the factors depends on their scope and the conditions are necessary by default. Well, the family is such condition.

The father-son pair from the vignette, M5 and M6, also greatly contrasts in regard to family. While M5 ostensibly places family first, noting that, in terms of importance, "the first thing that comes into my mind is the family. Second comes entertainment and the third place is most probably for work," this contention is challenged by statements in other portions of the interview, such as his contention that he is divided into two competing personalities:

I am comprised of two different persons. One of them is a family type. When I go back to [the city where my wife and children live], I am a family devoted person: I clean my little children's behinds, I kiss my children, I take them horse riding and tennis playing. These things bring

me enormous pleasure. The other person is the Moscow one. This means lechery, the night clubs, etc.

His father M5, values both the family and the country quite highly, but he is absent of the apparent "Dr. Jeckle and Mr. Hyde" split in family versus non-family personality possessed by his son.

Children

Among many father-son pairs, there is a clear tension between generations concerning the socialization of the new generations. The younger generation has the intent of letting its children grow up more independently, while its high valuation of materialism appears to unintentionally affect its children.

For M1, a clear individualistic tendency is noted in comparison to his father. M1 expects his daughter to handle her problems herself. "If it's her problem - then it's not ours," he notes. He is ready to help only if she needs it. 15 years ago, when she was just a toddler, he says he never thought about ideal values for her, whereas now, he wishes for her to be diligent and independent. The teenager's grandfather, M2, lists a variety of ideal values for her, such as that she be decent, responsible, and preserve the family's honor. He says that if she needs help, he will drop everything and do all he can for her, apparently in contrast to her father's tendency to let her first learn to solve problems for herself.

For M5, the advertising tycoon, he wishes that his children learn to be creative and productive, to earn money through helping others, and to avoid being a mere consumer. M6, his father, identifies honesty and non-materialism as ideal values for children. Evidently there is some difficulty of actually implementing or transmitting these ideals to the youngest generation, for M5 regrets the currently lazy and materialistic attitude of his son, but seems unable to break it down. In this interview, the son's socialization is impeded by the father's high valuation of work and the comfort brought by his high income. Here, the father admits his addiction to work:

Previously the only thing I had was work, now I have a family. I am very grateful to my current wife for her struggle with my tough character because it is really tough. I am grateful also for the fact that she teaches me values and the necessity of cuddling with my children, which I lacked before. The problem for me is that my whole life is focused on business.

However, he reports that his son does nothing, only plays computer games all day long and acts as a consumer. His strategy to get his son to change perhaps contradicts his aim to make him into more than a consumer:

Q: Do you think you will succeed in [making your son more active]?

A: I think so. I showed him the possibilities of a beautiful life. Further, if it is not possible, so be it. I suggested that he comes to me under my auspices and does a lot of things I would like him to do. There is a reward however. He will receive money for a driver's license and for his own car to drive, but he will have to drive it to the university.

Another example of the businessmen passing new values on to the new generation comes from M11. He wants his child to have its own opinion, defend his beliefs, and to see the value of "being remembered," *either* as a great evil or great good. His mother, M12, wishes the grandchild would become intelligent, well-read, kind, not aggressive, and decent. The father, however, complains his son expects too much in terms of materialism:

My child does not understand that some stuff should not be bought for some reason. He knows that we cannot buy luxurious house or change the apartment. Nevertheless, he cannot understand for example, that we do not buy this dictaphone just because we do not need it or he does not deserve it. This is in relation to the material things.

Other informants seem to maintain a set of quite social values as ideals for their children. M7 and M8, for example, both say that "loving others" is important for youth. In the meantime, M8 places "analytical thinking," a critical work value for him, as crucial for youth as well. Similarly, M9 sees Russia's new common values at the beginning of the transition as being "energetic, cosmopolitan, enterprising." Now, he supplements these ideal values for his children with the values of respecting others and critically perceiving the world. However, he laments that he is unable to influence his child now because of his divorce. His father, M10, in contrast, partly refuses to answer, noting that this young generation really has it tough:

Q. What are the values you try to teach your grandchildren?

A. I am not sure that I will be able to teach them these values and moreover in the time of the world capitalism I am even not convinced that this is useful. Other values apply here. I have often visited the US and talked to the people who went there with the first, the second and the third emigration waves. I see all the negative sides of the American capitalism. Nevertheless, our capitalism is even worse than the one in the worst times of the Wild West.

He goes on to say that he wishes his grandchildren lived in another country.

MATERIALISM

The Russian informants were quite active in speaking about materialism, compared to other topics they might have addressed. The economic devastation of Russia's transition years brought a powerful and motivating sense of material insecurity to those subjected to the new economy. This material insecurity appears to have generated both enhanced cost-

benefit thinking at work as a necessary tool of success and enhanced consumerism and money lust privately as individual aspirations begin to mirror the limitless possibility of the new material sphere.

An older respondent illustrates the first part of this transition well. M8, says that, in 1990, he was focused on material survival, but his values had to broaden as he had to "commercialize" within his business in order to stay afloat. He came to the realization that "money is needed" in work; in his mind, the meaning of money transformed from a basic commodity for survival into a way of life.

Money as a way of life means that the expansion cost-benefit thinking occurred as a necessary tool of success within business. This mode of action requires the establishment of strict monetary boundaries and profit calculation. M11 describes this well:

M11. First, [thinking more about money nowadays] is connected to what I do. In my opinion, a businessperson who does not think about money and material success cannot engage in business. From my acquaintances and the people of my age only few engaged in establishing and running their own business.

Paradoxically, in contrast to the rational cost-benefit calculations at work, materialism in private life appears to have become liberated from boundaries and tends to a form a mindless consumerism. M1, for example, illustrates this pattern. He thinks of expenses for the office, but in his private life, his consumption has become second nature:

The last and single thought that I have today is how to pay for the new office. I'm tired of thinking about that - how to turn over my money. Frankly saying, neither me nor my wife... we cannot even make some savings, that's why to think about... My wife has said it well: "Look, everybody thinks how to buy a car, how to manage all around it, but we..." All my thoughts about the BMW lasted exactly 10 minutes. Honestly. Just dully went and bought it quickly. I even didn't choose a model. I had just clear and bright opinion that one should buy a BMW, that's all. But I can say that we just haven't an example, so I can't compare. I see it as my brother thinks some themes through in a detailed way. But I'm too lazy to spend my time for it.

It is interesting that M1's thinking in the office is dominated by concerns about costs and profits, while his home life is precisely the opposite as he transforms into the unthinking consumer, partially as a retreat, as he is "tired of thinking about how to turn over his money."

Related to this consumerism is the expansion of the general attraction to material wealth. For the older generation, money was generally valued for survival purposes only, whereas for the younger it becomes the major focus. Pair-comparisons demonstrate this

trend well. For example, recall the vignette pair M5 and M6. While the father is anti-materialist, his son is quite wealthy and materialistic, throwing his money around to satisfy his needs for "entertainment." Similarly, another pair, M9 and M10, both of whom started their own businesses and both think about money more now than before, albeit the father refers to money still more in terms of survival and the son in terms of wealth. The father, although a workaholic, remains nonetheless quite family oriented. In contrast, the son, more money-centered, is divorced and estranged from his family. At times in his interview, the son ostensibly downgrades money, saying he desires wealth, but not "luxury." However, he is unable to hide the allure of wealth for him, and his dismissal of luxuries appears to be a self-soothing mechanism since he cannot afford them. For example, he mentions "of course I could say that a Ferrari is nice, but it is anyhow inaccessible for me." While he admits that wealth doesn't bring happiness, he still wishes to have more. At the beginning of the transition, he was striving in academia, a pursuit he abandoned seemingly for material reasons. He notes that there are more temptations and possibilities to spend money nowadays, such as a greater variety of consumption options and leisure activities. At the same time, the cost of everyday expenses have increased in cost as well, as one must manage the apartment and other survival-related expenses oneself. He has a sense of uncertainty in how to deal with money; it is unclear how to save and invest, even if one has money. These facts lead him to note that he thinks about costs and money much more than earlier. Even M9's less materialistic father M10 is somewhat attracted to the ways in which the oligarchs 'made' their money, noting he understands "in what a brilliant manner the money was stolen." Money has a sheen in the new society, even among those who turn their back to it.

Another pair, M11 and his mother, M12, are also illustrative examples. M11, at the beginning of the transition, valued intellectuality and says that he was "disgusted" by the goal of making money during those times. However, prodded by material insecurity, he soon realized the "reality" of the necessity of making money to survive and then created his own business. He has now learned to accept these new values, and writes off his earlier aversion to materialism as due to the "maximalism of the young person." However, his mother M12, still possesses those very same values and is exasperated by the changes. She notes that there were fewer chances to be materialistic before, since it was so hard to locate scarce goods. One could therefore not plan for them:

*Q. And when you had to look at prices, what influenced your choice?
Was that influence bigger earlier or now?*

A. Of course that was bigger before. But conditions were different then as well. One couldn't buy something good then, one had to manage some unbelievable searches. And probably occasionally you could find something good, but you couldn't plan it. There wasn't anything good especially as a present. That's why... I search, choose, look now, but within some reasonable limits. I can pay several thousands but of course not many thousands.

Now, in contrast, she notes that boundaries should be erected in regard to money, for the market itself does not prescribe boundaries in the same way as during Soviet times, where scarcity was very real, and to acquire something special, one had to launch some "unbelievable searches." It is precisely these internal boundaries which are lacking in her grandson, according to his father, M11:

When I observed my son and his friends, I found out that it is much easier for them to give their toys to each other as presents. They give each other different games, Gameboy, that is the small amount of property they possess.

The father does not understand why the son has no concept of something being too expensive or the idea of not needing something; paradoxically, this also allows the son to part more easily with his many possessions, such as his video games. This shows materialism both as a form of high aspirations and expectations in regard to material possessions and also as a simultaneous low degree of internalized boundaries regarding the scarcity of material objects.

The elder M12 also sees modern materialist values as having a negative impact on other spheres, such as in education. Based on her former work experiences in the government education ministry, she laments:

Now everything is different. There is a new generation now. Teachers have changed, if we observe the secondary education. They have to make money; they have to think always about that. It's hard to bring back the old things. Maybe they'd like to, but they can't do it another way. It's the old generation who had the feeling of duty. The young generation already counts.

Her impression is that burgeoning aspirations and survival incentives negate moral duty, a point to be returned to later. Her son M11 describes how the collapse of the Soviet Union led to this new materialist ethos:

The reason for this was that everything around collapsed, the whole old system... You see, it was very hard to talk about this. In the newspapers it was widely discussed that the majority of the young people's opinion that there is no point in studying if you have a street-stall near by the Kursk train station for selling Coke-cola and beer. This would mean that you have achieved everything! Or for example in case you had a 10 year old BMW, leather jacket, and golden chain, this meant that you have reached

the top. Everything was measured with material values.

Even some members of the older cohort have been affected by this transition from valuing intellectuality to valuing materialism. For example, M10, who owns a computer business, notes that at the beginning of the transition, his role models were creative scientists. In contrast, now he only thinks about "economics," since "everything else is crap." Calling it "a certain human logic," economics becomes reality for him, a state of nature, which has caused him to think more about his and his family's material needs, a focus on simple survival:

Q. Do you think nowadays more about money and material goods than before?

A. I have to think more about them because there is no future in front of us. During the communist times there were good prospects and stable wages, which we received no matter what. Of course, one was supposed to work for them, but the whole thing happened in a different way.

OTHER VALUES

The Moscow informants tend to see, in addition to the changes in their family relationships already mentioned, a contraction of their social sphere so that they are valuing their friendships, abstract relationships, and general morality less. At the same time, they note the expansion of instrumental and exploitative ties.

Friendships

Two of the Moscow informants refer directly to their friendship circles, alleging that they have weakened. M9, for example, speaks of this issue:

Q. Let's talk about relations with your friends. How have these relations changed through the years? Have the relations become more tight or weak? Which transformations happened?

A. I think they became weaker. There's less free time now and more time is spent for the job, for business. That's why they become weaker. The communication becomes more virtual. It's either by phone or internet. There are fewer real meetings. It's hard to gather a big crowd even for birthday party. 1/3 of all invited persons can't come even though they really wanted to. ... I think they will help in critical situations. Those friends, with whom I talk once a year, whom I know from the past times, so they will come if I call and say that I need help. I understand that.

Another Muscovite, M7, alleges that these friendships have faded from the scene because of his heightened family orientations. M11 also says that friendships collapsed alongside other relations, but claims they have started to reconstitute themselves again:

However, I must admit that 15 ago everything collapsed, including families, friendships, relations. There was this stratification. Emotions

were valued with the help of money. Nowadays, this trend starts to disappear.

Although friendship may be strained within this younger generation, the older informants tend to mention it readily. M6, for example, notes that "probably, the most important thing would be to have good friends with whom you share common ideas and understandings and with whom it is nice to interact." This informant has found it very important to maintain the old friendships he formed during the Second World War.

Nation-oriented, "Generalized Other" Values

Older Russian informants tend to speak at length about the state of their country, in stark contrast to the younger generation, which barely touches issues of the nation or the 'generalized other' at all.

Take the pair M1 and M2 as an example. The son is not at all country-oriented, whereas his father is concerned about the society at large. In contrast, the son never mentions society or contribution; instead, his "own mood" is the most important thing for him. Similarly, M6 places the nation first on his list of priorities, while his son, M5, discusses 'country' a bit, but does not rank it near his personal business, entertainment, and work priorities.

This disinterest in national affairs, however, appears to have arisen from a very different situation, a strong degree of political excitement and activism at the *beginning* of the transition years. Informants note that they were hopeful (M7) and optimistic (M10) about the collapse of the Soviet system and "rebirth of democracy" (M11). M11 notes that his spirit then was "for changing the world":

Back then, we saw how the whole empire collapsed. Therefore, because of all the meetings and the perceptions of the establishment of future democracy, life and our understanding of life was not so self-centered. There was the spirit that we are ready for great acts, for changing the world. This is something that interests me now less than before.

This optimism quickly faded into cynicism and disillusionment towards politics (M10 and M11) as high ideals faded. M11 blames this shift on aging, as his youthful idealism faded, to be replaced by a growth in "self-centeredness," in his own words. M9 addresses the issue more in depth, saying that previously, he used to care about others' thoughts, whereas now "I don't care about their opinions," largely because of the "mind individualization" that he reports resulted from the collapses. Ironically, this blasé attitude at the same time also made him more "tolerant and respectful," he says. In other words, he previously had

idealistic morals, which caused him to judge others. Now he has dropped these morals, making him more tolerant, since he doesn't care what others do.

Instrumentalization of Relations

An interesting emergent theme in the Russian interviews is the issue of the instrumentalization of interpersonal relations, especially in relation to materialism.

A variety of respondents report that the level of exploitation in society has increased. M2, for example, reports that he has become less trusting because there are too many "swindlers" around. There are no more "decent" people, he complains, and as a result, "We cannot trust anyone anymore." He reports that, during Soviet times, such swindling was limited by persons' fear of the central government. M8 also feels more exploited. He notes, "I turn into a plunder for those who would like to benefit from me." He claims, however, that he personally does not exploit others so much. M9 says that exploitation has become more common because people have become more "mercantilistic." This is because money has become the most important thing for people, especially for the youngest generation, he claims.

In particular, in certain cases it appears as if relationships became increasingly instrumentalized by those eager to reap profit from them. M5, for example, complains that his ex-wife, even after their divorce, used his relationships for her personal profit:

she used to come and say to me: 'Introduce me to that person, he is your friend. There is someone who is willing to sell an ancient painting and your friend may buy it. I can earn something from being the link between them'.

Morality

The morality theme turns out to be a major difference between the generations in Russia, and one closely related to intimate relations with others.

In the first pair, M2, the father, highly values honesty and decency. He indicates that his value of honesty *was* stressed slightly by transition, but he says he kept it and made it through by maintaining certain boundaries and values above all others, especially not by not 'selling out' on his values of family and country. In contrast, the son became demoralized, and says he does not hold "romantic" principles regarding his work. There is no need to fight for what he believes in while at work, he says.

Between M5 and M6, the vignette pair, there is even a greater contrast. The father highly values honesty, while the son has been involved in criminal business activities.

Where the father believes in boundaries, the son is a hedonist "entertaining" himself when away from his family through the power his money gives him.

Like M5, M11 also explicitly refers to Khodorkovskii as a success, even though he realizes he is a criminal and his capital is "amoral." For M11, it is *fame* that is important, regardless of its nature; recall his desire to teach his child to "be remembered," whether "as a great good or a great evil." In contrast, his mother, M12, is very moral, stressing biblical values and kindness, and believing in boundaries and limits. "Everything is available. But this everything should be in some reasonable limits," she advises. Her grandson, living in the same apartment, seems to have missed out on her values, as the father complains the son knows no limits. M11, however, is perhaps not as amoral as he makes himself out to be, as he admits he feels a conflict between, as he puts it, his "humanism" on one side and money and a running his business on the other.

We are given an important clue as to the genesis of this amorality among the successful. For M7 and M8, both father and son express a deep-rooted cynicism. The father's is directed toward commercialization and modern values. The son is cynical as well, but rather toward the government. The father has reluctantly accepted what he calls the "new behavior" but not the values that underlie it. This example suggests that the cost of maintaining one's morality amid these changes in Russia is to simultaneously *not* adapt to the new economic system, as illustrated also by M10:

Q. Tell me whether your moral principles have changed now in comparison to 15 years ago?

A. The trouble is that they have not changed. If they have changed, I would have changed as well. This is partly the reason why we did not become wealthy people. And we did not become wealthy because we were not given the chance to become such. The young people are predatory because they do not have moral values. They are ready to do everything for money. We have never followed such path of behavior.

In other words, M10 infers that if they would have given up their moral scruples and stolen money in a brilliant manner like the oligarchs did, they too would be rich. He continues:

I did not cheat myself in the respect that during the period of the wild capitalism I could have switched to lying and stealing. I did not turn into a criminal. I found inner strength to oppose this fast way of getting wealthy.

In contrast, M10's son M9, like most of his generation, does not address the issue of morality, despite his father's strong focus on it. Another from the younger cohort (M7) recognizes growing numbers of people that:

almost do not have principles and that is why they try to use any kind of

method to accomplish their goals.

...Those who had almost no principles are the wealthiest ones.

M11, another from the younger generation, also notes how the old ideals must exit as one adapts to the new system: "As you see, I have adapted, so.... I accepted the new rules. In my case, all the communist ideals I cherished collapsed."

Of course, a claim that Russian persons during Soviet times were thoroughly 'moral' would be an absurdity. M2, a pensioner, for example, notes that he also had to sacrifice honesty for his work during Soviet times:

Even sometimes it was necessary to tell a lie. In business interests, it happened sometimes. It is not necessary to be true in the last instance.

Rather, an understanding of corruption and immorality in the Soviet era ever more highlights the nearly universal recognition among my respondents that *nonetheless*, the modern economy has ushered in a tangible, literal demoralization in comparison.

SUMMARY

These data indicate an expansion of the valuation of work among the working Russian informants, one that tapers off for some as a high degree of wealth is accumulated, leading to a transition toward leisure and family, but for others work remains highly valued, as a "calling," even after enough money is accumulated.

Among the Moscow informants, these high work orientations come at the expense of valuing the family, which as a result is put off until the retirement years.

A rise of several types of materialism is also noted among our informants. First, the expansion of material insecurity at the beginning of the transformation appears to be alleviated by an enhanced cost-benefit thinking at work, and, at the same time, most younger informants display an enhanced value of material wealth and luxuries in general. While they are disciplined capitalists at work, they tend toward hedonistic consumption at home.

The decline of friendship networks is noted in Russia, as a result of enhanced focus on work, careers, and where time remains, families. In correlation with this, the younger Russian informants are also less nation-focused, less moral, and more likely to experience exploitation by others.

CHAPTER 7. A 'WALL IN THE HEAD'? QUALITATIVE FINDINGS FOR EASTERN GERMANY

...But today in the FRG everyone is responsible for his own actions. Now it is more important to assert oneself. Well, whereas at the time I would have criticised my son because of egoistic behaviour, I now say: "You have to learn to cope with it." In this society, a sheep can't do anything against wolves: he must be a wolf himself.

Eastern German man Interviewed by H. Uhlendorff (2003:216)

VIGNETTE

L7, "Christian," is 34 years old, and has just taken over the family business, a print shop managed during GDR times by his father. He has a 6 month old baby with his live-in girlfriend. His father, "Gerhardt," is 62 and still works part time at the business he used to own.

Both value their work very highly because of their motivations to take care of their families, but both mention that family suffers as a result of these efforts. They, however, admit to "choosing" work over family but feel nonetheless conflicted about their choice. Christian says this problem is due to the lack of time in the day. Gerhardt implies that the problem is more fundamental: "I mean, during times when we built something in order to give something to others the family had to suffer from it." Going further, Gerhardt says that it is "normal" that one's work makes the family suffer within capitalism.

As a result of their high focus on work, both have grown seemingly weary of this excessive work focus. Christian, for instance, remarks that, even in comparison to his relationships, "work by now has become pretty much the center of life." In another section of the interview, Christian expresses the wish that he would be no longer "enslaved" by self-employment. His father Gerhardt had long ago grown weary of work and wishes to retire soon.

Gerhardt reports having had no role models during the transformation years. Christian reports that some famous swimmers - and even David Hasselhoff from "Baywatch" - served as role models for him, for he was formerly a swimmer. However, Christian does not report his own father as a role model, even though he was in the same family business. Their father-son relationship appears somewhat strained from working so closely together for so long.

Regarding their "materialist" values, both report thinking about money more often today than in the past and say that the degree of exploitation has increased in society. Gerhardt reports that such exploitation, within "a brutal capitalism," is "totally normal. A worker will never make money using his own money. He will always make money using your money."

WORK

Many Leipzig informants seem to note an increase in their work valuations over the years, but most of them display some reluctance about this high work focus, especially in regard to its impact on other life spheres, such as the family and outside activities. Of course, all of the informants were faced with material and job insecurities in the early transition years. Each of them reacted in a way to secure work in order to take care of their families. However, for most of these, this work came with initial heightened ambition at the beginning of the economic transformation (L2, L4, L3, L12, L7, L8, L9). L3 describes how ambition is greater in the early professional career:

Of course, if one is just at the beginning of his life, well, at the beginning of his professional career, things like financial security or simply the profit you get out of your work are certainly of great importance, right?! Even today, the person who... one also tries to get, I will simply say, an appropriate income out of the work one is doing in order to support his family, in order to make certain things possible for the family, right?

Ironically, this "early career ambition" seems to have affected the working older informants as well. L4, L3's father, for example, rushed to learn about western practices relevant to his business and to educate himself with new skills, such as how to use a computer, so as to remain up to date and successful in work. This ambition was usually accompanied by a drive for "success" and recognition in work, the building of a "career," and a desire for material accumulation.

However, some informants have rejected this path toward achievement for one of sufficiency: they desired to work enough to support their families, but not more (L1, L5, L6, L11). L5 remembers his desire then to secure an existence in order to provide a good start for the kids, while L6 values the mere fact of "having" work, which is quite different than a focus on success and achievement in relation to work. Among those in the ambitious group, these ambitions subsided in a number of ways. For some, only retirement brings a lessened work focus (L2, L4, L12). 69 year-old L12, for example, is still working and can only vaguely imagine a day when he works less, for work is his main source of satisfaction. For others (L3), work values diminish once the "appropriate" amount of income is earned for the family. Still others remain heavily work focused even though they are no longer ambitious; they dully continue with their lives in a work-centered manner although it apparently gives them little satisfaction (L7, L8).

Many of the new jobs are more independent than under the previous regime, and therefore require more responsibility and out of work contributions. L2 notes, for example,

although the amount of time he spends at work and at home is roughly the same as before, he nonetheless brings more work home nowadays, since he is a freelancer. In contrast, his son is less work-focused because he has chosen a profession where he is not in a position to earn big money like his parents.

L3 and L4 were both quite work-focused in the early years of the transition, but both became less so. The father naturally withdrew from work because of retirement, while the son withdrew from his high work focus once a sufficient level of income was earned to support his family.

L5 and L6 speak about work in a way similar to one another. For the son, L5, work represents a secured existence, a "good start" for his kids. For his father, work was seen in a similar light, as a crucial activity *for* the family. To *have* work is the crucial factor for L6.

Both L7 and L8 work very hard, and admit that their family lives suffer as a result. Both wish for more free time as well. The father will retire soon, while the son, L7, doesn't wish to be anymore "enslaved" by self-employment. Like many others, L7 also notes that work has become more important for him over the years. He complains that the expansion of work has caused other activities, such as volunteering and participation in sports clubs, to suffer. As a result, one of his goals is to enjoy life more than he does today.

Similarly, both L11 and L12, who own a family business, were very business-oriented at the beginning of the transition, trying to get a new start for the business. Both seem to be worn out from their routine, longing to eventually take a break from everyday work and enjoy some free time. L12 describes his status as a "family manufacturer:"

Work, too. I mean, that's, like I said, independent manufacturers...means basically, I have to say, once a manufacturer, always a manufacturer. This is independent from the system of society, isn't it? I mean, our business has existed for over 100 years. One has to realize that we have survived five social systems. Didn't we? Beginning with the Kaiserreich, the Weimar republic, National Socialism, GDR and the Federal Republic- And I mean, when the family remains the center, a social system can come and go, but the family manufacture remains.

In this family-work mix, he says that, despite his lack of free-time, family is "the center." Work brings him satisfaction.

At the beginning of the transformation years, L9 was quite ambitious. During those years, he wished most for economic independence and wealth, such as having his own island by age 40. He imagined that family would come later than it did. Although he started a family earlier than he would have liked, he has incorporated it fully into his plans,

as his goals today include long-term happiness, encompassing both family life and a successful business. He hopes that, by a certain age, he would be financially successful enough to have enough free time and money for hobbies.

FAMILY

Despite their strong focus on work, many of the Leipzig informants nonetheless remained very family oriented. As noted above, many of them rejected a "work then family" orientation in lieu for a "work and family" or "work for the family" orientation. As reported above, in the life course, education and work came first until children arrived, at which point many Leipzig informants devalued their work ambitions in order to focus on the family. L3 is a representative of the "work and family" orientation, whereby work is envisioned for the family rather than in competition with it:

Thus whenever someone says „the prioritization has shifted”, this only refers to the stage of life someone is in at that moment. Of course, I had different interests as a student; I was less occupied personally and didn't have as much responsibility as I do nowadays, right? My wife and children are simply... of different responsibility. The set of values itself however remained the same.

Regarding interpersonal relationships though, of course, I set a higher value on them or I attach great importance to them. Nowadays I have a different point of view because of my family. I personally set a higher value on time that I can spend with my son and that is one of the problems for example I didn't have before.

In contrast, L7 remained heavily work-centered throughout the transition period despite having a family:

Q. First of all, I'd like to ask you which values are the most important for you in your life.

A. I have to think for a second...well, it's hard to put it in an order but basically it's health, family, work...while work by now has become pretty much the center of life...then friends, that is, relationships with one another, companionship is important as well of course...some kind of prestige... respect, actually it doesn't matter from what side, that one is respected in what he does, in his achievements...yes, these would be the most important things.

While certainly the family remains important to him, he admits that it has become trumped by the high value placed on work.

The father-son intergenerational comparisons, among the Leipzigers, display remarkable similarities. For example, L1 and L2 are both family-oriented; both emphasize "Christian" values and charity.

L3 and L4, as well, are also both family oriented and Christian. L4 describes his family duties as "self-explanatory," while L3 describes what is most important to him: "at the moment, it is definitely my son who is one and a half years old. Thus family is an important value to me."

Like the others, L5 and L6 both are highly family focused aim for family-work harmony. L6 describes how he managed simultaneous family and work responsibilities 15 years ago:

Well, the family was more important to me. That's for sure, but you can't just separate both. You can't separate work and family. If I wanted to offer something to my family, back then as today, I had to work. If not, I couldn't have afforded things for my family. And if... I mean, this problem never arose in our family. Nowadays there's sometimes the problem that people say that our wives always had to work and our children missed out. That isn't true.

Another similar pair is L11 and L12. Both try to achieve work-family balance, and both emphasize Christian values. L12, however, attempts to balance family together with work through the concept of a family business:

Q. How much can you arrange work and family today?

A. Well, that is actually...that is, you don't think about that anymore, that's a habit, which has been worked out since the beginning. Work and family, I have to say, work is 8 hours and that the family sometimes, I mean now it's anyway, the son has the business but also in the past as a child, the family or my wife were integrated in the work so that they found support, so to say, a family business, they have helped there. That's the situation.

His son is the same, stating that "if the business is well, the family is well." Their work-family harmony appears to be achieved through the rationalization of the business as the family.

In contrast, another family business seems to have strained the personal relationship between father and son. L8 volunteers about his son, L7: "Children never are like their parents want them to be." He and his son avoid each other on weekends since they already spend together six days a week at work. It is as if working together in a family relationship has made their relationship mainly a professional one. L8 says his family had "to pay" for the fact that he established a successful business.

In contrast to other Leipzig informants, L9 has come to devalue his family. He has placed his family time in the same conceptual compartment as his hobby time; you can do both when you have "free time." In this way, L9 is typical of the work first, family and

free time second ("work then family"), view. He makes time for his family on the weekend and works during the week:

Q: How do you justify the mentioned values, that is, family, job, if you get into conflict?"

A: "Hm, yes, I don't know if that is justifying, it's more weighing up."

Q: "Hm, how do you weigh up?"

A: "Well, I have a certain deal with the family that during the week, work comes first and on the weekends family comes first. With exceptions of course in both directions."

Q: "Insofar it's no problem if during the week a business appointment comes between?"

A: "Then I have to organize it, but basically, it's no problem."

Q: "Okay, and how do you feel when these conflicts emerge?"

A: "I can handle that relatively well. It's rather the family, I'd say, that has its problems." [emphasis added]

Children

There is remarkable agreement between the interviewed East Germans regarding their valuation of socializing the next generation, although the older generation indicates at times that the success of this transmission is questionable. Furthermore, the value of children among the Leipzig informants is, for the most part, self-evident. When children exist in the household, the Leipzigers tend to automatically shift their value priorities from work toward the family. A comparison of the Leipzig generations illustrates this trend.

L1 mentions Christian values, such as forgiveness and other-centeredness as ideals for his children, as well as charity, helpfulness, and tolerance. In comparison, his father, L2, mentions the family, personal relationships, and charity as key values. Materialism and ambition, he says, "should not be the most important thing."

L3 lists quite an ideal set of values for his children, among which are honesty, perseverance, humility, and a strong stance against nepotism and materialism. The father is less specific about ideal values, but more generally emphatic about the importance of Christian values, such as the 10 commandments.

Regarding the pair L5 and L6, the elder focuses on listening to and respecting one's elders as a key value to be transmitted to children. He describes his values through this story:

Q. What do you think is the reason for the fact that [your values] didn't change?

A. This is because of my parents and my education. I was raised as... I

want to give you an example: I was a young boy, I am Silesian, not far from Breslau. My father had been an estate inspector there. One day I went to the fields with my father, we had a small carriage and a horse pulling it, so we went onto the fields and there were the women, they were over there. I didn't say hello to them. In front of the women my father slapped me and said: "Remember this for your entire life: You are the younger one and have to say hello." I have never seen my dad not being the first one to take off his hat and say hello to people. And these values I kept for all my life.

The son, also focused on value transmission to the younger generation, emphasizes family, friendship, commitment, and diligence for children. These values appear compatible with the elder's, but the father still implies that the grandchildren are not, in fact, developing the value of respecting one's elders.

L7 mentions determination, openness, tolerance, courage, and the family as important values. L8, in comparison, was quite taken aback by the question, stating:

Life has to [socialize them]. That does not serve any purpose. You can be an example for him. What I want to have for my grandson, what he cannot buy anywhere is time. And that is also today, with 6 months, very important. When he needs me, I want to have time for him.

While he displays difficulty vocalizing his ideal traits for his grandson, he shows nonetheless high dedication toward his upbringing.

L9 also briefly refers to "Christian values" as ideals for his two children, but he seems to keep his reference quite generic, without providing a more detailed account:

Q: "Which values are you trying to communicate your kids?"

A: "Well, many values can be summarized, I'd say, under the aspect of Christian values. That is, things like, like charity or like, a certain honor, and fairness."

Q: "Something else, no?"

A: "Well, those were pretty huge ones already."

L11 and L12, who care after the family business, highlight the importance of duty to this family business to their children. In addition to transferring this business to the next generation, L12 highlights the values of education and a "humane character." His son, L11, wants to eventually hand over the business to his own children, but complains that now young persons only chase commercials or glamour. Recall, however, how his own goals, of owning nice cars and a villa, are glamorous as well in comparison to his father.

MATERIALISM

Many young Leipzig informants note a rising focus on material survival since the beginning of the transformation. L1, for example, says he thinks more often about money

and material things for the purpose of survival: "Well... I do think about them more often now... not because I'm materialistic, but because it's just... .. necessary."

In contrast, his father, L2, says that he was more focused on material *survival* at the beginning of the transformation, but now thinks more about the material *situation*, such as pensions, health care, needs arising from growing old. This transformation is one from material survival to material administration. L5, introduces a similar distinction between "wishing for" and "working with" money:

Q: If you would have to compare today with 15 years ago, how much do you think today of money and material things, as compared to the past. More, less...?

A: That would have to be distinguished. In the sense of wishing, less, so to say, than in the past and in the sense of handling it, working with it, more. As a student, money...of course money did interest me as well but these were those wishes to have lots of money sometime or to have money and to have an existence, to be able to buy a house or something, they did of course exist and worried me but the actual, the actual situation to need money that did not worry me so much. And today I have to take care of a family and I have a house that I invested in, so today that is much more important but less in the sense of wishing for money. I could also live with considerably less. I would have to change but that is not...the situation of wishing for more money, of course, it happens every once in a while, but that doesn't worry me a lot.

L2 also notes that he has come to think more of costs and benefits "in order to get along." This difference between generations could be one of lifestage, since the son may have more pressure for material survival now because of his family. The material values of some informants have apparently changed little. L4, for example, writes off his lack of materialism to the fact that he is "well-off," noting that his material views did not change since he was also doing financially well in GDR times.

More radically than the others, L9 thinks more of money now than in the past. He remarks that he must think about money more nowadays as a practicality, because of image cultivation at work:

When [commercials] communicate it like that, so that I accept that for my image...simple example, cars. Although one isn't alone saying that a car has to drive from A to B reliably. But where one is also judged from the outside. Is the business alright when he is driving such an old wreck? Or, when the car is too big, the customers say, we're all paying for that as well. One has to have certain influences from the outside that guide one searching for a car and the commercials of the producers is of course a means, that shapes the image and that one orientates oneself after.

However, L9 also notes the inflation of the value of time, saying that when planning a trip, it is less the cost than the time which is of value.

Intergenerational comparisons reveal that both the younger businessmen and their fathers have enhanced valuations of material administration and material survival in relation to the necessities of adapting at work. However, most appear to disdain materialism in the sense of luxury or money lust. Pair L1 and L2 exhibits this trend, as mentioned above. Regarding another pair, L3 and L4, both are focused on their family's financial security and education but consider themselves unmaterialistic. L3 notes, "It is important to me that my son doesn't solely live out of commerce but that he directs his life on such things as friendship." In comparison, his father says that while money is important in life, it is "not the most important thing." Similarly, L5 and L6 both also devalue money and materialism. L5 also tries to communicate to his children that "money isn't everything," while L6 complains about the "greediness for money" that is presently in society:

what bothers me most is that... this greediness for money, which did not exist in our times because there was not that amount of money and the crimes that come with it. Such a... there is hardly any sense of solidarity, hardly any. Everybody tries to find ways of making money, of ripping somebody off, or of attacking somebody in order to get money. And that's the worst thing we took over when the Wall came down. The worst thing. Crime, greediness for money and hardly any sense of solidarity, hardly any. Because everybody somehow tries to get money. Today, people are robbing an old lady for 3.60 Euros. That is... I mean, in the GDR we also had crime, that can I say, but that wasn't, but not in this way because it just wasn't necessary.

L7 and L8 both think of money more now than in the past, but for L7, this means in terms of material activity or "working with money." His father, L8, tells that he became quite materially oriented at the beginning of the transformation, but now regrets it. During those times, he longed to establish a business, create new jobs and lasting products, but now has grown more cynical about his society. For example, he says that, in the past people worked more for idealism, whereas now, it is only for money. Nonetheless, he brags that he and his wife have owned five pieces of real estate.

Both L11 and L12 say that they think more about money more today than in the past, largely because of business requirements. A businessman, L12 says, knows cost-benefit calculating "from the cradle." He says:

Yes, one is forced to think more about money now. You have to...during the GDR, You got your money for what you did, there was no need to hurry after your money. It was a totally different moral of payment, what you put on the invoice was paid. Today that's different. And neither was there haggling or something. That's different today. And that's why you have to talk more about money and contractual things, they're...It all

moved more into the foreground. You have to...well...during the GDR the prosperity wasn't so high like today and we had no possibility to make big money or something. And to think about money, that all went automatically. That's...today you have to be careful not to be cheated and buy insurance or something or to be lured by the stock market where the money is gone or something.

While his business focus is similar to his father's, there is something different about L11. He has another type of materialism as well: a hunger for luxuries. For example, he hints that he would like to indulge in a nice BMW or Porsche for himself, had he the money, and fantasizes that he could build a villa:

Q. What you want to accomplish in your life, what you wish for...

A. ...let's say, but that's now more of a fantasy, Villa Toscana, that is, building a house in a Mediterranean style.

OTHER VALUES

In Leipzig, there is some evidence among informants of a contraction of their worldviews toward the intimate family and work, and away from the wider community and friends. In addition, informants report a loosening of morality and the rise of exploitation in society.

Friendship and Community

Several informants report on the deteriorating value of friendship because of heightened family and work foci. L1, for example, as a result of new demands at work, has sacrificed his secondary relationships, such as friendships, in order to spend more time with his family. L4 also notes that his circle of friends became smaller, as many moved away and followed work. Unemployment among some friends may have also created relationship stressors between them.

More generally, L1, a highly social Christian, notes that he used to be more focused on both politics and charity when he was younger. The reasons these values declined in importance was because of the need to support his family. "To do good for other people is only second," he says. L4 similarly notes that his worldview contracted toward the intimate family and work, and away from the wider community, during the transformation years. L4 and his son have very different role models. While the father is still somewhat politically and morally motivated despite his perception of a shrinking community orientation during the transition years, he still mentions transition-era politicians and the Pope as role models; in contrast, his son, L3, admires the director of Porsche.

Morality

Notable among the Eastern German informants are the moral tensions that seem to have become more acute during the transformation years, coupled with a “moral gap” between the generations.

One pair, L5 and L6, illustrates how the new economy calls their honesty into question. Both of them highly value honesty, but the younger, L5, has problems maintaining it because of his job. He says that “honesty counts less now in society” because it has been replaced by intrigue. He elaborates on the issue:

Well, for instance, 15 years ago as goes for honesty I would have been honest by all means. That is something that I would tell my kids to be careful with because that is very dangerous. That is a social factor, that's how it is, and with honesty by all means you risk your neck. And insofar today honesty requires a lot more sensitivity than I, maybe that 15 years ago like that as well and I didn't recognize it but back then I was considerably more relentless as regards this value.

He is clearly disturbed over putting his honesty to the side: “Well, of course mostly I am in conflict with the value honesty.”

L9 is more pragmatic with the amorality of business. He introduces us to the concept of “trader's honor,” and when the interviewer misunderstands, he quickly corrects:

Q: “Can you remember if there were any moral principles guiding you back then [in 1990]?”

A: “I believe they weren't much different than today.”

Q: “Hm, that is, also honesty, trust...”

A: “Hm, did I say honesty? I don't think so.”

Q: “Not exactly, no. I did...you said those...”

A: “Traders honor. Yes, that is something else. That I keep the word that I have given. Being 100% honest at all times, I claim, isn't possible and isn't good either. Because one would hurt people too often if one would say things that have no relevance at all... Not in the sense of lying but rather in the sense of not having to say anything.

Q: “Then maybe you could elaborate that a little further. I obviously haven't understood it correctly.”

A: “Well, if I say, reliance, trust, honor then this could also mean that, in order to either protect or not hurt a partner, I don't say certain things because one knows how the other works and if he's maybe sensitive to certain things. ...Honesty, I think, is a thin line. That is, when does one begin to lie. He should...there is a difference between lying or saying things or maybe stretching the truth. Well, on the other hand lying is a critical thing because when statements are made they have to stand straight. That is, a consciously made false statement, that's not possible because then trust would disappear.”

Q: "Okay and you were conscious of that also back then, you'd say?"

A: "Well, maybe not that clearly."

Honesty in this setting is replaced as an ideal by the ideal of "keeping one's word." This is equivalent, says the informant, to the difference between lying and stretching the truth.

Other informants also have difficulties with morality. L7, for example, while viewing Oskar Schindler (the historical figure within *Schindler's List*) as a role model because he risked his success, is "not sure if I could do that, honestly." Recall his statement that he is "enslaved" by work. Nonetheless, he is unwilling to risk it, even for what he deems worthy causes. This illustrates well the creeping importance of work over the moral sphere.

Another informant, L12, is cynical, saying that he believed more in moral values during GDR times, because today, society's respect for manufacturing, his profession, is even worse than it was back then.

Exploitation

Leipzig informants also reported enhanced levels of exploitation in their society since the beginning of the transformation.

L1, for example, feels more used by others because money plays a greater role today since there are more goods on marketplace: "Back then you might have had a lot of money but that didn't mean that you were able to buy a lot of things, money was not worth too much, in that sense." He elaborates, connecting the issue further to exploitation:

Now things have changed. Nowadays, if I have money, I can do a lot of things or...or I can do a lot more with it... and that leads people or makes people do things they shouldn't do,... , using people for example... that's why the risk is greater [now than it was before].

Like his son, L2 also sees rising exploitation. He says that "something new arose" in this regard, with people trying harder and harder to exploit his business:

Q. That means this problem didn't exist 15 years ago?

A. No... actually not, or ... sure enough there are always situations when somebody tries to make one's way by taking advantage of someone or whatsoever, but 15 years ago this was a different situation. Certainly there were people who tried to shirk working a bit and then preferred to...something like this, you know, but not financially like it is today, it's a different dimension nowadays.

Likewise, L5 feels that he is exploited more now than in the past, but he notes that perhaps this is a lifestage effect, since he has more money nowadays than when he was a student:

Yes, considerably more than in the past...ok, that might be due to, as a

student typically you have no money, there is nothing to enrich...of course the position was a bit different back then. For instance, I had a car back then, an old Russian car, and this was driven by the whole seminar class. You could call that taking advantage but it wasn't. I mean, they didn't enrich themselves but they drove with it and me as well and when something was broken then I said it needs to be repaired but then they were all here and we made a great party in the backyard, with some beer and then repaired the car. Insofar, it wasn't taking advantage at all. Today I see that slightly differently. You have to be careful if you work with someone if he isn't exactly doing that. And you have to think very carefully if you give someone work what he'll do with it. Is he really doing only what he is supposed to or is he taking what to...or with the competing business, which is laid down in a paper or in a document, is he going to peddle with it or is he selling it as his own. As regards this, today I think certainly more that this happens. Sad, but that's how it is.

For some, rising exploitation in society is not surprising. L9 notes that it is “of course” more common today than in the past, “but I don’t know if that is to demonize. They make a living of that, it’s their job.” Similarly L7 and his father, L8, agree that exploitation has increased in Eastern Germany compared to the past, but the father says this is “normal” in capitalism.

SUMMARY

In summary, the Leipzig informants saw an enhancement of their work valuations during the transition years. For some of them, this implied high ambition which subsided upon the founding of a family. For others, they work from the start only enough to support the family, without high career or materialist ambitions.

Family valuations followed in synchronization with these work valuations. Most young informants aimed for work and family harmony, while the most ambitious opted for a "work then family" approach, with family ostensibly devalued in comparison to materialist and personal achievement goals.

While most informants display enhanced material orientations in regard to survival for the good of the family and "working with money" as a tool of success, most do not display a materialist lust for money or luxuries.

Some Leipzig informants indicated a shrinking of their community and friendship values in order to provide more time for work and family. This change goes hand in hand with a loosening of moral standards, at least at work, in the sense of the weakening of the value of honesty and the adoption of "trader's honor." In addition, the interview data suggest the expanded role of exploitation within Eastern German society.

CHAPTER 8. A TALE OF THREE CITIES

How do qualitative results on social values compare across Shanghai, Moscow, and Leipzig? Which findings are universal across the three cases, and which are case-specific? This information will be presented in this chapter. Differences between countries will be highlighted and potential location-specific reasons for them sought. While indications of why these similarities and differences exist may also be introduced, fuller causal indications and mechanisms are presented in depth within the "Mechanisms of Change" chapter (Chapter 10). In addition, the qualitative similarities between countries discussed here will be looked at in the next chapter (Chapter 9) within the quantitative data in order to determine of parallel tensions are determinable there. The qualitative indications described below are based on the accounts of interview data provided within Chapters 5, 6, and 7.

WORK

Ambition and the Phasing of Work and Family

Across the three cases, a universal find is the phasing of work-family valuations across the life course. While former workers tend to emphasize work and family harmony, the working informants, whether young or old, tend more often to employ a phased valuation of work and family, with heightened work orientations at the beginning of the transformation being rationalized by the planned assumption of high family valuations later, when high work valuations are 'complete' (See Figures 8.1 and 8.2). Among informants from across the three societies, phased valuation of work then family, in contrast to the work-family harmony emphasis, is accompanied with high degrees of ambition in work. This high ambition is usually driven by both material insecurity and longing for personal achievement and the establishment of a "career." Thereby, for younger ambitious informants, work tends to be viewed as all important and is viewed instrumentally, in contrast to a more balanced 'work as duty' orientation of the less ambitious and older informants. A focus on personal achievement and career development among the ambitious in work appears to be universal across the three groups of informants. Among the ambitious, it is especially worth noting that this ambition subsided usually with the evaporation of opportunities for further personal advancement and the notion of having achieved and earned 'enough.' Informants then typically transitioned into their 'family' or 'leisure' phases (See Figure 8.1). However, the circled reverse arrow in Figure 8.1 indicates how, for some informants, while money-related and ambition-related motivations have

faded, work becomes an 'end in itself,' and the informant never transitions to the 'family phase' as he may have envisioned, but rather continues to work, either because of the notion of work as a secular salvation, or because informant dully pursues it because he lacks alternative lifestyle possibilities.

A difference is observed in the dominance of the "ambitious" type in each country. While the ambitious were clearly dominant among the young Russian and Chinese informants, this type was more of a rarity in Eastern Germany, seemingly replaced by a more family-oriented, less work-centered, type focused more on accumulating material *sufficiency* for the good of the family rather than accumulating material wealth, maximizing personal achievement, or building an outstanding career.





Figure 8.2 Typical Work/Family Values Constellation of Older Cohort



Working for Material Security

Material insecurity is not a dominant theme among the Chinese informants, perhaps since China, at the macro-level and among its burgeoning new middle and upper classes, experienced only economic boom during its transformation years, in comparison to Russian total collapse and East German stagnation. In contrast, the factor of material insecurity, not found in China, appears to be linked to another phenomena lacking in China, that of the presence of "ambitious" older generation workers. Also, the fact that the Chinese transition was slower and smoother would have served less strongly as an incentive for the older generation to adapt. In contrast, both Eastern Germany and Russia had cases of older generation informants eager to adapt to the new economic system, presumably due to the shock and poverty of the transformation years.

Russia's severe shock therapy caused "hungry and poor years" and great material insecurity, in stark contrast to China. This deep level of material insecurity made the

Russian transformation more radical, thereby also precipitating more adaptation by its older generation, some of whose members were forced to adapt as well in order to survive. Indeed, within some of our Russian pairs, the father's adaptation was more extreme than then son's, for whom the transformation proceeded more smoothly, rather than as a sudden jolt. This radical flavor of the Russian economic conditions likely contributed to a more extreme ideological adaptation as well. Some Russian informants, for example, referred to work as their "calling" and "salvation," while others came to worship the economy as the ultimate source of value, whereby "everything else is crap." In Russia, while the achievement motivation was great, many informants, once they accumulated a comfortable level of material resources, then transitioned to phase two. For the Chinese and Eastern Germans, this phase meant more often family time, but for the Russians we see something new, the insertion of leisure time competing with family obligations, with some Russians opting for a hedonistic path, when enabled by their newfound wealth, rather than a quiet family life. This becomes a source of inner conflict, where the original work versus family conflict was replaced by a conflict of leisure versus family. Some Russians never transition to a leisure or family phase at all, but are rather content from the "moral calm" they receive from working. Made clear by the Russian case is that the difference in generations we measure here is symbolic of something deeper, a difference between those *working* and *not working* within the new economy. Those who worked during the transformation years experienced a value shift despite their age. Furthermore, for some, later life is dominated by a leisure versus family conflict in place of the work versus family conflict of earlier years.

Reluctance in Leipzig

In Leipzig, many informants dedicate themselves fully to their work only with great reluctance because of the costs of working for the health of the family. Such conflicts were comparably rare in Russia and unseen in China. Nonetheless, it was, of course, necessary to work hard in order to secure material security in the early transition years, especially in order to support the family. Thus, ambition struck many Leipzigers, and some Leipzig fathers were forced by material needs, like in Russia, to adapt to the economic change and work as well. Unique about the Leipzig case in this regard is that some businessmen rejected the route of high career ambition for a more relaxed one of material sufficiency; in other words, they worked only enough to secure the basic essentials for the family but desired nothing more. Such a factor was more rarely observed among the Chinese and Russian informants. Among the ambitious, ambition declined

upon reaching retirement age or upon securing a degree of material sufficiency. The Leipzig informants also point to how the nature of work changed, necessitating more often "working at home." This notion of working at home has parallels within the Russian and Chinese notion of spending weekends in the office, but working at home notably opens up more possibilities for family interactions. The Leipzigers are also quite cynical and fatigued regarding the overstretched work duties of the new economic culture, even calling it "enslavement," and they complain that family and leisure suffer as a result.

All working informants seem to indicate the expansion of working hours at the beginning of the transformation period compared to socialist times. In China this trend seems to have reversed itself, with most of my informants reporting they have their weekends off of work. In contrast, the Russian and East German informants report they have to work much more than they did 15 years ago. The East Germans most readily complain about the costs that family must pay in relation to work; this attitude contrasts markedly with the Chinese and Russian informants, some of which even refer to work as a "calling" which gives them "moral calm."

FAMILY

Family valuations closely follow work valuations across all three cases. Typically, when informants are ambitious, in terms of both self-realization and material goals, regarding their work, they are devaluing family in tandem. Those who are ambitious in the early years of their work lives tend to put off high family valuations until their work lives are complete, until their retirement years. Since work valuations are variable across the three cases, we find a parallel variation in family values. For example, a reluctance in sacrificing the family for work becomes quite apparent in Leipzig, whereas this is rare among the Shanghai- and somewhat limited among the Moscow informants. The younger informants are usually more ambitious and less family centered, while older informants were usually more family centered. The Leipzigers were exceptions to this trend in both directions: the younger Leipzig informants were more family-centered than the younger informants in Shanghai and Moscow, while the older Leipzigers tended to be less family-centered than other older informants, presumably because they were more involved in working during the transformation years.

Respect of Elders

Regarding the respect of the elder generation, it is clear that, across each of the three cases, the working generation's respect of its parents has become challenged because of the

perceived mal-adaptation of the elder generation. This trend is especially noted in China, followed by Russia and Eastern Germany. While the Leipzigers may tend to emphasize this value more than the others, questions still emerge regarding the successful transmission of this value to the younger generation.

Socialization of Children

The value of socialization of children among those within the parenting generation seems to be challenged in similar ways across cases. Among those investing energy in thinking about the socialization of their children, the entrance of individualist values, such as independence and ambition, is apparent across the cases. However, some informants have also adopted an individualist approach to their children's upbringing in another way, preferring to let them be socialized 'naturally' rather than imprinting them with any specific values. Confusion and contradiction regarding the parental child-rearing role also becomes apparent, especially among the Shanghai and Moscow businessmen. Especially among the Muscovites, the role of material values seems to conflict with the transmission of traditional values to the new generations. While Moscow and Shanghai informants clearly have trouble spending time with their children due to their strong focus on work, Leipzig informants tend to rather highly value the children at the expense of work.

MATERIALISM

From High Material Aspirations/Low Activity to Low Aspirations/High Activity

In all three country cases, informants clearly felt an enhanced material insecurity in the early years of the transformation. They responded to this situation by becoming fixated on material needs and survival. In this way, they tended towards a survivalist materialism. For some, especially in Russia, this survival focus was accompanied by temptation by the allure of a new consumerism, entailing luxuries and money lust. Compared to the Russian informants, such consumerism was somewhat more muted in China, perhaps because the traditional Chinese value of thrift stood in the way, whereas among the Eastern German informants, there was a noticeable disdain toward this luxury consumerism because of the ideologies of both Christianity and the social welfare state. The East Germans, while being quite focused on the "material situation," more rarely allow their values to digress into luxury lust. Both of these situations, in which money is "needed" and "lusted after," reflect a state of high material aspirations and low degree of actual material action, which could be characterized as *wishing for* money and material goods.

Later on, this way of thinking about money in terms of both needs and luxuries became rather a focus on *working with* money, the inculcation of a materialist habitus without the strong conscious insecurity and luxury lust of the past. This transformation of values between the time of high material aspirations and the time of their fulfillment is described quite well by M8: "This period could be compared to thirst. If a person is thirsty, he thinks of water. When there is no thirst, he thinks of water less even though he drinks it maybe even more than before." This is a state within which the value of thirst becomes active and clearly visible in behavior, although the person may not consciously think about water.

Profit Calculation

During the transformation, the informants seemed to have learned quite early on that "thinking about money" and profit is a necessary tool of success at work. They built their businesses based on discipline and a skill in dealing with money, which is paradoxically in contradiction to the high levels of mindless consumerism they pursue while at home, especially in Russia. It is as if the capitalist and consumer classes are united, in many cases, within the same individuals, requiring alternatively, disciplined calculation at work and hedonistic fulfillment at home.

Image Cultivation

Just as "profit calculation" becomes a key to work success, "image cultivation" is another key skill to be developed by the successful worker within the new economy. Informants in all three countries refer to this need to look good and "successful," although some of them refer to it as a merely instrumental concern, while for others, it becomes inculcated as an unconscious value through culture.

Consumer Culture

In each of the three countries, there is a sense among the informants, young and old, of the dominance of the new consumer culture. In China, this is posed in opposition to, and detrimental to, the traditional value of thrift. In Russia, a sense of loss of "intellectuality" is noted in relation to this newfound materialism, while in Eastern Germany, material culture is more often posited as in opposition to religious beliefs.

OTHER VALUES

Friendship

One key difference between cases is that the Chinese informants report the expansion of their friendship networks during the transformation period, while the Russians and

Eastern Germans report that their friendship circles contracted. The latter informants spent less time with friends usually because of their attempted focus on family alongside their demanding work schedules. Presumably, since the Chinese report that informal social networks remain quite important to how they do business, and they spend very long hours at work as well, this strong friendship focus may come at the expense of family.

Politics

In addition, informants from all three countries display an intergenerational gap regarding valuation of the outside community and nation. In China and Russia, members of the younger generation are much less nation-centered than their patriotic fathers, with this gap being linked in Russia to the fading of idealism associated with the disillusionment of the early transition years. The East German informants note that they are less focused now on the wider community than they used to be earlier in the transformation years, as a similar disillusionment to the Russian case seems to have occurred because of the failed promises and material insecurity ushered in by the transformation.

Observable is a contraction of political outlooks among informants from all three countries, especially later in the transformation years. At the beginning, there was a noticeable sense of euphoria in Russia and Eastern Germany because of the respondents' hopes about building new democratic and free societies. However, this optimism quickly shifted into pessimism as the true faces of economic and political transformation became known; the resulting social disruption, poverty, political corruption, and crime transformed some of my informants' hopes into cynicism. In China, a broad depoliticization did not occur as there were no widespread expectations of political change in the first place, especially after the suppression of the nascent Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989. Rather the Chinese businessmen's thoughts came to focus on building their businesses, supporting their families, networking with their friends, and taking part in the expanding consumer society. In Eastern Germany and Russia as well, the distractions of daily life, such trying to survive materially, taking care of the family, and consumption, also contributed to the downfall of initial excitement at the beginning of the transformation.

Younger informants are not particularly concerned about 'contributing to the nation.' This is especially true in Eastern Germany, while some Russian and Chinese businessmen prefer to frame their business contributions as their way of contributing to the overall society. In contrast, other businessmen openly state they do not care about contributing to society. This ambivalence is a contrast to the strong political orientations of the older

generation, whose members often couched their personal experiences in terms of their relation to the country.

Morality

All three countries display evidence of rising exploitation within close and distant relationships with others, with the worry that more and more relationships become instrumentalized. Interestingly, the Chinese report that those relationships which are explicitly instrumental seem to suffer less from work-related stress than those that are intimate, implying that the instrumental relationship is more amenable to the needs of work.

Related to this exploitation, the East Germans and the Russians especially expand this discussion into one about morality. Informants from both countries report a notable demoralization in association with adaptation to the capitalist economy. In other words, there is a sense that those who were most successful did so by partially abandoning their morals. The older informants lament this moral shift strongly. Among the younger informants, only the Eastern Germans consistently worried about the moral relativization they saw as a necessary adaptation to the new economic situation. These worries surface especially within informants' value conflicts, to be discussed in depth in Chapter 10. Also, as discovered from some of the Eastern Germans, religiosity appears to be strongly linked to the maintenance of morality and high family valuations within the new economy.

CHAPTER 9. CHECKING THE NUMBERS

The qualitative data described in the previous chapters illustrated the emergence of value tensions as represented by both retrospective accounts and intergenerational value gaps. It is valuable to look within a representative sample, one also representing diverse socio-economic groups, women, and rural informants, in order to determine whether parallel value tensions are found in comparison to qualitative indications. This chapter does just that. The value categories of work, family, materialism, and other values are analyzed as per whether or not tensions are revealed across the same categories as indicated within the qualitative data. These data are not a “test” of the qualitative findings representing the more significant contribution of this dissertation. These data are also not presented in order to argue for a real “value-shift” in objective terms in the societies in question. Rather they should be viewed alongside qualitative indications in order to answer the question, “Are there indications of value cleavages apparent within available quantitative data as well?”

Indications of value change are looked at over time, and gaps in values are highlighted across birth cohorts and between new and old occupational groups. These are the same cleavages highlighted within qualitative indications: the gap between generations and the gap marking off those participating successfully within the new economy from those who are not.

Quantitative data used here originate from the World Values Survey, from three waves (1990, 1995-97, 2000-2001). These data are described more in depth within the methods chapter (Chapter 4) and appendices H, I, and J.

All reported mean differences are tested for significance using two-tailed T-tests, whereby the means will be reported within the text, together with the level of significance (for example, $p=.01$). More detailed data concerning these test outcomes are located within Appendix J.

WORK

Within the preceding chapters, one of the major qualitative findings presented was the gap in work values between the younger working generation, exemplified through its ‘work *then* family’ orientation, and the older generation’s prior ‘work *and* family’ orientation. This finding is paralleled in two ways within the quantitative data: a gap in the

valuation of work between 'modern' and traditional occupations and a gap between cohorts and occupations in their valuations of non-materialistic aspects of work.

Importance of Work

The first relevant and adequate variable from the WVS dealing with work values is v8, which asks informants how important work is in their lives. They may answer on a scale from one to four, with four being the highest (See Figure 9.1). What becomes immediately clear in the figure is the declining importance of work for the oldest cohort over the transformation period, as this cohort is either retired or retiring. In all three countries, the youngest cohort is also tending to also fall behind in the importance of work, with the two middle birth cohorts, born between 1948 and 1967, experiencing the highest work valuations. Also noticeable is that Chinese and Eastern German work valuations are much higher than that of the Russians, and the Russian work values appear to be 'catching up' toward the rough 3.6 means of the other two nations. Even taking into account the crashing work values of Russia's oldest birth cohort, Russian work values experienced a significant ($p=.001$) growth between 1990 (mean=3.25) and 2000 (mean=3.34), while the other two nations remain relatively stable over the years (See Appendix J for tables of T-test results reported in this chapter).

Additionally, it is also found that high values of work are held and nourished primarily by those within the new occupational classes, meaning those employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, and office workers who are not involved in manual labor and who work within the information economy (Figure 9.2). Across all three pooled countries and waves, these persons holding new occupations are ($p=.001$) more likely to value work (mean=3.46 versus 3.39). Together, these findings indicate that adjustment to work requires considerable adaptation, and that this adaptation must be more radical within the new occupational sphere, so that those aiming toward success within the new economy must adapt through the enhancement of work.

Figure 9.1 Importance of Work over time, by nation and birth cohort





Figure 9.2 Importance of Work over time, by nation and occupational group



* "new occupations" signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Nonmaterial Job Expectations

Birth cohorts in all three countries are also split visibly regarding whether they mention the following as important in a job: respect from others, ability to use initiative, possibility for achievement, responsibility, that the job meets one's abilities, that the job is interesting (See Figure 9.3). These qualities were contrasted with more traditional material job attributes, such as good pay, good security, and good hours. Remarkable is that in each country, the younger cohorts are more likely to value these job qualities than their old counterparts; this intergenerational difference indicates a potential long-term indicator towards change. Variations over time are also noted, as Eastern Germany, with a comparatively high level of modern job expectations, has noticed a strong drop ($p=.001$) in these modern job expectations between 1990 (mean=125) and 1999 (mean=109). China¹² has also seen a significant drop between 1995 and 2001 (means=102.28 versus 86.8, $p=.001$), while nonmaterial job expectations in Russia have increased significantly ($p=.001$) over this same period (means=89.1 versus 96.5).

Figure 9.4 demonstrates the strong divergence in nonmaterial job expectations between persons in 'modern' occupations compared to the others. Those in modern jobs are much more likely to stress the value in finding a job with a high degree of respect, a job which provides chances for personal achievement, a job with responsibility, a job that meets one's abilities, and a job that is interesting. The mean level of such job expectations for these modern occupations, with all countries and waves pooled, is 109.8, compared to 94.8 for the others, a highly significant ($p=.001$) difference. This divergence, like the intergenerational gap noted, suggests that the economy is supplying new motives to individuals regarding to their willingness to work. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that these non-material job expectations are *not* 'post-materialist' in the sense of heightened sociality. Rather, they highlight the non-materialistic aspects of work which have a strong correlation with individualism; these job characteristics stress the *personal* achievement and ambition of the worker. This focus on personal achievement and 'career' correlates well with qualitative findings regarding the heightened 'ambition' among workers and the young. We will be able to look at some of the *material* job expectations in a section below for a comparison.

¹² T-tests comparing variables across time periods in China will use 1995 as the initial wave of comparison, rather than 1990, because the 1990 Chinese sample is significantly biased toward urban respondents compared to the later samples.

Figure 9.3 Nonmaterial Job Expectations (respect, initiative, achievement, responsibility, meeting abilities, interesting job) by birth cohort





Figure 9.4 Nonmaterial Job Expectations (respect, initiative, achievement, responsibility, meeting abilities, interesting job) by occupational field



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

FAMILY

Qualitative data have stressed the detriment to family values caused by enhanced values of work. Two pieces of evidence especially supported this trend: the mal-adaptation of the older generation to the transformation and thus diminished respect for it, on the one hand, and the individualization of the socialization of children, on the other. These findings are paralleled in the quantitative data analysis. Primarily, the data indicate the substantial differentiation of both the value of unconditionally respecting parents and parental willingness to sacrifice for children and by birth cohort.

Parental Duty to Sacrifice for Children

Figure 9.5 represents a strong trend, whereby each younger birth cohort consecutively cares less and less about sacrificing for its children. Within this item, informants could agree with one of the following statements. The first (represented by the lower value, 1, in Figure 9.5), reads "Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children," while the second is (value=2), "Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being." The strong inter-cohort mean difference is significant (.001) across all countries, with the pooled average of the younger half of respondents, born between 1959 and 1983, having a mean value of 1.58 (n=4297) compared to the mean of the older respondents of 1.70 (n=7319). To reiterate, each new birth cohort, including those middle cohorts in the 'parenting phase' of the life course, is less likely to believe in parental sacrifice. In Eastern Germany, a significant decay over time is noted, with the mean falling from 1.76 to 1.59 between 1990 and 2000 (p=.001). In comparison, the Chinese respondents' mean value of sacrifice for children rises moderately between 1995 and 2001 (mean=1.61 versus 1.74, p=.001). Likewise, Russia displays a small, but significant (p=.019), increase in the value of sacrificing for children (means=1.59 to 1.63).

We may also look at the value of parental sacrifice for children through the perspective of occupation (Figure 9.6). While the Eastern German and Russian cases display only small variations within this dimension, the differentiation in China is huge, with those working within the modern economy, as office workers, managers, and owners, much *less* likely to sacrifice their own well-being for their children. We see that at the beginning of the 1990's, before China's full-fledged urban economic transformation had gotten under way, these two occupational classes were closer together concerning their value of sacrificing for their children. Since then, the modern occupational class has individualized

across this dimension to a considerable extent, albeit in line with expectations considering our other findings on the expansion of the importance of work and personal ambition. Even if we include data from 1990, when those working in modern occupations showed much higher valuations along this dimension, we find a wide difference in means between the two groups (means=1.60 versus 1.72) in China, one significant at the .001 level.

Unconditional Respect of Parents

In a manner reminiscent of the above variable regarding sacrificing for children, this variable, whether or not one should love and respect one's parents unconditionally, is arrayed almost perfectly by birth cohort (See Figure 9.7), with the older cohorts placing more and more value on respecting parents and the younger ones more likely to say that parents should "earn" their respect. Like the previous variable, in Eastern Germany there has been a significant ($p=.001$) decrease in belief in unconditional respect of parents, with the mean dropping from 1.76 to 1.70 from 1990 to 1999. In contrast, China seems to be experiencing a re-traditionalization across this dimension. There, the mean value of respecting parents increased from 1.80 to 1.95 over the 1995 to 2001 period, significant at the .001 level. Russia, despite its lagging value of sacrifice for children, also experiences a burgeoning value of respect for elders (from a mean of 1.76 to 1.85, $p=.001$).

The new occupational groups, being less traditional in theory, also are narrowly less likely to embrace unconditional respect for parents (Figure 9.8). Across all pooled respondents, those in the modern occupations (mean= 1.78) are slightly less likely to embrace unconditional parental respect than those in other occupations (mean=1.84, $p=.001$).

While the quantitative data hint that we may be seeing a re-traditionalization in regard to 'respect of parents,' I am inclined to believe this is a vocalized reactionary response, a more shallow re-traditionalization against what appears to be a more substantial trend in the other direction. This seems especially to be the case since we do not find the parallel trend to enhanced respect of parents, which, if a re-traditionalization were truly occurring, would be a simultaneous enhancement of the parents' desire to sacrifice for children. Rather what we see is a one-sided demand by the society that elders are respected unconditionally, which contradicts their own unwillingness to sacrifice for the youth.

Figure 9.5 Whether parents should have to sacrifice for their children, by nation and cohort, 1990-2000





Figure 9.6 Whether parents should have to sacrifice for their children, by nation and occupational field, 1990-2000



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Figure 9.7 Respect of Parents by birth cohort and year





Figure 9.8 Respect of Parents by occupation and year



* "new occupations" signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

MATERIALISM

The qualitative interviews found increasing activity of materialist values due to the dominance of a new material culture and the personal adaptations of individuals toward this culture in order to achieve success through tools such as image cultivation and profit calculation. This new materialism is exemplified through consumerism, a focus on money, and perpetual worries about material security, which are tapped quantitatively by measurements of the value of thrift, good pay in a job, and the value of job security. As a value emphasizing saving money rather than spending it, it is not surprising that the value of thrift is one quantitatively varying between birth cohorts, occupations, and even time periods. In addition, the importance of high pay and job security are stratified by cohort as well, with the youngest respondents most concerned about high pay and the working-age respondents (the middle two quartiles) most concerned about job security.

Thrift

WVS respondents were asked to select from a list of values which ones should be taught to children. Figure 9.9 demonstrates how the value of thrift, or saving things or money, is devalued by younger cohorts and appears to be decreasing over time as well. This may be because it is being challenged by modern values of consumption as indicated within the qualitative interviews. Two-tailed T-tests on this WVS item reveal the pooled older birth cohort members (1902-1958, mean=.60) to be 10 percent more likely to highly value thrift than the younger cohort respondents (1959-1983, mean=.50, $p=.001$). Furthermore, the value of thrift declines significantly ($p=.001$) in Eastern Germany (from mean=.58 to .43), Russia (mean=.61 to .52, $p=.001$), and less so in China (1995 to 2001, mean=.62 to .57, $p=.013$).

As a clue for the reason of thrift's demise, in all three countries, it is highly undervalued by those in modern occupations compared to others, and the gap is extraordinarily large (Figure 9.10). For example, of the pooled East Germans, 46.7 percent of persons in modern occupations chose thrift as an important value for children, while 61 percent from other occupations did the same ($p=.001$). Among the Chinese, 49.6 percent of those in modern occupations chose thrift as an ideal, compared to 63 percent from other occupations. Among Russians, because the analysis includes the first waves, before the value of thrift diverged for the two occupational groups, the overall difference between these groups is less extreme, 51.8 percent compared to 57.7 percent in the traditional occupations, but it remains nonetheless highly statistically significant ($p=.001$).

Importance of High Pay

In comparison to the earlier presented findings on how non-materialist job expectations were highest among younger birth cohorts, we find the same regarding materialist job expectations, indicating that the younger respondents are overall more emphatic about *all* ideals related to work. On the issue of "good pay" within a job, the younger birth cohorts are progressively more concerned with it than the older (see Figure 9.11). Among the oldest two birth cohorts, 77.8 percent named good pay as important, compared with 81.7 percent among the youngest two birth cohorts ($p=.001$). These inter-cohort differences are the greatest in Eastern Germany. Changes over time are not significant in Eastern Germany, but Russia experienced a significant ($p=.001$) expansion in the importance of pay between 1990 (82.7 percent) and 2000 (89.2 percent), and China displays a decline ($p=.001$) in the importance of pay between 1995 (76 percent) and 2001 (65 percent).

Likely because of their higher incomes and lower material insecurities, those in the 'new occupational field,' including management, ownership, and office work, value good pay in a job slightly *less* than workers in other occupations (Figure 9.12). This difference is strong and significant ($p=.001$) in Eastern Germany, with only 65.6 percent of modern occupations valuing high pay compared to 78.6 percent in other occupations. The other countries' occupational differences along this variable are insignificant. Our qualitative findings may help us explain this fact since the Eastern Germans tended to be less 'ambitious' and more oriented toward material sufficiency and basic satisfaction of needs than their Russian and Chinese counterparts. Thus, it is possible that the Eastern Germans know when to say "enough is enough." As such, those in this new occupational class already earn more than those in other occupations and are probably more likely to shift their focus towards more family time once these basic needs are met, in contrast to the more consumerist Chinese and Russians who may rather opt for earning even more money.

Figure 9.9 Valuation of Thrift as Ideal Value for Children, by cohort and year





Figure 9.10 Thrift as a Value for Children by occupation and year



* "new occupations" signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Figure 9.11 Good pay important in job, by birth cohort and year





Figure 9.12 Good pay important in job, by occupation and year



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Importance of Job Security

In contrast to our above findings about the importance of good pay in a job, Figure 9.13 shows very clearly the rapid expansion of job security worries during the transformation years, especially in Russia. A birth cohort trend is clear as well, in that we find that the oldest and youngest cohorts have the least amount of concerns with job security, as they are not yet within or may be just leaving the job market. There are expansions in the importance of job security in two of our three societies. In Eastern Germany in 1990, 72.2 percent of respondents listed it as important, as compared to 79.4 percent in 1999 ($p=.001$). The Russian explosion in job security values is extraordinarily prominent, from 38.2 percent to 69.4 percent, a near doubling between 1990 and 1999 ($p=.001$). Expansions in the importance of job security are negligible in China, likely because of its extraordinary economic growth throughout the past 15 to 20 years. These results concur with the qualitative finding that many individuals, especially at the beginning of the transformation, experienced great material insecurity and were thus especially likely to look for secure jobs, especially in Russia, where the economic shock together with the lack of unemployment benefits combined to produce crisis.

Analysis of job security values by occupational field (Figure 9.14) tell us a result that we might expect, that those in the modern occupations are less likely to have job security worries, since they have successfully adapted to the new economy and earn decent income. This gap is small but significant in Eastern Germany (means=.708 versus .780, $p=.001$), quite large in China (means=.484 versus .655, $p=.001$), and tiny but significant in Russia (means=.590 versus .621, $p=.023$).

Figure 9.13 Job Security Important, by birth cohort, by year





Figure 9.14 Job Security Important, by occupational group, by year



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

OTHER VALUES

This miscellaneous category primarily deals with valuations of *distant* sociality and morality. First, among Russian and Eastern German qualitative informants, friendship values are apparently in tension with values of work and family. Quantitatively it is found that friendship valuation is differentiated as 'modern' across cohort and occupation, and thereby, is apparently favored by the new economy. Second, qualitative interviews pointed to an intergenerational gap in both patriotic and community orientations, which is quantitatively paralleled by differentiations in the value of politics across birth cohorts and occupational groupings. Third, this same issue of contraction of outlooks towards others may be spun positively as 'independence,' which was featured prominently in the interviews. The value of independence is also a place of variation between cohorts and occupations in the quantitative data. Fourth, qualitative indications of the linkage of the twin traditional values of religion and family are paralleled by quantitative findings showing a clear breakdown of religiosity across birth cohort lines. Finally, the important qualitative finding of the diminished role of morality is echoed in quantitative data demonstrating that those respondents who are younger, in privileged occupations, employed, and wealthier are less likely to believe in moral absolutes.

Importance of Friends

Within the WVS, the indicator of the value of friends (v5) is aligned nearly perfectly by birth cohort. Each newer birth cohort is consecutively more friendship-oriented (Figure 9.15). Across all years and countries, the oldest two cohorts (mean=3.04) are less friendship-oriented than the younger two (mean=3.22), and at a significance level of .001. Over time, the East German valuation of friends rises slightly during the transition period (from a mean of 3.19 to 3.34, $p=.001$), while the Chinese value declines somewhat (1995 to 2001, mean=3.15 to 3.02, $p=.001$). In contrast, Russian friendship values do not change significantly between 1990 and 1999, according to this dataset.

When viewing friendship values through the prism of occupations (Figure .16), it becomes clear that high friendship values are focused within the privileged occupation group. Across waves and country samples, employers, managers, professionals, supervisors and office workers (mean=3.16) have a significantly higher value of friendship than the other combined (mean=3.04) occupational groupings ($p=.001$). Thus, the expansion of friendship values appears to proceed in tandem with the economic transformation, perhaps because of the importance of 'contacts' and weak ties, the instrumentalized relations mentioned earlier by the interview informants.

Importance of Politics

Figure 9.17 displays how a strong political orientation is also differentiated by birth cohort, with the older cohorts (mean=2.46) tending toward a higher valuation of politics than the younger (mean=2.37, $p=.001$). In addition, it is worth noting that politics in Russia are highly undervalued compared to Eastern Germany and China, which has the highest mean valuation of politics among our three countries. However, the value of politics declines substantially in Eastern Germany during the transition years. The mean 1990 value in Eastern Germany was 2.64; since then it has plummeted to 2.26 ($p=.001$). In comparison, politics valuations in Russia and China appear relatively stable over this period. Nonetheless, the intergenerational inequality in political interest, coupled with the low degree of Russian political interest and the strong Eastern German downturn, add weight to the notion of a political demoralization.

In addition, those in the privileged occupations (mean=2.51), because of their location at the center of the new occupational structure, are somewhat more politically oriented than those of other occupations (mean=2.40, $p=.001$; Figure 9.18). This suggests that the demoralization we sensed within our privileged interviewees is likely much greater among other groups.

Independence as an Ideal Value for One's Child

The Figure 9.19 displays very nicely how the value of independence as an ideal trait for children delineates nearly perfectly across birth cohort, with the newer cohorts progressively more in favor of independence as a trait. Using data pooled from all three nations and waves, the older two cohorts (42 percent) are 13 percent less likely to select independence as an ideal trait than the younger two cohorts (54.9 percent, $p=.001$). Alongside, between 1990 and 2000, Eastern Germany and Russia experienced no significant change in this value, while in the Chinese case, it jumped by 24 percent (50% to 74.1%) between 1995 and 2001 ($p=.001$).

A look at the value of independence according to occupational group, however, reveals a trend (Figure 9.20) whereby the members of the privileged occupations value independence the most. The differences are moderate in Eastern Germany and Russia but quite radical in China, where 83 percent of persons with 'new economy' occupations are valuing independence, compared to only 61 percent of the others. Thus, the new economy encourages 'going it alone' and managing oneself as ideals for its new members compared to the traditional norms of group support and group identity.

Figure 9.15 Importance of Friends, by birth cohort and year





Figure 9.16 Importance of Friends, by birth cohort and year



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Figure 9.17 Importance of Politics, by birth cohort, by year





Figure 9.18 Importance of Politics, by birth cohort, by year



* "new occupations" signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Figure 9.19 Independence as an Ideal value for Children





Figure 9.20 Independence as an Ideal value for Children



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Importance of Religion

The analysis of data on the importance of religion (Figure 9.21) reveals in Russia and Eastern Germany a precise breakdown according to birth cohort, with the older cohorts progressively more religious than the younger, but no such trend is determinable within China. In Eastern Germany, the older cohorts are much more religious (mean=1.92) than the younger (mean=1.57; $p=.001$), while in Russia the same trend is more moderate (mean=2.35 versus 2.16; $p=.001$), although the Russians are overall more religious than the Eastern Germans. Over time patterns are also apparent, with a considerable secularization apparent in Eastern Germany between 1990 (mean=2.06) and 1999 (mean=1.62; $p=.001$) and in China between 1995 (mean=1.71) and 2001 (mean=1.48, $p=.001$). In contrast, there is a rise in the reported importance of religion in Russia (mean=2.12 to 2.39, $p=.001$) during the transformation years. The data show no discernable or significant differentiation in religiosity according to occupational grouping (Figure 9.22).

Belief in Absolute Moral Standards

One item (v183) of the WVS asks the respondent whether he/she believes in "absolutely clear guidelines" about good and evil. Alternatively, the respondent may answer that there can never be such absolute standards, but good and evil depend on context. A cohort analysis on this item (Figure 9.23) shows that moral relativism is highest in the youngest cohorts and lowest in the oldest cohorts. A T-test shows that while 37.8 percent of respondents in the two oldest cohorts believe in moral absolutes, only 30 percent of the younger respondents believe the same ($p=.001$). Changes were also observed over time in the 1990's. In Eastern Germany, the number of persons believing in moral absolutes appears to have increased substantially, from 22.7 to 38 percent ($p=.001$). In the meanwhile, Russia moral absolutism also increased in the 1990's, from 30.8 to 39.4 percent ($p=.001$). However, in China there was a small, but significant, decline in the belief in moral absolutism during this same period (from 41 to 36.3 percent, $p=.029$).

Respondents within privileged occupations are *not* more strongly adhering to these moral absolutes (Figure 9.24). In 2000, this group was scoring lower than other occupations on this item. All around, however, there are no significant differences occupationally in the three country, three wave, pooled data. In addition, we find that those not working (including students, housewives, the retired, and the unemployed) are *more* moral than the employed (see Figure 9.25), potentially paralleling the qualitative finding that participation in the modern economy requires a moral relativization.

Figure 9.21 Importance of Religion, by birth cohort





Figure 9.22 Importance of Religion, by Occupation



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

33.6 percent of employed respondents believe in absolute guidelines regarding good and evil, compared with 37.2 percent of respondents without employment, including housewives, students, the retired, and the unemployed ($p=.001$). Even more surprisingly, belief in moral absolutes is differentiated according to income, where the richest third of the population is less likely to believe in moral absolutes than the other two thirds (see Figure 9.26). In Eastern Germany, it is observable that the middle and lower income thirds possess the strongest belief in absolute morality, with the richest third lagging behind. In Russia, the trend is even more differentiated, with the poor having the highest morality, the middle class having a middle degree of morality, and the richest third have the least. In China, the differentiation is rather between the middle class, with the highest degree of morality, and the lower and upper classes, each possessing a comparatively lower level. Furthermore, this differentiation of morality across income groups in China and Russia appears to widen throughout the transformation period. By 2000, of the respondents (all countries pooled) with the lowest two thirds of income (compared to others in their nation), 40.8 percent believed in absolute moral principles, compared to only 33.2 percent of the highest income group. These data parallel the qualitative finding that those who became rich may have done so at the expense of their moral principles.

GENDER

The quantitative sample from which the above analyses are drawn contains both men and women. In comparison, the qualitative sample involved exclusively men, with the exception of one Moscow mother. While quantitative analyses above meshed quite well with the qualitative results, it is worth asking to which extent these quantitative results were affected by adding women to the analysis, especially considering men were chosen qualitatively because of their 'most-affected' position in terms of their values being more likely pulled toward those demanded by the economy. In order to approach this question, T-tests were performed on all the above variables, pooled across waves and nations. Table 9.1 displays these results. These findings are remarkably consistent with those of Beutel and Marini (1995), who found men to be more competitive, materialistic, and less compassionate than women. In comparison, results here indicate that women more highly value sacrificing oneself for one's children, unconditional respect for parents, job security, and the importance of religion. In contrast, men place higher value on the importance of work, non-materialist job expectations, high pay, politics, and independence. Thereby, men are indeed more affected by the individualization processes mentioned here, while women seem to embody some sort of resistance. Notably, this makes this study's overall

quantitative change findings more conservative than would an exclusive focus on male businessmen, who indeed embody these individualization tensions the most. Nonetheless, even women in our sample experience, when separated from the male sample, some of the same trends documented above (See Table 9.2). Between 1990 and 2000, women have become less likely to value non-materialist job dimensions, but have seen a moderate increase in their concern for high pay and a huge growth in their concern for job security. Women also follow the same trend as men in that they become less likely to value sacrificing for children compared to 1990 but nonetheless become more likely to unconditionally value elders. In addition, women come to devalue thrift, politics, and independence, while they demonstrate an increase in their valuations of friends, religion, and absolute moral principles.

Figure 9.23 Belief in Absolute Moral Principals, by birth cohort





Figure 9.24 Belief in Absolute Moral Principals, By occupational field



* “new occupations” signify those in occupations favored by the new economy: employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers.

Figure 9.25 Belief in Absolute Moral Principles, by employment status




Figure 9.26 Belief in Absolute Moral Principles, by relative income




Table 9.1 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables by Gender

Variable	n	Male mean	standard deviation	n	Female mean	standard deviation	comparison	significance
Importance of work	6039,00	3,460	0,766	7096,000	3,337	0,84	M>F	0,001
nonmaterial job expectations	6085,00	103,043	50,386	7186,000	97,420	49,53	M>F	0,001
sacrifice for children	5292,00	1,643	0,479	6332,000	1,667	0,47	F>M	0,007
respect parents	5875,00	1,790	0,407	6928,000	1,819	0,38	F>M	0,001
thrift	6115,00	0,556	0,497	7229,000	0,571	0,49	n.s.	n.s.
good pay in job	6110,00	0,803	0,398	7214,000	0,784	0,41	M>F	0,006
job security	6110,00	0,626	0,484	7218,000	0,644	0,48	F>M	0,028
importance friends	6039,00	3,116	0,704	7142,000	3,099	0,72	n.s.	n.s.
importance politics	5963,00	2,544	0,926	6997,000	2,325	0,90	M>F	0,001
independence	6115,00	0,514	0,500	7229,000	0,429	0,49	M>F	0,001
importance religion	5866,00	1,780	0,910	6881,000	2,125	1,02	F>M	0,001
belief in absolute morals	5734,00	0,341	0,474	6581,000	0,355	0,48	n.s.	n.s.

n.s. not statistically significant.

Table 9.2 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables between 1990 and 2000, for women

	wave	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comparison	Significance
Importance of work	1990	2198	3,334	0,799	n.s.	n.s.
	1999-2000	2493	3,318	0,892		
nonmaterial job expectations	1990	2246	99,281	50,885	1990>2000	0,002
	1999-2000	2495	94,720	51,896		
respect parents	1990	2105	1,788	0,409	2000>1990	0,000
	1999-2000	2417	1,837	0,369		
Sacrifice for Children	1990	1898	1,696	0,460	1990>2000	0,003
	1999-2000	2234	1,652	0,476		
Thrift for Children	1990	2246	0,605	0,489	1990>2000	0,000
	1999-2000	2538	0,514	0,500		
Good pay in job	1990	2246	0,740	0,439	2000>1990	0,000
	1999-2000	2523	0,795	0,404		
Good security in job	1990	2246	0,509	0,500	2000>1990	0,000
	1999-2000	2527	0,712	0,453		
Friends important	1990	2202	3,051	0,748	2000>1990	0,013
	1999-2000	2518	3,104	0,712		
Politics important	1990	2165	2,420	0,922	1990>2000	0,000
	1999-2000	2452	2,281	0,863		
Religion important	1990	2135	2,080	1,056	2000>1990	0,005
	1999-2000	2430	2,165	1,017		
Independence important	1990	2246	0,495	0,500	1990>2000	0,001
	1999-2000	2538	0,449	0,497		
believes in absolute morals	1990	2052	0,292	0,455	2000>1990	0,000
	1999-2000	2281	0,389	0,488		

n.s. not statistically significant.

Table 1.2 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables between 1990 and 2000, for women

CHAPTER 10. MECHANISMS OF CHANGE

The high standard of living in the domain of the great corporations is *restrictive* in a concrete sociological sense: the goods and services that the individuals buy control their needs and petrify their faculties. In exchange for the commodities that enrich their life, the individuals sell not only their labor but also their free time. The better living is offset by the all-pervasive control over living. People dwell in apartment concentrations -- and have private automobiles with which they can no longer escape into a different world. They have huge refrigerators filled with frozen foods. They have dozens of newspapers and magazines that espouse the same ideals. They have innumerable choices, innumerable gadgets which are all of the same sort and keep them occupied and divert their attention from the real issue -- which is the awareness that they could both work less and determine their own needs and satisfaction.

H. Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (1955:100), Ch. 4, The Dialectic of Civilization

SUMMARY

In discussing *how* values changed in the discussed manner, in the direction of weakened face to face sociality, four important processes emerge: conscious adaptation, ideological conflict, cognitive dissonance, and intergenerational changeover. These are the broad mechanisms key to understanding how the growing latency in social values arises in these cases. First, the capitalist transformation embodied objective changes in goods and work. At the individual level, *conscious adaptation* to these new structures, the economic cultural structure, is the general process describing how individuals cope and adapt to the new social system in order to ensure success. Yet this individual adaptation is embedded within a macro-level context characterized by rapid ideological change and *ideological conflict*, which hints at the subjective elements of the transformation. Capitalism was perceived in post-communist countries as a monolithic block because individuals understood it ideologically, through the lens of the previous system. Thus, they adapted their values in order to match their perception of the new order. As a result, there occurred a clash between the values of the new society, capitalism, and existing normative structures, and individuals faced *cognitive dissonance* as a result, which was resolved through value change in the direction of enhanced individualization. Finally, *intergenerational changeover* dynamics also result in individualized values through 'natural' fresh contact, the lack of appropriate role models, the influence of peer groups,

and the breakdown of socialization of the young generation. Such intergenerational changeover effects occur within any social change, and this particular one was no exception, resulting in a younger generation better adapted to the new system in comparison to its elders.

Through these four mechanisms, this chapter presents an integrated means of explaining deterioration of values in our three post-communist countries. These explanations are produced by the conjuncture of both relevant and fresh indications within the observed data and the theoretical approaches outlined at the beginning of the dissertation. The details of the overall model of explanation are illustrated by Figure 10.1. It is a dynamic model, showing both catalyzing and buffering effects against the main process of individualization, which occurs at the core through individuals adapting and being socialized to the key 'tools of success' within the capitalist economy. The diagram is not intended to imply an immediate deterministic notion of individualization but rather indicates the tendency toward the individualization outcome for reasons to be explained here.

On the diagram's left is the independent variable, the capitalist market economy, whereas on the right, we have the main outcome noted in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9: an individualized value set whereby intimate sociality becomes latent. The principal mechanisms taking us from the left to the right are the joint processes of socialization and adaptation. Socialization refers mainly to the naturalized 'top-down' value-schooling enacted by social-structural agents such as parents, schools, and workplaces. In the meanwhile, adaptation is the more agentic form of value modification whereby individuals consciously enact a behavior adjustment according to their own desires and preferences, attempting to achieve a match with the needs of the ruling economic culture. To the right of this socialization/adaptation box is the notion of 'tools of success.' These correspond to the societal 'rules of the game' by which individuals should adapt their behavior in certain ways in order to be successful within the capitalist economy. These particular tools involve concepts to be discussed in this chapter, such as profit-oriented calculative rationality, skills of interpersonal exploitation and instrumentalization, the commodification of time, image cultivation and consumerist display of luxuries, a high degree of personal ambition and independent self-sufficiency, a strong focus on work, a materialist mindset, and moral flexibility. Each of these generates its own unique individualizing effect. Overall, those who acquire these tools, which are matched to the needs of the economic culture, are thereby more likely to achieve success than those who

do not. Yet those who adopt these tools, whether consciously or unconsciously, are less likely to be able to devote their time and mental focus to the intimate social sphere.

Numerous processes catalyze and slow ('buffer') this transmission of individualized market-economic values. Among the catalysts are intergenerational changeover effects. Specifically, Mannheim's (1952) notion of 'fresh contact' is used to demonstrate how younger generations always tend toward a more radical adoption of new cultural forms than their parents. In addition, the older generation's lack of knowledge about the new economic system exacerbates the younger's reliance upon peers as a source of knowledge and as role models, thus enhancing the fresh contact effect. Finally, the breakdown and modification of the socialization of values into children also result in a value set which is less intimately social.

In addition, the liberal free-market state, epitomized by the American or British model, catalyzes the individualization process through promoting individualist ideals. The American 'frontier mentality,' the notion of one 'pulling oneself up by the bootstraps,' the 'do it yourself' mindset, the demonization of welfare and receiving social help, plus the glorification of business, creativeness, and the entrepreneurial spirit; these all characterize how the capitalist economic culture is supported ideologically by a particular form of state, a state that ensures, not prevents, the transmission of values functional to the economic machine. The Chinese and Russian states have both adopted this model. The Russian state, upon the Soviet collapse, adopted a laissez-faire approach regarding values, one resulting de-facto in the furthered interests of values conducive to economic health. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party actively encouraged consumerist and capitalist values through propaganda.

Value conflict and the resolution of this conflict is also a major source of value change. At the micro level, considerable energy will also be spent here elucidating the role of cognitive dissonance within value change. When conflicts occur, as my data show, between work and family, and between money and morality, these are most often resolved in the direction of least resistance, which is the direction of the economic impulse: enhancing work at the expense of family and intimate relations. Furthermore, the parallel of cognitive dissonance at the cultural level is ideological conflict, by which individuals interpreted capitalism through a communist ideological lens, and thus adapted to capitalism in its 'ideal' communist form: as a wholly individualized, immoral, and anti-social entity.

Finally, the role of media and advertisements in furthering individualization is also established. The goal of advertisements, in locking persons into consumerist lifestyles


conscious of image and sensitive toward material success markers, is one at odds with the individual goal of shielding oneself from spending more time shopping and working than necessary. Modern movies and music may also sell ideals which are aligned with the dominant cultural motive, one of economic success and domination.

Several factors have been identified as buffers working against the transformation towards individualist values. One of these appears to be the welfare state. Eastern German informants, when faced with moral and social conflicts over their work, were quite ready to admit or pursue the *possibility* of shifting jobs because of the existence of a social safety net. In addition, pro-family laws and work-family harmony ideology may have also played roles in allowing the Eastern German informants to at least *feel* the acceptability of a balanced work-family routine. This is in stark contrast to the non-welfare states which promote work, self-realization, and profit ideologies. In addition, religion appears to be a powerful bastion of pro-social values. Each of the informants that espoused religiosity also displays a high degree of respect for sociality and work-family balance. This is likely due to religion's espousal of ultimate values in conflict with those of the ruling economic system (i.e. god versus profit). Finally, gender is also a strong indicator of pro-social values, based on outside research and the findings of this study, as women are more likely to hold onto pro-family, religious, and anti-materialist values.

Thereby, this chapter outlines and provides evidence for the individualizing potential of the four mechanisms introduced here and embedded in Figure 10.1.

MECHANISMS OF VALUE CHANGE

Figure 10.1 : Explaining Deterioration of Social Values



CONSCIOUS ADAPTATION

There are two ways in which adaptation is understood. First, adaptation is a generic process which describes how individuals come to match their environments, whether they do so through intentional learning, less intentional processes such as ideological manipulation or acculturation, or through traditional notions of socialization. This concept is a key one in explaining how, within the capitalist economic structure, former communist citizens may come "to be socialized in a way which makes disorder, uncertainty and risk-taking an element of everyday life" (Kupferberg 1999:11). Yet there are many ways through which such adaptation or socialization may occur; the question is a black box within which many varieties of behavioral modification may fit. Here the intent is to specify some of the various mechanisms of value change operating in this context.

With this in mind, the second way in which adaptation is used here is in a more specific sense. The adaptation analyzed here occurs in a mostly conscious form. Conscious adaptation implies actors learning the rules of the game and the means to success within a particular system. Thereby, conscious adaptation should be seen as the reflective adaptation of individuals to their new environment. Yet this 'conscious' adaptation is only one of several mechanisms of value change provided here. The unconscious dimensions of value change in post-Communist societies are described in the below sections on ideological conflict and cognitive dissonance.

Perception of Economic Culture

A prerequisite of conscious adaptation is recognition by the individual of the structure or *Sinn* (sense) of the society. Our informant L3 points out that this recognition is one of a concrete economic structure, even a "natural one," according to which one must adapt in order to be successful in work. When speaking of money and material things, this informant used as a subject the German word "*man*," meaning "a person" (as in, 'a person should do this or that...') whereas when speaking of his own values and ideals, he used "*Ich*," or "I." This shows that he depersonalizes the demands of the economic structure into impersonal rules and pressures which he must obey, while he set these in contrast with his own innate interests. In contrast, his father, L4, notes that "since I am not working anymore, one is a little shielded by the problems of the working world." L6, as well, found it unnecessary to adapt to the new society due to his age and thereby lack of economic integration:

Q. What do you think of people who behave capitalistically (informant's

terminology) and use others?

*A. I am refusing this, but I can understand them. Everybody has to see to making ends meet. That's how I see it as outsider, you know. If I was 20 years younger, or 25 or in your age, I would see things like they do. **But I don't have to see it like them.** I do understand them, but I refuse it.*

Q. What do you feel when you see a rich man in movies and TV shows who is presented as a role model for success?

*A. This comes close to the question. I understand that. I also understand that people produce commercials for this. But I couldn't care less. I don't know if you understand what I mean with saying this. But I think this probably has to do with my age, **I'm standing outside.** If not, I would possibly see things differently. I suppose my sons see it differently than I do. I don't know, but I assume it. [emphasis added]*

Similarly, M12 notes how her lack of economic involvement meant that she did not need to adapt, which is in contrast to her son:

Q. Did these changes somehow affect your values, your points of view or not at all?

A. They happened. I saw what happened. But I can't say that they have affected me too much. I haven't participated in all these happenings, so my point of view could be subjective, it's not objective at all.

In contrast to the non-workers, L7, as a businessman, describes how his reflective adaptation implies value change. He notes that, over the transformation years, he has "grown into the business" as a result of his focus over time upon career, personal progress, leading the business, and being successful. Thereby those working are 'playing the game' and thus must adapt to the 'rules.' Yet there are specific conditions that motivate them to adapt: material conditions and, more importantly, personal ambition.

Economic Conditions

Certainly, one of the prime motivators of adaptation during the transformation years was economic scarcity and material survival, or at least the threat of economic insecurity (Kasser et al. 2003:13). In this view, scarcity is *a* motivator of value change, not *the* motivator, as Inglehart (2000) argues. During the transformation years, individuals were motivated by the threat of poverty to secure a material foundation for themselves and their families. Indeed the economic conditions in Eastern Europe were miserable. Some note that the economic depression resulting from the transformation was comparable or worse than was the Great Depression for developed countries (World Bank 2002:5; as cited by Outhwaite & Ray: 51). The shock of adjusting oneself under such conditions of material insecurity proved especially poignant, for example, in Eastern Germany, where upon

transformation individuals entering the western labour market had to learn to "prove themselves" constantly (Offe 94, cited by Kupferberg 179).

There are many observations within the interviews of the relevance of material insecurity. The father-son pair M7-M8 is a notable example. During the transformation years, the father, M8, was still working and thus had a frantic rush in order to successfully commercialize his business for the sake of material well-being. This sacrifice has amounted to the fact that the family became important only "by default" for him. In contrast, the son M7, is more family oriented, because his transition occurred more smoothly and less suddenly since it was experienced concomitant with his youthful socialization and without the same material burdens shouldered by his father. It was a 'natural' part of growing up, part of the known social environment being adapted to by him and his peers. As a result, the son is more family-oriented than the father. Thus, shock because of material insecurity stimulated a radical transformation in the direction of heightened valuation of work, to the detriment of active valuation of the family.

Ambition and Aspirations

Yet material insecurity was only one of many motivators among people who experienced the transformation. Also important was the enhancement of personal ambition and aspirations during the transformation, whereby the accumulation of money and material subsistence for many are only side-effects of striving for personal achievement. This personal achievement cult is part and parcel of the "western ethos of winners and losers" (Pollack 1992; as cited by Kupferberg 1999:26).

A rise in the value of individual-achievement is strongly documented within the interviews. Typically the young informants have a sturdy achievement-orientation. As an illustration of this trend, S13's focus on self-realization is quite strong:

Q: What is the most important thing in your life?

A: Self-realization. I won't be suppressed by anyone. I am not a presumptuous man but I have such a nature that if I find that someone wants to prevent me from developing on purpose, I will resist.

Similarly, S9 notes "The first value is to devote myself to the cause I love and make some achievements." These high-achievement oriented persons typically channel these drives toward their careers. In contrast, the older generation notes that a strong personal drive toward individual success was not necessary and may have been frowned upon in the past. For example, S14, the father of the 'insuppressible' S13, recalls, "Planned economy means whatever assignments the leaders gave to you, you should strictly take their orders.

Nobody would refuse to finish the assignment and nobody would say 'I'm sure to succeed'." S7 notes as well the tendency of the younger generations to "overestimate themselves."

This focus of members of the younger generation on personal ambition and personal achievement is clearly one of enhanced self-focus, differing greatly from the more group-oriented work orientations of their fathers' generation. A high degree of self-confidence and ambition should be seen as both a source of motivation and as a tool of success within the new system.

Tools of Success

Individuals' recognition of the nature of the objective economic conditions - within work and consumption - in which they live also implies that they learn something about how to achieve success within these systems. Several tools of success are outlined here: tolerance of failure, cost-benefit analyses, image cultivation, interpersonal exploitation and instrumentalization, and commodified time.

Tolerance of Failure

The seeking of and taking on of more risk by individuals, due to their high drives toward personal achievement, also implies the suffering of more failures (Beck 1992). Therefore, the younger generations must also adapt a 'thick skin.' Since plans do not always work out as they should, one must have an enhanced tolerance toward enduring failure. S9, for example, notes that he will attempt to transmit such a value to his son: "If he can endure many problems, he will be sound in mind. And that's a requirement for me as well." S13 similarly values endurance of failure:

Q: What do you think is the most important quality for a successful entrepreneur?

A: The ability to endure failure and difficulty.

The ability to endure failure enhances the individualism inherent in the high self-achievement mentality noted above. It allows the individual to become continually more self-confident, risky, and self-directed. The enhancement of these traits improves the likelihood of both economic success and narcissism.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

Businessmen need to learn cost-benefit thinking, specifically profit-calculation, in order to survive. Thus, this economic thinking is attached to particular roles, such as worker and non-worker, businessman and non-businessman. L12 points out that a

businessman knows cost-benefit thinking "from the cradle." This is also noted in a comparison of the L5-L6 pair, whereby the younger definitely notices a change in his cost-benefit thinking, while his father did not change in this regard. Other excerpts also demonstrate the importance of profit calculation as a tool of success of the businessman:

(S15)

There was space for my promotion in that field. However, I had an early start in my present field so I concern little about material things. However, I care about material things for my company and my business.

(S9)

We can meet life's basic demands and think little of our individual lives. As for the enterprises, the more the profits are, the better, which is absolute.

(S17)

In life, we think we can afford to spend money when there is need to do so. However, as an enterprise, I will consider of the inputs and profits. If the profits are not so good, I won't do so.

Here, there is a universal recognition of the importance of profit calculation. L7 also describes this newfound frugality, that:

professionally of course, [there developed] a way bigger conscience about the costs ...I mean it's just, it's not that one saves money endlessly but yet one considers what one needs...I think today it's certainly more important to get high quality things cheaply.

L7 also remarks that, in comparison to his father, he personally tends to "scrutinize" more closely in business matters, compared to his father, who tends to deal with commercial things "calmly" and intuitively. Also interesting here, however, is that L7's frugality notion is applied to work *and* home, implying a partial 'colonization' of the lifeworld by this rational form of calculation. Other informants, such as L1, perceive this threat of rational calculation to everyday life but maintain their defenses against it by maintaining a division, by, for example, attempting to refuse to focus too much on costs and benefits when it comes to activities within the family.

Furthermore, rationalization occurs within informants because of the new requirements that they learn to "manage" the state and its new requirements by themselves. L4 describes this change:

New was and is, of course, that with the state...yes...how to say...with the fiscal office or with the health insurance that one...or also as regards the pensions, with many things you have to act on your own. You either have to get informed and one has to take care of things more actively, and it wasn't like that in the GDR - which had formed us. Everything was done for you, it was just like that. But one couldn't change anything either.

Today one has to be careful, that is...

Therefore, several aspects of rational cost-benefit analyses described here relate to the individualization in question. First, the rational thinker is also more independent, separated by his/her calculative logic from the world, which then must be 'managed.' Therein is the second danger, that calculative logic itself will objectify everything and *everyone* into objects of analysis, thereby raising dangers of estrangement, instrumentalization, and exploitation. Finally, these both imply that calculative logic may "colonize" other more innately communicative spheres of life (Habermas 1989b).

Image Cultivation

Examples were noted in the previous chapters of the role of image cultivation and its importance for the entrepreneurs, businessmen, and managers who were interviewed. Image cultivation is given as a justification for a particular style of consumption, whereby individuals consciously choose to buy a nice suit (S13) or a nice car in order to be perceived as successful by their peers and customers. Thereby, however, a habitus of consumption develops which later may liberate itself from its original pragmatic intent or justification. This liberated consumerism may tend toward becoming an end in itself, potentially blinding its victims to other forms of ultimate valuation, such as the family, or communication itself.

Instrumentalization and Exploitation

Abundant examples were provided in preceding chapters of the enhanced roles of exploitation and instrumentalization within post-communist relationships. The word exploitation is more often used as a critique of the behavior of others, while informants rarely admit they are exploitative themselves. Nonetheless, certain informants admit to "using" others in an instrumental style, one that is "normal" within capitalism; they thereby reject the negative valences of "exploitation" as communist rhetoric, while incorporating its essence as normal.

L1, for example, as we may recall from Chapter 7, feels more used by others nowadays because money plays a greater role since there are more goods on the marketplace. He remembers how money was worth less back in those days, but now, the possibilities are greater, which "makes people do things they shouldn't do." Thereby, the informant indicates the expansion of the field of exploitation through explaining the growing incentives of exploitative behavior. This exploitative and instrumental style of relating to others explains the prevalence of larger and thinner friendship networks in the post-

communist setting as well as the older generation's reaction against this style of communication, one that views relationships as instrumental objects rather than as inherently valuable.

Commodified Time

The above-described conscious adaptive processes each embody their own forms of individualization. However, there is a powerful multiplier in exacerbating their joint individualizing effects. Time itself has become more rare, as it has become commodified and inflated in value (Neidhart 2003). Whereas socialist work embodied somewhat stable working hours and limits upon productive capacities, admittedly partially supplied by the lower psychological incentives for working harder, the capitalist system in contrast transforms time into money. Thereby, the enhanced focus on work found within post-communist businessmen and entrepreneurs is one that demands every ounce of available free time. Many examples of this have already been provided in previous chapters, but the outcome must be reiterated. A system which commodifies time, converting it into money and 'success,' also commodifies the relationships which rely upon this same precious resource. Informants often complain about the time conflicts between work and family. The result of this conflict usually resolved in favor of work, with the 'family phase' of life, as emphasized in Chapter 8, being postponed until retirement. In other words, the resource of time is granted to the family and primary relationships only when the informants' true loves - work and the self - have had their fill. The inflated and commodified value of time causes individuals to change their rhythms of time (see Outhwaite and Ray 2005:181) so that life sequencing itself is altered.

The interviews are replete with examples of the inflated value of time and the notion of work-family time conflicts. Many informants, especially the East Germans, for example, complain that time is too short to simultaneously manage work and family. The indication is that, at the beginning of the transformation, money was short and time was replete, whereas now the opposite is true. L9, for example, complains that he has the money to go on vacation, but it is much more difficult to secure the time.

The pace of modern time, due to its expanded value, aside from taking time away from intimate relationships, may also lead to uprooting. L3 describes:

But time is so fast and ephemeral, that one... that one asks oneself whether one personally even has such a big influence in those matters. One is able to determine a certain set of values for oneself and his own life indeed and this set of values is going to be valid in 5, 10 or for me even in 20 years from now, but one doesn't have the ability to, I simply

*say it that way, predict the progression of one's environment any longer.
Time became too fast-moving for that.*

The pace of life makes stability in values difficult to ensure.

As the ultimate irony, this perpetual lack of time, which the informants themselves complain about, is commodified not directly by the economic system but rather through the informants' themselves, as made clear by the prevalence of this problem especially among the self-employed. Recall one Eastern German's notion that self-employment is a form of slavery. Another, L2, remembers how, 15 years ago, the amount of time that he spent at home and at work was about the same as today, except that today he unfortunately brings more work home, since he is a freelancer:

but if you are in a position where you have responsibility, as entrepreneur for example, then this conflict is given, because if you decided to do something like this then you have to do it like this in order to get it working. Certainly you could organize things differently or so, I mean everyone does things as he thinks it is right and that is why I invested a lot of time that I didn't have at my disposal for other things.

Important here is that he notes, "certainly you could organize things differently," but he chooses not to.

IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT

The above section on adaptation had focused primarily on conscious, agentic, and willed responses to the new economy which resulted in a de-intimization of values. In contrast, it is necessary to also address the unconscious and subjective mechanisms of this change. In order to adequately do so, we must consider how the post-communist transformation was perceived, based on the ideological context within which individuals faced the 'objective' economic structure. This ideological dimension exists at the level of culture, above the level of individual cognition upon which we have until now focused. Moreover, this ideological step lays the ground to introduce one of the most surprising of our individualization mechanisms: cognitive dissonance.

Monolithic Blocks

Individuals adapting within post-communist societies were certainly faced with *real* changes in the realms of work, such as greater instability, and consumption, such as the range of available products and luxuries. Certainly many responses to these changes would be somewhat automatic and 'natural,' but nonetheless the way that post-communist citizens came to *evaluate* these changes would be unique because of the ideological baggage they inherited from the communist past. In other words, the capitalism inherited

by post-communist citizens was one viewed through the glasses of a cultural bias, the communist ideological lens. Just as many Westerners triumphantly greeted the communist collapse as a victory against totalitarianism and oppression, many individuals in those countries greeted it as the victory of what had until that point been known as an immoral, hedonistic, and materialistic capitalist economic power. Communism and capitalism presented one another in pure forms, as monolithic blocks, and this presentation is difficult to completely eradicate for individuals within either system.

This is not to suggest that either communist or capitalist populations naively swallow the ideology they are handed in whole or unquestioningly. As reported in Chapter 3, there was indeed widespread disillusionment in socialist societies prior to the economic transformation, exemplified through widespread mistrust of all official information in Soviet Russia and East Germany. Nonetheless, these ideologies *do form* one part of the cognitive environment of individuals in transition since this 'information environment' functions at levels of unconsciousness as well as on the more apparent level of ostensible resistance. Despite convictions to the contrary held by many in Western Europe or the United States, communism did have a "grip on the hearts and minds" of its citizens (Kupferberg 1999:1). In Eastern Germany, for example, even after the regime lost its appeal, many citizens still saw the communist experience as an "'error' growing out of good intentions" (Offe 1997:170).

This is not mentioned in order to underplay the internal resistance to Communist regimes, the poor material conditions they provided, or the real oppression they inflicted. However, individuals experiencing the economic transformation also experienced an ideological one. As Kupferberg (1999:31) notes, although the communist regimes were a "system of lies," they had to nonetheless "persuade" the great majority of citizens to join them. This is why "information policy" and information control was a key aspect of the former communist regimes (Kupferberg 1999:40).

Culture Shock

This notion of opposing ideological systems implies a cultural shock for those transitioning from one to the other. One must either adapt the new ideology, neo-liberalism, alongside its condemnation of the communist past *in pure form*, or cling to the past, issuing a strict condemnation of the capitalist present. Among those who adapt, taking on the new ideology, this creates a hardened mindset in which, to quote again one of the elder Moscow informants (M10), "everything except economics is crap." Those who adapt can be quite candid of the meaning of this personal shift in values, as our Moscow

informant 11, a successful businessman, noted, "In my case, all the communist ideals I cherished collapsed." In other cases, persons refused to adapt. For example, many East Germans still support the previous regime ideologically, specifically the moral superiority of socialism (Kupferberg 1999:145). Especially for older persons, this transformation came as a shock. For the younger, the transformation in values was equally tangible, but held more of an air of excitement, at least at the onset.

Literal Demoralization

Thus, many persons experienced "culture shock" when confronted with commodity civilization (for the Eastern German case, see Stolpe 1992; Schorlemmer 1992; as cited by Kupferberg 1999:135). This created an "anomic effect" in the sense that previous norms ceased to hold value. With rapid social change, previous "meaning-constructions" were made irrelevant, which threatened individual self-worth and sense of reality, creating a 'demoralization' to be coped with (Kupferberg 1999:55-56). Beyond this general form of demoralization, however, it should be stressed that morality literally ceased to hold value.

Communism defined itself in opposition to a capitalism that was morally abhorrent, with heightened rates of crime and prostitution, rampant exploitation, egoism, and hedonism. Communism, in contrast, *claimed* to be the 'city on the hill,' a system that put community over self, morality over exploitation, gender equality over patriarchy, responsibility over hedonism. Therefore, the collapse of communism, and even moreso, its apparent exposure as one massive Potemkin village (Kohak 1992:202; as cited by Kupferberg 1999:32) also undermined its claim to moral authority. Castells (1998:64) has also referred to this "mockery that the Communist state made of the values of human solidarity" (as cited by Crow 2002:2). Yet when solidarity and morality are exposed publicly as propagandistic frauds and myths, as happened within the post-communist setting, especially in Russia, solidarity and morality cease to be real or valued. For those who fully adapted to the new economy, there was a tendency for morality itself to become a thing of the past, one of the lies exposed by the victory of capitalism. In turn, the capitalism of their perception was adopted in its ideal (from the communist perspective) form: egoism, profit first, hedonism, and immorality. Therefore, the widespread recognition of "demoralization" noted within the early transformation years (Malysheva 1992; Shlapentokh 1991) was more than just a feeling of loss and collapse; it was literal: an abandonment of *morality itself* as a vestige of the failed and naive communist past.

In 2003, in St. Petersburg, the author of this dissertation became acquainted with two women who were visiting from Nizhny Novgorod, the third largest Russian city. The

women visited St. Petersburg, a major tourist center, for the first time, and he accompanied them on a trip to one of the outlying Tsarist palaces. At one point, a conversation arose about mail-order brides, a large industry involving many Eastern European women. The author made too clear his opinion of a conceptual link between mail-order brides and prostitution. Quickly, it became apparent that these two women were on the other side of the argument, stressing the economic advantages of the practice for the women involved. Most pointedly, however, was how one of the women dismissed anti-prostitution moral argumentation with "Akh, takiyi morali!", which can be translated into "oh, what morals!" What was striking was her inference that morality in general was superfluous, or at best, a luxury.

In another case, in Moscow in 2006, the author attended a musical performance with a Russian acquaintance, and afterwards the friend, a married man with three children, proposed a trip together to a restaurant where, "you can buy the most beautiful women in the world for 200 dollars." This type of pastime is not uncommon among successful men in Moscow, so the author tried to delicately extricate himself through arguments such as "I have a girlfriend" and later, "it would make me uncomfortable," to which the Russian responded, "well, we could just go to have a look." In the end, it became clear that the joint outing would not happen, but the refusal seemed alien and foreign to the Russian. "We are from different worlds," the Russian said in bewilderment several times, not understanding which sort of strange moral tinge would prevent the researcher from taking advantage of his offer.

These two examples of literal demoralization represent a trend whereby part of the adaptation to new values is the fading of old values, one of which, having a poor match to the needs of the capitalist economy, is moral reasoning. At the same time, among those who did not adapt to capitalism, such as many of the elderly, they report that a good number of the vulgar Marxist-Leninist accusations became realized: "capitalists are greedy and capitalism as a system is immoral because it allows people to be thrown out into the street without either job or roof;" this particular perception is, of course, irrespective of the "real" greed or victimization of this system (Kupferberg 1999:138).

Demoralization Process

In order to more precisely characterize the linkage between adaptation to capitalism and demoralization, the most successful persons may be focused upon as symbolic of those 'most-adapted' to capitalism, and their demoralization cannot be explained by economic

scarcity. Kukolev (1999:292), in describing one of the new elite classes, the "free artists," notes how their lack of moral scruples *aided them* during the transformation years:

In Soviet times, they were engaged in small-sized speculation with imported goods, audio records, and so forth. Those who did not find work went to the bottom of the social scale and often developed problems with alcohol and drugs. During the perestroika years, many of these people rushed into the business world. Being very aggressive, cunning, and unprincipled, they were often quite successful. They ascended the management of large financial empires. Their knowledge and experience of life permitted them to balance legal and illegal activity through good relations and connections to the highest levels of the establishment as well as with criminal structures.

In other words, these criminals of Soviet times were perfectly suited to build empires within the new economic environment.

As adapting individuals come to perceive high-level economic involvement and adaptation as natural, they also come to perceive immoral behavior as a key to economic success. As noted in the previous chapters, this becomes clear among the businessmen interviewed for this project, who noted the benefits of dishonesty and exploitation within work. Those who put profit first will achieve the most profit. Morality is not needed in the times of the capitalist "wild West" (M10).

Cynicism

Across large portions of post-communist populations, political cynicism became widespread. It was a reaction both to the demoralization above and to the failures of the initial hopes of the transformation (Trotsky 1969; Sztompka 1991; as cited by Kupferberg 1999:131). This cynicism regarding political institutions has been "linked to a legacy of corruption and a moral vacuum in which social solidarity was weak and crime rates were soaring" (Outhwaite and Ray 2005:17). This cynicism could be seen as an advanced stage of demoralization, in which individuals no longer hold 'naive' thoughts about the nature of the new economic system and are rather coming to terms with its corruption:

people are growing impatient and believe that change is being blocked or delayed. The result is a high degree of alienation and anomie among the people. The lack of ultimate values and ends reduces all social action to an instrumental level, especially action in the political system by elites. It is not surprising that crime, corruption, suicide rates, and lack of adherence to governmental regulation are the accompaniments of the collapse of communist regimes (Shlapentokh, Vanderpool and Doktorov 1999:10).

This process involves the overcoming of old communist values since the possibility of a classless society is erased:

For a citizenry raised in the belief of a Marxian utopian vision of a classless society and rudely suffering under the yoke of the selfish greed of the communist party elite and its dominant bureaucracy, the hope of a humane society that cares for its people is shattered (Shlapentokh, Vanderpool and Doktorov 1999:7).

The impossibility of classlessness in modern Russia is exacerbated by the corruption of its elite structure, driven by oligarchs, ex-KGB, and corrupt politicians, leading one scholar to note that "Russian society is in a suspended state, its institutions in disarray, its idols broken" (Keller 1999:355).

Within the interviews, political cynicism was coupled with growing self-centeredness (M11, for example). Informants turned inwards, toward their goals of personal achievement and strong foci on work in lieu of their previous goals. M7 describes this notion of cynicism and its relation to the destruction of old values well:

Like in Marxism they taught us the thing that determines the societal state of mind. I think that this relates to the nation in general. The attitudes of a lot of people are cynical because they realize that the country does not serve the people's interests but its own.

Q. Was your attitude more positive in the beginning of the '90s?

Of course, there was the hope that the new government will take care of its people and that freedom of choice, enterprise will be present.

Q. Do you think that this does not exist anymore?

To a big extent this period was devoted to the annihilation of all these values.

Media

The media play a role in transferring values to the new capitalist classes. While many informants deny the manipulative effects of media upon their own values, others nonetheless show that they are influenced by what they see. L3 admits that he has no television, as he claims that it "dumbs people down" and "prevents them from thinking."

Yet media have been successful in transferring certain images of success to the businessmen. In China, for example, where media is state-controlled, there are programs which cover the illustrious lives of the entrepreneurs, attempting to firmly establish them as role models. S13, for example, wants to learn all he can about famous entrepreneurs from several well-known television programs. Other informants are influenced by advertisements that tap into this "entrepreneurial image":

(S15)

Q: When you see the advertisements which encourage people to spend more money or buy certain goods to show their success, how do you feel?

A: Personally, I agree with that. There are many high-level advertisements which affect me a lot. What I care about is the enterprise culture the advertisements have embodied. I don't care which star helps to promote the products. What attracts me most is the persuasive culture the ads have embodied. If the enterprise culture is embodied to full extent, I think the products would be also very good. So the quality of the products lies on the level of its enterprise culture. By the way, I will buy whatever products Tony Leung helps to promote because I think he is very masculine.

Nonetheless the vast majority of informants claim they are uninterested in and unaffected by media. On this note, M11 equates contemporary Russian skepticism with advertisements with the former Soviet-era skepticism toward earlier Soviet propaganda. Yet, this informant notes in another portion of the interview that he *believed in communist ideals*. It is likely that this propaganda had a long-term effect despite the resistance that it generated at the immediate level; in this way, it was effective at a level beyond consciousness. Might the same effectiveness be claimed for advertisements, the "propaganda" of capitalism? Such a creeping effect should not be counted out, since it is scant to believe that billions of dollars in advertising attempting to influence individuals to consume have no influence. It is very unlikely, however, that individuals would admit they are unconsciously affected by a stimulus. Yet this point takes us to one of the main mechanisms of value change within these informants, cognitive dissonance.

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

As presented above, individuals consciously adapt to the more objective elements of economic culture, but their evaluation of the culture itself occurs through the lens of ideology and is impacted by ideological conflict. Yet in order to move further, the notion of merely conscious adaptation will be put aside in order to look at the unforeseen and unconscious cognitive consequences of cultural-level ideological conflict. Therein, the tools of success mentioned above, as individuals adopt them, come into conflict with other deeply held values.

With years of ideological struggle between opposing forces of "capitalism" and "communism," it should not be surprising to find that the collapse of communism triggered value conflicts among the citizens experiencing it. There are at least several reasons why such conflicts are of greater sociological interest. First, it is quite useful that they can be explained in ways completely consistent with existing cognitive dissonance theory, thereby allowing a thorough exploration into the rise of, forms of, and resolution of dissonance among this population. In this way, the at-first vague notion of 'value conflicts' becomes

transformed into the more scientifically exploitable concept of cognitive dissonance. Second, because of the central place of the concept of dissonance resolution within cognitive dissonance theory, we come to an important sociological finding from analyzing these data: cognitive dissonance among these post-communist informants is consistently resolved in a way that is relevant for a broader theory of social change, one representing a devaluation of sociality. Post-communist informants resolve their dissonance through enhanced valuation of the economic sphere at the expense of their valuation of intimate sociality. Third, it is apparent that the source of dissonance among these post-communist persons is closely linked to their work within the new capitalist economic system.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Cognitive dissonance (as per Festinger 1957) is the negative feeling that arises from simultaneously possessing two opposing cognitive states. That feeling spurs a drive to dispel it by eliminating the conflict. There are two primary preconditions for dissonance to arise. First, conflicts stem from the competitive environment within which cognitions are seated because of limited time in which to distribute behavior; this is the environment within which dissonant cognitions are forced into a zero-sum game. Furthermore, in order for dissonance to arise, the cognitive elements in question should tend toward opposition. Our post-communist informants and their conflicting values display both of these: time conflicts and cognitive opposition.

Limited Time

Festinger's focus on decision-making, forced compliance, and involuntary exposure to dissonant information signifies the importance of a cognitive environmental quality which allows cognitive oppositions to emerge. There is no reason to expect that opposing mental states, such as the valuation of different objects or conflicting means in one's mind should necessarily result in opposing mental states *a priori*. The conceptual transition from difference to opposition requires the addition of a competitive environment. Indeed, most people have a wide array of values that, on the surface, appear to coexist harmoniously although they might imply competing ends or means. The majority of persons, to some degree, value their relationships, money, work, achievement, comfort, and political freedom, but it is a mistake to believe that this coexistence of values implies harmony. To do this would involve an incomplete notion of values, that of values merely as cognitive entities. However, values are not only relevant as they sit in the mind. It is also relevant how they crystallize into behavior. This is why scholars cite the importance of the prioritization of values (Nye 1967:241-242; Schwartz and Bilsky 1987). Values are

important to us, as social scientists, because they are our construct for how they will select their behavior, and it is in this act of behavioral selection that valuation as prioritization occurs and conflict becomes visible.

The pressure of behavioral selection becomes most apparent in reference to limited time. Limited time is an oft-cited cause of dissonance, specifically of work-family conflicts (Frone, Russell and Cooper 1992; Voydanoff 1988). Such examples of time pressures are abundant among those who are conflicted within the post-communist sample. For example interviewee L2² and his son both note a conflict between their family and work time. His son, L1, describes it in this way:

Yes, well, that sometimes is a problem. I do have to work a lot, first because I am a freelancer and second because lawyers have a very time-consuming work in general. Unfortunately, that is the way it is and it is certainly not that easy if you have a family and also two little kids because my wife does a lot, meaning she does the most but also would like to do something else once in a while.

L3 also relates his own work-family conflict to his limited time:

If I look for example at the time I am spending on work here and add the work-time in the region, which in fact means all of Germany - well if I get more specific: we are having projects in Dortmund and Frankfurt at the moment - then there certainly is this distance between me and the family. It isn't very good for the family... or it isn't necessarily beneficial for the family.

In nearly every case of conflicting values, the informant refers to limited time as a main cause of his dissonance. Here are some examples from the other two cities, Moscow and Shanghai:

(M7)

The conflict now is that I work for a company where I have to stay at work longer. I leave early and come back late. This contradicts my family values because I cannot see my children enough.

(S15)

Take my family values for example. I think family values are very important while my family members and friends don't think that I regard them as important. Nowadays I don't spend much time with my family members for I have little time to do so... In fact, I regard family as very important from the depth of my heart. I don't think I have spent as much time with my family members as my friends have.

Likely these informants would not experience dissonance from time pressure alone if they were choosing between a set of inherently compatible options, but in fact their limited time makes it possible for inherent cognitive oppositions to become manifest.

Cognitive Opposition

The second prerequisite to cognitive dissonance, aside from limited time, is cognitive opposition. This notion of an inherent opposition separable from the problem of time constraints is often ignored in work-family conflict literature (See Frone, Russell and Cooper 1992), although it may be found implicitly through the notion of inherently conflicting behaviors (Greenhaus and Beutell 1985:77). Festinger (1957:13) describes such cognitive opposition in detail: "two cognitive elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element follows from the other." Festinger (1957:14) gives, as examples, several different types of opposition: logical, cultural, violation of past experience, and a specific case opposing a general rule.

The informants of this study, when they are conflicted, consistently display conflicts between their family and work values, or more generally, between morality and money, thereby suggesting an opposition between these spheres. This opposition, it will be shown, is both a logical and a cultural one.

Leipzig interviewee number one describes how his mind is caught between the two spheres of work and family:

(L1)

Q: How do you feel when those kinds of conflicts arise?

A: Well...torn back and forth, well, you feel kind of like in a running wheel...you constantly move...but you never really reach the finish line, because, then you are doing neither one nor the other right. Then you are not really at home, and if you are at home you are somewhere else in your thoughts, and the other way around...

Notice this informant's report that he is "somewhere else in his thoughts" while at home and his complaint that he can "neither do one thing or the other right," neither work nor family. This implies an opposition between these cognitive elements for him. Combined with his limited time and the negative feeling he has associated from this opposition, he is experiencing a classic case of cognitive dissonance. Describing his family as important, he depicts managing his work-family balance as "a highwire act." He is typical of a class of informants feeling torn between family and work. Another informant, M7, in speaking of work and professional values, laments "Of course, they contradict each other, but you cannot do anything." L8 summarizes the conflict in vivid words:

I mean, during times when we built something [in the business] in order to give something to others the family had to suffer from it. Maybe the children of entrepreneurs can buy bigger ice cream cones but have to pay for it with their 'worse' family situation.

In other interviews, it becomes clear that some informants feel they have to sacrifice their social morality in general in order to be successful in the modern economic environment. Leipzig 5, for example, a technology advisor, has to sacrifice his honesty, a value about which he speaks repeatedly during the interview, mostly in the form of nostalgia for the honesty he formerly possessed. He complains that he has to set this value aside while at work in order to convince his clients to purchase services they do not need or at a price that is too high, thus causing considerable dissonance:

Q: Yes. Does it ever happen that your values conflict with others? And if yes, how do you handle it?

A: Well, of course mostly I am in conflict with the value honesty. That depends on the situation. That's clear... Well, with business partners or with customers..., that is the honesty thing which is unfortunately not always the guiding value. That's how it is. ...I can't generalize how I handle it. That is, I have lots of difficulties to...to give up this value but I decide in the situation what is more important for me and sometimes it's not the honesty.

Other informants feel that they have to exploit and pressure their employees while at work in order to maximize efficiency, thus generating another form of dissonance. In the words of L2:

I'd say if you are an entrepreneur you have to see to it that you work generates a certain profit, if not, it doesn't work. To do so, you have to put your employees under pressure and maybe you also have to or you can't pay them the wages you think they are worth... sure enough you are in a conflict then...

M10 faces a similar conflict between workplace efficiency and treating people well. He notes, that at work "I have to force people do some things, I see that they cannot do them but I cannot fire them as well. This is a conflict which should find its solution." M11 also sees a conflict between dignity and humanism "on the one side, and the desire to earn money and establish a successful business from another." Toward the end of the interview, he notes:

For example, I want to run a business and earn money and therefore I have to fire this worker because his work is bad. I feel sorry for him. Well, here you have a conflict. I have to constantly change when I talk to my mother. It often happens that you do not say what you mean at work. I do not like this at all.

This situation is reminiscent of L1, who reported that he felt as if running in a wheel, trapped between work and home modes of thinking. M11 also feels this way, as if the modes of thinking in work and at home are contradictory. Workplace efficiency has no place at home when speaking with his mother (who lives in his house supported by the

informant and his wife), and home's humanism has no place at work when it comes to firing an employee or negotiating a contract. This cognitive opposition is also expressed well by another informant:

(L7)

Q. In what way do you think do some of your values conflict with others?

A. Yes, considerably...there is for example the value of family versus the value of business and making progress vs. the value of social thinking, that is for example the work at the Red Cross...

Notable here is that the specific modes of thinking pertaining to home and at work form not merely a logical cognitive opposition, but there appears to be a broader cultural dissonance between business, economic thinking, and money on the one hand and social contribution, interaction, and morality on the other. This points not to a generalized work-family conflict as the source of dissonance, but rather to a *specific form* of work, that which is necessary for success within the modern capitalist economy.

Money versus Mensch

Before moving on to the resolution of cognitive dissonance among the informants, it is helpful to theoretically frame the above dissonance. The particular form of cognitive opposition found within these examples of dissonance in post-communist persons is well-theorized in classical sociology and touched upon in value-change research, but it has been inadequately applied to the post-communist case, especially in the explicit language of cognitive dissonance. These opposing logical and cultural elements may be broadly labeled as ‘money versus Mensch’¹³, in order to highlight this tension between economy and sociality. Admittedly, it would be folly to argue that these two spheres are really existing “hostile worlds” (Zelizer 2005), but at the same time it would be brash to suggest that they are harmonious in light of evidence of dissonance. Therefore, talk here of the spheres of sociality and modern capitalist materialism and work values being in conflict should be read to understand there is a tendency toward conflict and an inherent tension, but not quite an open hostility. There is, of course, a wide body of classical sociological work that suggests that materialist and social concerns may exist in tension with one another, which has already been discussed within Chapters 2. Within this body of theory, there is unity in that cognitive opposition is seen as based in the fact that the economic and social spheres entail different modes of valuation. In the economy, the rational-calculative

¹³ *Mensch* refers here to its two meanings: first, in German, meaning a person, thus symbolizing the social sphere; and second, in the Yiddish, meaning a 'good' person, thereby adding a moral dimension to the concept.

mode and its means- and ends-focused forms of quantitative valuation are tools of success. In contrast, social relations are idealized by an intuitive valuation which qualitatively values others and relationships as intrinsically valuable.

More recent research on the topic concerns work-family conflicts, a specific variety of cognitive dissonance, where it has been noted that “work and family roles still have distinct norms and requirements that may be incompatible with one another” (Greenhaus and Beutell 1985:77; Voydanoff 1988). More specifically, the “managerial stereotype” emphasizing self-reliance, emotional stability, aggressiveness, and objectivity may experience role conflict with his family members, who expect him to be “warm, nurturant, and emotional” (Bartolome 1972; Schein 1973; as cited by Greenhaus and Beutell 1985).

More broadly, Burroughs and Rindfleisch (2002), through their analysis of survey data and an experimental study, find considerable support for the position that materialistic values conflict with more collective values, such as those values dealing with the family or religious belief. These researchers base their claims on the work of Shalom Schwartz (1994), which supposes that self-oriented values are inherently in opposition to other-oriented values. Schwartz posits, for example, an opposition between hedonism and achievement on the one hand - which use self-centered satisfaction as a motivation - and benevolence, conformity, and tradition on the other (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004:363). For Burroughs and Rindfleisch, materialist values are self-oriented, and are therefore posed in opposition to other-oriented values. On this point, they rely upon theoretical roots partially in cognitive dissonance theory. This position, compared to classical approaches to this particular cognitive opposition, focuses more on differing *objects* of valuation, since cognitive opposition arises due to the economy and society valuing incompatible objects of value, the self and material wealth on the one side versus ‘the other’ on the opposing side.

The two approaches to the ‘money versus *Mensch*’ incompatibility, based on differing *modes* and on differing *objects* of valuation, are reconcilable. A desire to maximize material acquisition or self-gain is best pursued by using rational calculation with a clear end, *terminal valuation*, and a selection of appropriate means, *instrumental valuation*, toward that end. In contrast, the pursuit of meaningful social interaction tends to forsake a calculative approach in lieu of valuing interaction and ‘the other’ according to an *intrinsic valuation*, in which “life itself is a cornerpiece” (Nye 1967).

This point is best illustrated through the use of ideal typical tools developed for this purpose. In order to solidify the three valuation categories introduced above - terminal, instrumental, and intrinsic - and more importantly, to test their value against plausible and

relevant real-life scenarios, a series of ideal types representing the tools used for success within important roles will now be introduced and classified according to the scheme. The purpose of this is to demonstrate how the differences between the modes of material valuation and social valuation, with these representing logical and cultural oppositions, open the way for cognitive dissonance.

Within individuals' actions in different everyday roles, such as father, worker, husband, friend, and investor, different modes of valuation are implied by the tools best used to fulfill these roles. Despite the intent of performing a particular role, the tools required to accomplish that role will be illustrated through ideal types in order to show how the tools of success within different roles may conflict with one another. This focus on tools is chosen because of an issue mentioned earlier: an analysis of cognitive values does not reveal conflict until those values are transformed into behavior. The tools used to fulfill roles are likely to conflict with other competing tools because of behavioral time constraints.

To start with, ideal types representing the tools crucial for fulfilling successful roles in work are examined. For an individual involved in competitive capitalist business, the notion of *profit calculation* is a critical means toward achieving economic success. The valuation of profit calculation is a rational and terminal concern wherein maximization of profit over time is the mode of achieving success, despite toward which end the economic success for that particular business may be used. In addition, someone in a *supervisory role* over other persons is expected to rationally calculate his/her employees' efficiencies as a means toward the higher goal of group efficiency or effectiveness. Similarly, a person in the role of *customer service* must instrumentally treat the customer well as a means to earning future business; again, this is a rational calculation. The successful worker must focus on *production*, and whether on a farm or in a factory, must also value his/her output of high quality materials or knowledge as the end of his/her efforts, an end toward which all means must be rationally aligned.

In contrast, roles which are not directly work-related often must use a very different variety of tools. As a tool of parenthood, *motherly love* is an intuitive, uncalculated, intrinsic concern from the mother directed unconditionally toward her child/children. Similarly, *best friends* are those friends who employ a longstanding respect and emotional bond with one another; in contrast, the tool of *networking* links the pursuer to the pursued rationally, either through calculated assumptions of reciprocity or through pure instrumentality. In another example, *religious belief* also employs intrinsic valuations;

those who ‘play the role’ (whether consciously or unconsciously) of one who believes in God, tend to value God or their spirituality based on intuitive expressions of faith.

When individuals act within work-related roles, success requires tools that use rational and means-ends valuations. In contrast, when acting in non-work-related spheres, such as the family, within friendships, or as a person of faith, success requires tools which employ intuitive and intrinsic valuations. Figure 10.2 illustrates this relationship between ideal types and the modes of valuation appropriate to them.

The reader might recall the Burroughs and Rindfleisch hypothesis that materialistic and collectivist values ultimately conflict because they value different *objects*: the self versus the other. Surely self-oriented and/or materialist values do conflict with other-oriented values, but this conflict may be rather due to different valuation *modes* (intrinsic, instrumental, terminal) used within the materialist/ego-centric and social spheres. Work- and materially-oriented roles demand a successful use of rational values, while social roles demand the successful use of principally emotional and intuitive values. This is one fault-line, which when confronted with pressures such as limited time, erupts into cognitive dissonance.

Figure 10.2 : Categories of Valuation of the Role-Assigned Ideal-typical Tools

Social Sphere	Intrinsic	Instrumental	Terminal	Material Sphere
	<i>Motherly Love</i> <i>Religious Belief</i> <i>Best Friends</i>	<i>Customer Service</i> <i>The Supervisor</i> <i>Networking</i>	<i>Profit-calculation</i> <i>Production</i>	

Of course, one might object that a degree of sociality is required in work, and a mode of rationality is often used in relationships; in reality, emotion and rationality are mixed. However, it is likely that the greatest success within the role of the mother is probably achieved through emotion, not rationality, and the greatest success as the CEO of a large firm is achieved more through calculation than through intimate relations; it is a matter of propensity. The mother’s ideal tool is love, and the CEO’s is to keep an eye on profits, or at least dividends, for the shareholders. This is not to say that the CEO or mother do not possess other tools; it is rather that some of these are primary compared to others.

Dissonance Resolution

Now that the nature of this dissonance between spheres has been discussed, it is time to return to the informants. *If* such dissonance between work and family, and work and morality indeed occurred with the economic transition among this study's informants, and continuously increased in intensity, how was it resolved?

Within the interviews, a devaluation of family in comparison to work appears to be the favored resolution of cognitive dissonance, one predetermined by the domination of the new capitalist work culture in post-communist societies. Informants report feeling no choice but to adapt to the economic culture if they wish to become successful in the modern economy. L3, for example, sees material survival and looking after material conditions as a "natural" structure to which one must adapt. Similarly, L7 notes that struggling within the business implies a form of personality modification, causing one to become "grown into the business." L2 describes this process of adaptation well:

If you are in a position where you have responsibility, as an entrepreneur for example, then this conflict is given, because if you decided to do something like this then you have to do it like this in order to get it working. Certainly you could organize things differently or so, I mean everyone does things as he thinks it is right and that is why I invested a lot of time that I didn't have at my disposal for other things.

This necessity of adapting to the economic culture, and the family-work conflicts that come with it, leads to a sense of fatalism in some of the informants. They learn to accept such conflicts as a natural part of life, as evidenced by the following passage:

(L3)

I just have mentioned that both my wife and I are conscious of the fact that there is potential for conflicts there. In any case there are things which are restricting the family life but we are both also very aware of the fact that it doesn't work in a different way.

(L2)

Q. How do you feel if conflicts like this occur?

A. Well, that is not nice... that's for sure. But I also have to say that after the years you put up with it. You know it is not good, but it's like that and you think about it less than if you are confronted with it again now.

As evidenced in the above passage from L2, this sense of fatalism quickly leads to a blasé form of escapism, as he learns to "think about it less." Escapism is also quite evident among other informants. M11, for example, feels bad that he does not spend enough time with his child. How does he handle it? He answers, "The best way to deal with it is with the help of adrenaline. You sit behind the wheel at 200 km/h." After digging deeper, he reveals the transition from fatalism to escapism:

I do not like the fact that the world is wrong, that I cannot shape it the way I want to. And I try to form it. ...I can be depressed but this will not be for a long time and usually afterwards I start being very active.

Thereafter, his cycle loops back to the beginning, a sense of fatalism and demoralized acceptance that "absolute truth does not exist." Ultimately, his conflict is covered up by the motto of "continue swimming." He remains active in the economy, pursuing his career ambitions and economic success, de facto accepting fewer behavioral choices that benefit his family. Perhaps he (M11) will eventually opt toward the direction of M9, who from his similar position of escapism approaches nihilism as a solution to his dissonance. He declares that the solution is "very simple. Stop worrying and start to live."

While some, like M11, tell themselves that the conflict cannot be resolved, many rationalize their behavior as benefiting the family economically. Furthermore, many informants highlight that time can be spent with the family "later." For example, L9, who, as most of the young informants, has children, sees a strong focus on work *today* as a solution to his dissonance and plans to spend time with the family *later*. As goals for the future, when he has obtained his material security, he imagines his focus will be "family and *also, in general, spare time. [emphasis added]*" Family-time becomes just another free-time activity which he will pursue upon his early retirement if it materializes. It occupies the same mythical place as his youthful (as he recalls from 15 years ago) desire to move to his "own island" by age 40.

In the midst of these processes of resignation, fatalism, escapism, and postponement of the family in regard to work-family conflicts, work gradually becomes an end in itself. L7, for example, expresses a degree of dissonance between his work and family values. His solution to this, however, involves a further entrenchment of work, in his words, more work "rigor," with the intent that this would free more time for him at home:

Q. How can these conflicts be resolved?

A. (He laughs)... I don't know if Einstein can come with something...well, through further improvement, essentially of the main part of work, that is, the cycle of things here at work, and thereby getting more spare time for the family, for the club, for other activities .

Q. How could this improvement look in your opinion?

A. Rigor...that is really, but that can be brutal, also on colleagues... Documenting norms of effort in written way, checking the clock and stuff like that, well, checking the clock itself doesn't help much but there are systems of time recording and eventually also changing the personnel...I'd say...it is a functioning business...yes, that's it basically...better self-organization, even higher discipline...

His solution is ironic. The same rational calculation which causes dissonance with his intrinsic social forms of valuation is then posed as a solution to the dilemma. He has a faith that more rigorous, calculating, and efficient work may both solve his time-crunch with his family and liberate him from work-family dissonance, both of which were caused in the first place by rigorous, calculating, and efficient work.

Similarly M10, a scientist, notes that he 'resolved' conflicts with this daughter by escaping into his work. He notes that "work saves" in an allusion to Weber's (2003) *Protestant Work Ethic*, but the meaning is inverted. It is as if Weber's fear has come true, that the disciplined and rational calculation of capitalism has liberated itself from its religious and moral roots and become an end in itself.

Nonetheless, this new work ethic *does* tend to free the informants from their dissonance. M1, for example, a workaholic yet carefree architect, also refers to "the protestant ethic" and the idea that "the job saves." He believes that if he works well now, the future will be "happy and joyful." Notice that the spiritual salvation motivating the classical protestant work ethic becomes replaced with a secular aim, a comfortable early retirement with lots of wealth, free-time, hobbies, and the family. In the meantime, although he only takes, on average, three days off from work *per month* - he works most weekends - he experiences no qualms or dissonance related to his time away from the family:

Q. It happens sometimes that people, for example, have the value of family and from the other side is the value of work which takes all available time...

A. I say, I don't know it exactly as there's not any conflict here. We spend so much time together so it looks like it is enough. And it looks like we work also so long, so it is enough as well. Probably one should work less because I suspect that there could be a conflict and one should spend more time together. I don't know, I'm not sure. My daughter doesn't need it for sure that I stay home for the whole day. And I think, my wife doesn't need it either.. Most probably we have very balanced situation.

By reducing his expectations and valuation of family time, he frees himself from the spectre of cognitive dissonance.

Many of the other informants do not display cognitive dissonance. These fall into two categories. On the one hand are retired persons, who, since they do not work, have not had to adapt modern work values at odds with their own social values. For example, L4 notes, "since I am not working anymore, one is a little shielded from the problems of the working world." Many of these older informants note that they too would probably have adapted in

the same way as the younger generation, even after negatively evaluating such behavior, if they would have been involved in the economy:

(L6)

Q. What do you think of people who behave capitalistically (this is the informant's terminology) and use others?

A. I am refusing this, but I can understand them. Everybody has to see to making ends meet. That's how I see it as outsider, you know. If I was 20 years younger, or 25 or of your age, I would see things like they do. But I don't have to see it like them. I do understand them, but I refuse it. ...But I think this probably has to do with my age, I'm standing outside. If not, I would possibly see things differently. I suppose my sons see it differently than I do. I don't know, but I assume it.

Another informant, M12, the only mother in the sample, also notes that her lack of involvement in society explains her lack of adaptation, in contrast to her son, the man who earlier mentioned he must "talk differently" with his mother.

On the other hand, the second group that experiences no dissonance consists of the young businessmen who have already devalued the family. Those for whom work is highly-valued, such as L11, may declare that "what is good for the business is good for the family," even though social concerns are irrelevant in work, as he notes that "work is for making money." In this case, the family becomes subjugated as an appendage to work, a mechanism for supporting the worker. In some cases, work is explicitly valued more highly than the family, as in this example from S13:

Q: You have to show your responsibility for your work, your family and your friends. There may exist conflicts among them and if you think more of one aspect, you may think less of the other. How do you handle it?

A: I will think more for the enterprise and less of the family. My wife supports my work very much. For example, she will understand me if I can't go home to have supper with them. I think if you have a sense of responsibility, some conflicts can be resolved successfully.

A clear pattern emerges. Those with no dissonance are either not working (the older generation) or not highly valuing the family if they are working (the younger businessmen). The two members of the older generation who *were* still working at the time of the interview, who founded their businesses within the new capitalist environment, were equally dissonant to the younger generation members. When arranging the young informants, since the older informants exhibit very little dissonance, along a scale of the amount of psychological discomfort shown when they speak of family and work in the interviews, the Leipzig informants, show the most dissonance, followed by the Muscovites, and then by the Shanghai informants. Interestingly, this appears to be directly proportional

to the informants' family valuations, their amount of focus on child socialization, and their respect of the older generation. The most-family oriented individuals tended to be the most psychologically conflicted as well. What does this suggest in light of cognitive dissonance theory's means to resolve dissonance? If two cognitive elements are in conflict, A and B, the most direct way to resolve this dissonance, aside from inventing a "cognitive overlap" between the elements - as already noted by those who adopt the 'work for the family' or two-stage 'work then family' strategies - is simply to either reduce the value of A or the value of B (Festinger 1957: 44-45). It is possible that the least conflicted informants are so because they have *already* devalued the family in comparison to work. The conflicted Leipzigers, in contrast, remain conflicted because they, more-family oriented, have *not yet* devalued the family as a response to overwhelming new cultural pressures to enhance the value of work. Congruent with this hypothesis is that the Leipzigers also still hold members of the older generation as role models and take an active role in socializing the next generation, two family-value support mechanisms which are comparably lacking among our less-conflicted, more work-centered informants. Furthermore, the most-conflicted Leipzig informants tend to be religious, another factor that would strengthen their family orientations. Finally, it is possible that the German welfare-state, the equivalent of which doesn't exist in Russia or China, has to some extent shielded the Leipzigers from the insecurities of the market culture which otherwise might have enhanced their work valuations at the expense of family; this became clear because some conflicted Leipzig informants are willing to take the risk of quitting their elite jobs in order to find something new in order to relieve their dissonance, thanks to German unemployment insurance as a safety net.

In summary, it is striking that 'modern' values of materialism and individualism are arrived at partially as a result of patterned individual resolutions of dissonance. This pattern emerges in the favor of modern economic values and at the expense of traditional sociality because the economy presents itself as a "reality" to be adapted to, and one that is perceived as difficult to change, two factors demonstrating the firmness, or resistance to change of pro-economic value sets (Wicklund and Brehm 1976:3). Along these lines, some scholars have noted that family boundaries are more "permeable" than work boundaries, meaning that work more often interferes with family life than vice versa (Frone, Russell and Cooper 1992). This is likely because of the strong negative sanctions associated with violation of work role demands (Greenhaus and Beutell 1985:77) in comparison to family

roles, which is especially the case within the contemporary capitalist economy, where non-adaptation may threaten material survival.

INTERGENERATIONAL CHANGEOVER

Intergenerational changeover contributes to individualization in four ways: through the notion of "fresh contact," the lack of role models in the older generation, the role of peers in the younger generation, and the breakdown of socialization values among those in the working generation.

Fresh Contact

"Fresh contact" is a term used by Karl Mannheim (1952) to indicate how the new generations interface with the society as they mature. Since a young generation encounters the new society without baggage from a prior socialization, its initial socialization occurs simultaneously with social change, and as a result its adaptation will be more full and direct than that of older generations, who are affected by previous socialization experiences. In contrast, older generations come into contact with social change through the lens of their own experienced pasts. Therefore, in terms of values, the unique social location of the youth tends to result in a value bias toward the more modern value set, in comparison to older generations. Important here is that this "fresh contact" effect is universal to all social changes, since the specific nature of a social change is irrelevant to it.

Lack of Role Models

Another result of intergenerational changeover during a period of rapid social change is that the older generation ceases to provide adequate role models for the youth. This has been noted many times within these interview data.

To select a few examples, recall L9, who does not mention his father as a role model, but rather selects his role models from the world of business. This trend of informants choosing famous role models and bypassing their mal-adapted parents is notable. Among one of the more bold informants, M11 mentions Julius Caesar as his role model and admires him because of his ability to manage and plan complex situations. This is a role model that the informant developed only eventually, because during the time of the early transformation there was no one who served as a moral authority.

This lack of role models of the younger generation exacerbates the fresh contact effect noted above, as it forces individuals to adapt either alone or with their peer groups, with thereby less reference to the existing cultural value set and a bias toward the new system.

Peers-Group Influence

As a mirror image to the lack of parental role-models, those who experienced the transformation in their younger years had to look into themselves and to their peers in order to see proper and effective modes of adaptation, thereby ensuring the "freshness" of their adaptive response. S11 describes this how this worked for him:

I become sophisticated gradually, which has a loose connection with my parents. Other qualities of how to behave are learned from my colleagues and friends after stepping into society.

His process of "sophistication" and "self-improvement" is one that simultaneously involves estrangement from his parents and their values. If anyone, he looks to his peers for guidance, who have also severed their roots to the past.

Breakdown of Socialization

Emphasized very strongly within the interviews, especially those within China and Russia, is the devaluation of socialization itself among the businessmen-parents. In other words, despite their structural roles as parents, many opt for 'natural' or 'independent' socialization of their children by the society at large, while others are either confused about their roles as socializers or unable to implement the values which they envision as important because of competing claims within their lives of work and leisure. This withdrawal of parents from socialization ensures that the children will be affected by, at best, random and arbitrary socialization forces, or at worst, will become ideal pawns of economic and political manipulation schemes, such as advertisement and propaganda.

Many post-communist persons do not realize their parental roles because they see the role of socialization as one that primarily falls upon the state, for example within schools. One single mother known by the author in Moscow in 2005, for example, complained about her 7-year-old son's unruly behavior in school and his other developmental problems. As a sociologist, she imagined that perhaps the author has some sort of expertise in child development and continued to press him for advice, which he eventually reluctantly offered, assuming that it could be no worse than the psycho-medications the school psychologist was attempting to force upon the seven-year-old. The author knew the child, since he was his English tutor, and offered the opinion that perhaps parents should try to establish boundaries and acceptable limits for the child's behavior. This was offered because the boy was essentially treated like an adult in that he could do anything he pleased, such as playing computer games for 8 hours a day when he desired. In any case, and regardless of the sense or nonsense of the advice, the mother's reaction was, "Huh? Isn't that what the schools are for?" During communist times, those families which

exercised less than ideal parenting practices were nonetheless helped by the thick role that the communist state, for obvious reasons, played in the socialization of the youth. Uhlenborff (2000:208) has noted this trend in Eastern Germany as well. After collapse of socialist schooling system, which involved state involvement in moral upbringing, many East German parents now are insecure about their socialization responsibilities. Now that this state role has dissolved, many families are left without a safety net, yet even the other, more progressive, families have their values nonetheless pulled in the direction of greater apathy toward socialization. As a result of each of these processes, individualization is enhanced as children learn to fend for themselves, and are socialized 'naturally and independently' according to the consumerist whims and designs of mass society.

CHAPTER 11. DISCUSSION

...Capitalism has survived itself.

Leipzig respondent's shock over the collapse of communism (L6)

OVERVIEW

Evidence from qualitative interviews comparing new-rich businessmen with their fathers provided a tentative model by which the transmission of values from the capitalist economic culture to individuals takes place. Individuals in post-communist societies were faced with a new economic system which implied both objective and subjective elements. Objectively, daily life shifted across two dimensions in fundamentally similar ways, whether the individuals we are speaking of were living in China, Russia, or East Germany. The previous bounds and scope, both positive and negative, of the spheres of work and consumption were ripped open. Subjectively, this shift was interpreted through an ideological battleground forged by communist ideals of the past and the neo-liberal capitalism entering by force. These objective and subjective shifts result in a set of outcomes ultimately pushing the new value set in a direction we may label as individualization, one encompassing, in addition to positive aspects, enhanced latency of intimate social values.

On the one hand, individuals ‘recognize’ the economic shifts outlined above and tend to respond to them in ways that are both creative and rational. They consciously choose to adapt their behavior, and their values, in a way which they perceive will allow them to succeed in the new economic environment. On the other hand, individuals are more than their conscious wills alone, and are affected in unforeseen and unintended ways. For example, the clash between the habitus of values they bring from the past and those values which are functional ‘tools of success’ within the current economic arena is one resulting in dissonance, one which tends to be resolved in the direction of least resistance, the erosion of the intimate values which are not prioritized by capitalism. Both conscious adaptation and cognitive dissonance are at least partially nested within a polarized ideological environment characterized by communism and capitalism in their ideal forms. This means both that dissonance is magnified and that conscious choices are exaggerated to fit a capitalism seen through a communist lens – at the same time as creative, competitive, and profitable as it is egoistic, hedonistic, materialistic, and immoral. That this result is also one of loosened valuation of sociality should not be underestimated.

Finally, as Mannheim (1952) showed us, intergenerational changeover has a tendency to produce a comparative radicalization of values in the younger generation through several mechanisms. First, 'fresh contact' demonstrates how youth are socialized contemporaneous to social change, so that they experience the changing world simultaneous to their biological aging, thus carrying less value baggage from the past. Second, post-communist persons complained that their parents were poor role-models during the transformation since they knew very little of the capitalist economy, and thus, they had to rely upon their equally young and radical peers for advice. Third, socialization of children itself has been adapted in major ways, so that the new generations are increasingly stepping back from active roles in transmitting values to the youth, whether this be due to role confusion or a conscious choice to pass – or allow to be passed – 'individualist' values to their children. Intergenerational changeover is an enduring producer of radicalized values, which has been no exception in this particular transformation.

The mechanisms just described appear to be the dominant forces producing the main empirical outcome of this research: value tensions and gaps between generations and between new and old occupational groups, as demonstrated by both qualitative and quantitative data. Principally, the value of work has expanded, so that the young working generation ambitiously views it as a means of self-realization and making money, as compared with the older generation, which viewed it as a simple duty. As a result, high work valuation – even approaching work as an 'end in itself' – pushes family and intimate social values into latency, as they compete for time and focus. In contrast, the older generation tends to see work and family as in harmony. The younger generation also has developed a new phasing of the life course, with a high work focus coming first, during the youth, and a focus on the existing family occurring only later, upon retirement, alongside other 'leisure' activities. As a result of this, as mentioned above, parents tend to put less energy into their children's socialization and upbringing. Simultaneously, society loses respect for the outdated knowledge and capacities of the elderly, the remnants of the mistakes and failures of the past. Materialism is also a place of great tension between generations. The necessities of image cultivation and profit-orientations in work spur a consumerist orientation that is antithetical to traditional valuations of thrift. While such orientations, at the beginning, are merely instrumental, as the material habitus develops, it both tends to colonize non-material spheres and spurs a cult of conspicuous consumption for signifying success. Regarding other values, a trend seems to be the contraction of both

patriotic and community orientations, a general de-politicization. This de-politicization is coupled with the expansion of the value of 'independence' and the literal demoralization of post-communist populations. Concerning valuations of friendship, the value of friendship in general may becoming enhanced, but qualitative data suggest this is a more instrumentalized, and less intimate friendship, one that is conducive to the 'networking' and weak-tie needs of the new economic culture.

The relay of individualized values from the economic culture to the individual is not occurring as a uniform, unchallenged, or uncontextualized process, but rather it is shaped greatly by other factors. This individualization is catalyzed by intergenerational changeover, cognitive dissonance, ideological conflict, and state reinforcement of neo-liberal values (especially in China). In the meantime, this individualization may be stymied by religiosity, the role of the welfare state in producing values emphasizing work-family harmony (in Germany), and by the female gender, as women appear – based on both this and outside research – less affected by materialism and competitiveness than men.

PROBLEM AREAS

Life-Stage Effects

One of this dissertation's prime inferences is that intergenerational value gaps illustrate a tension that has relevance for social change in the long-term. Yet the father-son pairs interviewed here as well as the members of different generations responding to the World Values Survey are simultaneously representing persons of different age groups. Thus, critics might argue, the value gaps reported here represent not social change crystallized within different generations but rather age dependent variations, or life-stage effects. While such argumentation can certainly not be wholly dismissed, as biological age and social change are always conflated (Mannheim 1952), this same fact is also the reason why it is impossible to explain most of these value gaps by age alone.

The notion of universally valid life-stages that are valid across all cultures and epochs is clearly questionable. One argument sometimes delivered against this dissertation's findings is that members of the younger generation are more work oriented – and more conflicted – than those of the older generation because they are in the 'work phase' of their lives. Thereby, high work orientations are assumed to be universal and have nothing to do with post-communist persons or capitalism per se. What is it that causes us to curiously label more than half of the life-span the 'work phase?' Moreover, considering that all but one of the younger generation informants of this study have children, why do we not

assume them to be in the 'parenting phase' of their lives? Indeed the results of this study suggest that exactly this phasation of 'work then family' is privileged within capitalist economic culture compared to within the planned economic model. All available data point in this direction: the crash of marriage and birth rates immediately upon transformation in post-communist societies, the fact that older informants retrospectively recall having emphasized work-family harmony during their communist-era working years, the fact that younger informants face major time pressures negotiating work together with family, and the fact that older informants place far more emphasis on child-rearing than do the younger informants currently within their 'parenting phase' of life.

Methodologically, father-son pairing coupled with retrospective reports of the fathers allows us to infer the difference, in social change, between the two. Under normal circumstances, the father could be expected to impart his values into his son, and where unsuccessful, this difference could be written up as due to age differences or social change. Retrospective accounts of the fathers, although certainly imperfect due to nostalgia, bad memory, and influence of current value sets, give us a rough indicator as to what they were like during their younger years. By such accounts, the fathers speak with a vocabulary entirely different than their sons within every sphere of values: work, family, material values, and values related to more distant others. Many of the fathers' recollections are specific enough to be difficult to discount. For example, East German and Russian fathers vividly recall working on very few weekends compared to their sons today. Other informants recalled specific occasions where household duties were shared together with the wife for the purpose of maintaining family harmony; in contrast, their sons simply note that the wife should "understand" that work comes first. Nonetheless, even if we discount retrospective reports, the real-time differences in values between fathers and sons are of a nature making them difficult to explain through a lifestage explanation alone. Why would persons become more moral with age? Why would image cultivation and profit orientations decline with age? Why would parents care *less* about the socialization of their children than the grandparents? Why would persons become more community-oriented and nationalistic with age? Of course, for each of these cases, we can come up with age-specific explanations, but these explanations become more and more arbitrary without reference to the central historical-contextual clue that unifies them all: the link to capitalist work and new routes to occupational success.

Another nail in the coffin, which reinforces the argument that social change evidence cannot be hastily dismissed, is that many value gaps noted between generations which

cannot be written off as due to life-phase harmonize quite obviously with specific social changes that occurred. Young informants admit the allure of certain luxuries and advertisements for purposes of image cultivation, yet advertisements did not exist during communist times, and luxuries themselves were scant to be found. Nonetheless we find this very expansion of consumerism within the younger generation coupled with a decline in traditional values of thrift. It is absurd to try to explain this value gap away through a life-stage effect alone since there was no readily comparable consumer culture, advertising industry, or high-class luxuries to speak of during planned-economy times. Each of these has expanded notably over the past 15-20 years, and in the past, excessive displays of wealth were even condemned.

Finally, the qualitative nature of the data used here have allowed for the initial tracing of mechanisms of value change within individual minds. Individuals have both given specific accounts of how their own values have changed and provided the context for externally-observed value tensions within them. Sure enough, aging mechanisms are alluded to, since it is impossible for individuals to differentiate between their own psychological development and the influence of external events. Yet aside from allusions to the role of life-stage and biological aging, more telling for purposes here is that informants time and time again provided evidence of specific mechanisms, tied to socio-structural conditions, by which their values were affected. These mechanisms, already described above as cognitive adaptation, cognitive dissonance, ideological conflict, and intergenerational changeover, trace a drive toward value tensions from the macro-level of capitalist economic culture to the micro-level of the individual mind. These mechanisms thereby function as a roadmap that is analytically independent from life-stage/age-effect argumentation through its strong links to specific socio-cultural changes.

Generalizability

Understandably the theoretical language used in this dissertation may lead to the false impression that a claim for ‘really-existing’ social change has been made. Especially the use of ideal-typical language and the dichotomies it entails – capitalism versus communism, individualist versus social values – easily conjures movements across these dimensions. Naturally some readers might assume the claim here is that such a movement has occurred. Yet this is incorrect. The argument made here is one of tendency toward movement rather than movement itself, of the possibility of a specific change, even the likelihood of that change in the long run, but not the generalization of change itself over the observed period.

The roughly five father-son pairs interviewed in each of three different countries cannot prove a universal change, nor could they even if they had been randomly sampled. Nor can each small country sample demonstrate a change within each society. The young businessmen interviewed are not representative of other segments of society. A purely urban qualitative sample does not translate immediately into repercussions for non-urban populations, especially in China, where three-fourths of the population are poor rural-dwellers. Yet none of these things was claimed. Rather this qualitative sample was chosen for a different reason: not to prove a specific shift but rather to mine for ideas on how such change is occurring, should it indeed be unfolding across a broader spectrum. The theoretical setup of this work predicted that *if* a de-intimization of values would occur as a result of the transformation to capitalism, then *surely* it would occur in the theoretically most-affected places, among the most affected generation within those of the most-affected gender working in the most-affected occupations, and that this effect would be even further magnified by contrasting this most-affected group with their less-affected and comparable fathers. Thereby, in this way, the results of this dissertation tell us two things. First, the fact that social values are indeed comparatively deteriorated in exactly the places the theory directed us to look strengthens the value of this particular theoretical setup. Any other finding would have called for a theoretical revision. Second, and more to the point, this particular mix between theory and method created a highly sensitive instrument for focusing on the capitalism-sociality link, so that the mechanisms and ‘how’ of this link may be illuminated. The purpose was not to say that indeed society has transformed, but rather to look in the place of most likely change and to focus on how such change occurs.

The quantitative data analysis conducted in this study does not ultimately resolve the generalizability question here. Representative quantitative data were used to look at parallel tensions to those found within the qualitative sample. Thereby the quantitative contribution here is intended to compare with the qualitative finding of value tensions, highlighting a tendency towards change rather than change itself. During the final write-up of this dissertation, a new wave (2005) of the World Values Survey data has been released. These data will be analyzed within a future work as per the availability of adequate indicators for measuring individualization across these three countries and across multiple waves. So far, however, the existing indicators and samples of the WVS have not been convincing enough to justify using these data as a ‘test’ of de-intimization in the post-communist world. That said, if the adequacy of these data is demonstrated, such a future

test may be initiated, and across the communist world as a whole, using OECD countries as a control group.

The data analysis conducted in this dissertation tells us much about value tensions which are becoming apparent within a focused group, and more widely as shown quantitatively, within China, Russia, and Eastern Germany. It has also described the mechanisms whereby such value tensions tend to resolve themselves through the increasing latency of intimate sociality. Thereby, a principal finding strengthens – through describing the links between them – the notion of capitalism itself as a harbinger of individualization. ‘Testing’ this strengthened and elaborated hypothesis, both in the post-communist setting and more broadly, is the task of future work.

Thereby, most broadly, the presence of modern capitalism may help paint for us a vector for human sociality, one also influenced by the other factors outlined in Chapter 10. We must ask ourselves the extent to which the value tensions – and presumably, over the long-term, value shifts – found within our most-affected group may, as scouts, show us the terrain into which other populations – such as the rural, traditional occupations, and the poor – are drawn as they ‘modernize.’

INDIVIDUALIZATION

At the outset of this work, a critique was launched of utopian strands of individualization theory. Such arguments often reported the historical “democratization” (Gillies 2003) of relationships as the principal meaning of individualization. This ideal development supposedly culminates in Giddens’ (1991) notion of the pure relationship, one freed from hierarchy and ascribed relational obligation. This dissertation has highlighted an opposing, less shiny, side of the coin, one marked by rust and decay.

Individualization is profoundly ambivalent. The individualized informants in this study displayed enhanced levels of personal ambition, tolerance towards others, self reflexivity, independence, and confidence. Yet these positive traits are not without cost. The same informants’ personal ambition makes them focus increasing amounts of time on their own development at the expense of their loved ones, their tolerance of strangers is due to their indifference towards them, their self-reflexivity tends toward narcissism, their independence prevents a dependence upon intimate relationships with others, and confidence makes one less likely to listen to or seek advice. While one side of the individualization coin is utopian, this project has sketched part of the other side through

empirically investigating its relation to capitalism because the utopian view alone was presumed incomplete.

All this is not to imply that social integration and social values are inherently ‘good,’ more important than other goals, such as democratization or liberal values, or without drawbacks. Rather, social values are presented as valuable here only from a perspective which prioritizes informal social control and normative regulation because of apparent social disorder consequences when they are lacking. In any case, a focus on fundamental sociality may serve to broaden value discussions that, as of late, have tended to view economic growth as a panacea. In the meantime, it is tempting to believe the opposite, that normative and integrative decline is an inalterable consequence of economic development.

PRAXIS

One aim of this project is to provide a negation of optimistic modernization theorizing on the topic of economic development and social values, thereby empirically demonstrating the plausibility of the correlation of modern capitalist development and de-intimization. There are at least two reasons to pursue this aim. First, the empirical foundation of this thesis provides a fuller understanding of the topic at hand. Second, this particular thesis also normatively suggests the danger inherent in a utopian version of reality; it functions also as a warning.

Once such a warning is in hand, how might this project handle the task of moral praxis or action? While every warning spurs action, a problematic arises in that the directionality and mechanics of social action are never implicit in knowledge. The warning that a nuclear missile has been launched at us may jolt us to action, but does not specify how to respond. We could attempt to shoot the warhead down, launch our own in a counterattack, evacuate underground, call the enemy for clarification, get to sleep before the missile hits, pray for salvation, hold a tea party, or read a book about Armageddon. Each is a way of responding to the crisis, embodying its own set of values, but none of these responses is imbedded within knowledge of the crisis itself. The how of praxis is not linked in a clear-cut way to the description of the problem, but is rather an issue of politics, values, and moral philosophy, and will thus have to be taken up elsewhere. Siding with Weber, and against Marx and the Frankfurt School on this issue, the gap between values and knowledge unfortunately remains wide.

Nonetheless, there is no need to drop the issue entirely as one devoid of hope. If we happen to decide that the negative components of individualization outweigh the positive,

this research has pointed to important buffers that may slow process. Religious values, since they offer a form of ultimate values in competition with the ultimate values of material culture, may offer solace. In addition, states which resist purified forms of the market economy, through providing alternative policy and values, such as the welfare state, may also fight against this particular individualization. Finally, females appear more able to maintain their sociality than men. What to do with these three points is not clear. While conservatives might argue for a return to the past in these dimensions, this is neither feasible nor superior to more progressive alternatives.

Despite the difficulty, even impossibility, of acting based on a secure framework of knowledge, it is necessary. In this regard, perhaps the more pragmatic course of action – as opposed to more revolutionary approaches – of the communitarian approach is a way forward. For example, Etzioni's (1988) concerted attack on the classical economics mainstays of rationality and individualism, arguing instead for the insertion of emotions, values, community, and morality into our way of understanding the economy could be seen as an attempt to subvert economic logic from within, as a Trojan Horse. Admittedly, grave misgivings arise as to the penetrability of the walls of modern capitalist logic, but praxis demands that doubt kneels to faith.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. ENGLISH INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

Interview Guideline - English

	Topic	Time Allotment	Example Questions
VALUES NOW	Ostensible Prioritization of Values	3	1a) What are the most important things in your life? 1b) Which values are important to you? 2) Are there any moral principles that guide you? If so, what are they?
	Goal-Based Prioritization of Values	7	3a) What are your biggest goals in life? 3b) How do you imagine your life in the future? 4) Who is your biggest role model and what do you admire about them? 5) Which values do you try to instill in your grandchildren?
VALUES BEFORE	Previous (15 years ago) ostensible prioritization of values	3	6a) What were the most important things in your life? 6b) Which values were important to you? 7) Are there any moral principles that guide you? If so, what are they?
	previous (15 years ago) goal-based prioritization of values	7	8a) What were your biggest goals in life? 8b) How did you imagine your life in the future? 9) Who was your biggest role model and what do you admire about them? 10) Which values did you try to instill in your grandchildren?
CAUSES OF VALUE CHANGE	Causes of Value Change - Individual answer	2	11) Why did your values change between 1990 and today?
	Causes of Value Change - hypotheses	13	12) Do you think more about money and material things than you did before? 13) Do you think more about costs and benefits nowadays, for example about the costs of getting married, having children, or going on vacation, than you did before? 14a) Compared to before, do you think people more often use you for money or material gain? 14b) Compared to before, is it more tempting to think about using others for material or monetary gain? 15a) How do you feel when you see an advertisement that encourages you to spend more money or buy certain products in order to be successful? 15b) Do company advertisements influence you to buy more or to work harder now compared to before? 16a) How do you feel when you see movies or television shows that show a rich man as the model of success? 16b) Do movies and television influence you to buy more or to work harder now compared with before?
VALUE CONFLICTS	Value Conflicts	10	17a) Do you think any of your values are in conflict with others? 17b) For example, are your work values in conflict with your family values? 18) How do you justify one value with another if they are in conflict? 19) Are these conflicts a source of anxiety or do they make you feel bad? 20) How do you think these conflicts can be resolved?

45 minutes

APPENDIX B. CHINESE INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

- 1) 在您的人生中，最重要的东西是什么？
- 2) 是否有某些道德准则指导着您？如果有，它们包括哪些？
- 3) 在您的人生中，最大的目标是什么？
- 4) 谁是您最重要的榜样？您欣赏他们的哪些方面？
- 5) 您会把哪些准则/价值观念灌输给您的子女/孙子女？
- 6) 在您的人生中，最重要的东西是什么？
- 7) 是否有某些道德准则指导着您？如果有，它们包括哪些？
- 8) 在您的人生中，最大的目标是什么？
- 9) 谁是您最重要的榜样？您欣赏他们的哪些方面？
- 10) 您会把哪些准则/价值观念灌输给您的子女/孙子女？
- 11) 90年代至今，为什么这一阶段您的准则/价值观念会发生改变？
- 12) 对比过去，现在您是否对钱和物质方面的东西考虑的更多些？
- 13) 对比过去，现在您是否对开支和收益考虑的更多些？比如说关于结婚，抚育小孩，或者是度假等项目开支的考虑？
- 14a) 和过去相比，您是否认为他人更多地利用了您的关系获得物质利益？
- 14b) 和过去相比，您是否会更多地倾向于考虑利用别人的关系来获得物质利益？
- 15) 当您看到那些为体现成功，而鼓动您花费更多的钱，或者是购买某种商品的广告时，您会怎样看待？
- 16) 当您看到那些把富人作为成功象征的电影或电视节目时，您会怎样看待？
- 17) 在您看来，您的一些准则/价值观念与其他准则/价值观念之间发生过冲突么？
例如，您的工作准则/价值观念与家庭准则/价值观念之间存在冲突么？
- 18) 您是怎样在相互冲突的准则/价值观念之间作出判断的？
- 19) 这些冲突是否给您带来焦虑，或者它们使您感到不安？
- 20) 您认为怎样才能处理好这些冲突？

APPENDIX C. RUSSIAN INTERVIEW GUIDELINE

Interview Guideline - Russian

Topic	Time Allotment	Example Questions
Ostensible Prioritization of Values	4	1a) Что для вас самое главное в жизни? 1b) Какие ценности для вас важны? 2) Какие моральные принципы влияют на ваше поведение?
Goal-Based Prioritization of Values	6	3a) К каким высоким целям вы стремитесь в жизни? 3b) Как вы представляете себе свою жизнь в будущем? 4) С кого вы берете пример и какие черты вам в нем/ней нравятся? 5) Какие ценности вы стремитесь передать вашим детям/внукам?
Previous (15 years ago) ostensible prioritization of values	4	6a) Что для вас было самое главное в жизни, 15 лет тому назад? 6b) Какие ценности были для вас важны, 15 лет тому назад? 7) Какие моральные принципы влияли на ваше поведение, 15 лет тому назад?
previous (15 years ago) goal-based prioritization of values	6	8a) К каким высоким целям вы стремились в жизни, 15 лет тому назад? 8b) Как вы представляли себе свою жизнь в будущем, 15 лет тому назад? 9) С кого вы брали пример и какие черты вам в нем/ней нравились, 15 лет тому назад? 10) Какие ценности вы стремились передать вашим детям/внукам, 15 лет тому назад?
Causes of Value Change - Individual choice	3	11) Насколько понятия ценности изменились для вас с 1990ого года по сегодняшний день? 12) Почему понятия ценности изменились для вас с 1990ого года по сегодняшний день?
Causes of Value Change - hypotheses	12	13) Думаете вы сегодня о деньгах и материальном положении больше чем раньше? 14) Думаете вы сегодня вольше чем раньше о расходах будничной жизни, если вы хотите съездить в отпуск, жениться/выйти замуж, или завести детей? 15a) Насколько больше вы сегодня, по сравнению с прошлым, склонны использовать других людей ради своего материального благосостояния? 15b) Насколько вы думаете, по сравнению с прошлым, используют вас другие для своего материального благополучия? 16a) Какого мнения о рекламе, которые вас вынуждают тратить больше денег или покупать определенные вещи, чтобы считаться успешным? 16b) Каким образом, по по вашему мнению, влияют на вас реклама вынуждая вас вольше тратить или больше работать, по сравнению с прошлым? 17a) Что вы думаете о фильмах, телевидении, и музыке, которые представляют вогатого человека ака образ успеха? 17b) Насколько фильмы, музыка, телевидение влияют на вас вынуждая вольше тратить или больше работать, чем раньше?
Value Conflicts	10	18) Каким образом, по вашему мнению, некоторые из ваших ценностей вступают в конфликт с другими ценностями? На пример, в какой мере ваши ценности на работе вступают в конфликт с вашими ценностями связанными с семьей? 19) Каким образом вы объясняете ваши ценности, если они вступают в конфликт друг с другом? 20) Какие чувства вы испытываете в связи с этими конфликтами? 21) Как эти конфликты могут быть решены?
	45	

Interview-Richtlinie

Thema	Zeitvorgabe	Beispielfragen
Generelle Wertegewichtung	3	1a) Was ist Ihnen das Wichtigste im Leben? 1b) Welche Werte sind Ihnen wichtig? 2) Gibt es irgendwelche moralischen Prinzipien, die sie leiten? Wenn ja, welche?
Zielorientierte Wertegewichtung	7	3a) Was sind die höchsten Ziele in Ihrem Leben? 3b) Wie stellen Sie sich Ihr zukünftiges Leben vor? 4) Wer ist Ihr grösstes Vorbild und was bewundern Sie an ihm/ihr? 5) Welche Werte versuchen Sie Ihren Enkeln zu vermitteln?
Generelle Wertegewichtung vor 15 Jahren	3	6a) Was war Ihnen das Wichtigste im Leben? 6b) Welche Werte waren Ihnen wichtig? 7) Gab es irgendwelche moralischen Prinzipien, die sie leiteten? Wenn ja, welche?
Zielorientierte Wertegewichtung vor 15 Jahren	7	8a) Was waren die höchsten Ziele in Ihrem Leben? 8b) Wie haben Sie sich Ihr zukünftiges Leben vorgestellt? 9) Wer war Ihr grösstes Vorbild und was haben Sie an ihm/ihr bewundert? 10) Welche Werte versuchten Sie Ihren Enkeln zu vermitteln?
Ursachen des Wertewechsels - Individuelle Antwort	2	11) Warum haben sich Ihre Werte zwischen 1990 und jetzt geändert?
Ursache des Wertewechsels - Hypothesen	13	12) Im Vergleich zu früher (vor ca. 15 Jahren), wie oft denken Sie heute an Geld und materielle Dinge? 13) Im Vergleich zu früher, wie oft denken Sie heute an Kosten und Nutzen, z.B. bei der Entscheidung, zu heiraten, Kinder zu bekommen oder zu verreisen? 14a) Im Vergleich zu früher, wie oft werden Sie von anderen benutzt, die sich an Ihnen materiell bereichern oder durch Sie Geld 14b) Im Vergleich zu früher, wie verlockend ist es, darüber nachzudenken, andere zu Ihrem eigenen Vorteil zu gebrauchen? 15a) Was denken Sie über Werbung, die Sie dazu anregen soll, mehr Geld auszugeben oder bestimmte Dinge zu kaufen, die Sie 15b) Inwieweit werden Sie von Werbung dahingehend beeinflusst, mehr zu kaufen oder, im Vergleich zu früher, härter zu arbeiten? 16a) Was empfinden Sie, wenn Sie in Filmen oder Fernsehshows einen reichen Mann als Erfolgsmodell dargestellt sehen? 16b) Inwieweit werden Sie durch Film und Fernsehen beeinflusst, mehr zu kaufen oder, im Vergleich zu früher, härter zu arbeiten?
Wertekonflikte	10	17a) Inwiefern stehen manche Ihrer Werte in Konflikt mit anderen ihrer Wertvorstellungen? 17b) Können Sie zum Beispiel Arbeit und Familie gut miteinander vereinbaren? 18) Wie rechtfertigen Sie die jeweiligen Werte, wenn sie in Konflikt miteinander geraten? 19) Wie fühlen Sie sich, wenn derartige Konflikte auftreten? Werden Sie unsicher oder fühlen Sie sich deshalb schlecht? 20) Wie denken Sie könnten diese Konflikte gelöst werden?

APPENDIX E. RESPONDENT PROFILE SHEET

respondent NAME (first): _____

respondent NUMBER: _____

Interviewer: _____ Date: _____
Location: _____

INFORMATION SHEET

Age: _____ (35-45);
Sex: _____ (Male);
Sector: _____ (retail, IT, service, Telecom, or other);
Position: _____ (manager, upper level, owner, or other);
Income, top _____ percent (top 1-20%) in Shanghai;
Married? _____ (Yes); how many years? _____
Wife's work: _____
Child? _____ (Yes); how old? _____
Father near Shanghai? _____ (Yes);

Nowadays, **including weekends**, how many days of vacation do you typically take each month? _____ And you are working then about _____ (30-x) days? (YES)

In 1990, 15 years ago, **including weekends**, how many days of vacation did you typically take each month? _____ And you were working then about _____ (30-x) days? (YES)

*Now, you will be asked to briefly reconstruct a diary of your typical **workday**, starting at midnight, when you are probably asleep, to midnight the next day. You should include all meal times, work times, leisure times, socializing times, and transportation. Please mention if you are conducting this activity alone or with others, and who the others are. Please try to construct the typical day as accurately as possible, and not how you would like your day to be. "To begin with, at midnight on a typical day, are you already asleep at midnight?"*

*Now, you will be asked to briefly reconstruct a diary of your typical **non-work day**, for example a weekend or vacation day.*

*Now, you will be asked to briefly reconstruct a diary of your **typical workday 15 years ago**, in 1990.*

*Now, you will be asked to briefly reconstruct a diary of your **typical non-work day 15 years ago**, in 1990.*

Thank you for this initial information. Now it is time for the interview to begin. We are very grateful for your cooperation and remind you that we will change your name and protect your identity. Please be as open as possible about the questions asked.

APPENDIX F. SAMPLE TIME DIARY

Time Diary (Typical Work Day today)

[illegible]

Adapted from: Americans' Use of Time Project

APPENDIX G. CONTEXTUAL CODES, PAGE 1 OF 3

1990 Activism	harder	CHANGE desire to travel
1990 Ambition	Advertisements not affected	CHANGE direct to indirect exploitation
1990 Business	Aging effect	CHANGE doctors and journalists
1990 Career	Altruism	CHANGE economic reductionism
1990 Carefree	Ambition	CHANGE exploitation
1990 Charity	Analytical thinking	CHANGE exploitative people with power
1990 Commitment	Apathy	CHANGE family
1990 Competence	Authenticity (self)	CHANGE father less of role model
1990 cost-benefit calculation	Balance	CHANGE from self focus to other focus
1990 Country	Calmness	CHANGE general conditions
1990 Cultural involvement	Candidness	CHANGE honesty
1990 Discipline	Capitalism	CHANGE honesty to intrigue
1990 Dissidence	Care free	CHANGE idealism
1990 Do it yourself	Career	CHANGE idealism less
1990 Education	CAUSE CHANGE business role	CHANGE idealism to pragmatism
1990 Enjoy life	CAUSE CHANGE learned more. more socialized	CHANGE individualization
1990 Entrepreneurialism	CHANGE accepting bourgeoisie values	CHANGE inequality
1990 Excitement	CHANGE achievement to money	CHANGE inflated self-valuations
1990 Fairness	CHANGE anticorruption to cheating people	CHANGE inner peace
1990 Family	CHANGE CAUSE aging, life stage	CHANGE intellectual focus to money
1990 Family over work	CHANGE CAUSE business development	CHANGE intergenerational value transmission
1990 Freedom	CHANGE CAUSE capitalism	CHANGE less family
1990 freest and best time	CHANGE CAUSE different money environment	CHANGE less money oriented
1990 Friendship	CHANGE CAUSE economic possibilities	CHANGE less trustworthiness
1990 Gossip devalued	CHANGE CAUSE education	CHANGE life more fast-paced
1990 Health	CHANGE CAUSE education and family	CHANGE Materialism
1990 Honesty	CHANGE CAUSE events	CHANGE money
1990 Housing	CHANGE CAUSE external and internal	CHANGE money and greed
1990 Humaneness	CHANGE CAUSE family	CHANGE morality declined
1990 idealism	CHANGE CAUSE higher relative prices	CHANGE more cost-benefit oriented
1990 Improvement	CHANGE CAUSE job security	CHANGE more distant relationships
1990 Intellect	CHANGE CAUSE material well-being	CHANGE more individualized bureaucracy
1990 letdown	CHANGE CAUSE political environment	CHANGE more social because of family
1990 Management	CHANGE CAUSE property	CHANGE more work?
1990 material security	CHANGE cause reality	CHANGE mutual assistance to exploitation
1990 Materialism	CHANGE CAUSE reforms	CHANGE nepotism to ability
1990 Materialism Devalued	CHANGE CAUSE responsibility	CHANGE nepotism to efficiency
1990 No Role Model	CHANGE cause retirement	CHANGE no value of family
1990 Politicians valued	CHANGE CAUSE social environment	CHANGE noncalculation to calculation of money
1990 Politics	CHANGE CAUSE social upbringing	CHANGE opportunities
1990 Religion	CHANGE CAUSE society	CHANGE other focus to self-focus
1990 Renovation	CHANGE CAUSE struggle for progress	CHANGE people having kids later
1990 Respect important	CHANGE CAUSE vanguard company	CHANGE politics
1990 risk taking	CHANGE CAUSE war	CHANGE prestige to work AND character
1990 role models few	CHANGE commercialization	CHANGE profit chasing
1990 Rules devalued	CHANGE communality to uniqueness	CHANGE relations
1990 Self-determination	CHANGE community policemen	CHANGE relations thinner
1990 Self-realization	CHANGE consumerism	CHANGE role models
1990 social networks	CHANGE corruption	CHANGE safety
1990 Social Recognition	CHANGE cost-benefit analysis	CHANGE schools
1990 Society	CHANGE costs	CHANGE segregation
1990 Solidarity	CHANGE cynicism	CHANGE selflessness to competition
1990 Sports		
1990 Success		
1990 Thrift		
1990 Travel		
1990 Voluntarism		
1990 volunteering		
1990 Work		
1990 Work as survival		
1990 Work family ambivalenced		
1990 Work for pension		
Ability		
Achievement		
Activism		
Adaptation devalued		
Advertisement		
Advertisements make one work		

APPENDIX G. CONTEXTUAL CODES, CONTINUED, PAGE 2 OF 3

CHANGE social help to self help	Conscientiousness	Humility
CHANGE social over work TO	Consumerism devalued	Idealism devalued
work over social	Consumption	Image important
CHANGE solidarity	Consumption and breaking the	Immorality
CHANGE studies to family	law	Immorality devalued
CHANGE teaching	Consumption devalued	Income
CHANGE thrift to consumption	Contentment	Income equality valued
CHANGE time no money TO	Conversation	Independence
money no time	Cosmopolitanism	Independence valued
CHANGE tolerance	Country important	Individualism
CHANGE travel	Courage	Inner peace
CHANGE travel more difficult	Creativity	Innovation
CHANGE travel to less travel	Culture	Integrity
orientation	Cynicism	Intelligence
CHANGE trust	Decency	Intergenerational change good
CHANGE values annihilated	Dedication	for business
CHANGE wishing money to using	Determination	Intergenerational Gap
money	Devotion	Intergenerational transmission
CHANGE work insecurity	Dignity	important
Changing view of exploitation	Diligence	Japan oriented
Character	Economic development	Kindness
Charity	important	Laughing at oneself valued,
Children	Education	ability to
Christian values	Education valued for giving	Leisure
Clarity of thought	morality	Love
Comedy	Efficiency	Love Others
Comfort	Elders respected	Loyalty
Committment	Employment devalued	Management ability valued
Communication	Enduring Failure, hardship	Masculinity in advertising
Communication devalued	Important	valued
CONFLICT analysis vs. emotion	Energy	Material security
CONFLICT art and money	Enterprise culture valued	Material self-sufficiency
CONFLICT avoidance	Entertainment non-material	important
CONFLICT conflicting valuations	Entrepreneurialism	Materialism
CONFLICT dissonance resolution	Equality	Materialism and family comfort
CONFLICT efficiency vs. sociality	Experience	Materialism devalued
at work	Exploitation	Materialism in balance
CONFLICT employer employee	Exploitation devalued	Materialism to indicate social
CONFLICT entrepreneur role	Expoitation normal in business	status
CONFLICT escapism	Fair Play	Mentorship
CONFLICT family and business	Fairness	Money
CONFLICT family and leisure	Family	Money as indicating success
CONFLICT geographical distance	Family and work harmony	Money as intelligence
CONFLICT honesty and success	Family business	Money devalued
CONFLICT honesty and work	Family for happiness	Money Important for Business
CONFLICT money and health	Family over work	Money is not everything
CONFLICT new job	Flexibility	MONEY planned allocation to
CONFLICT no fundamental	Focus	market allocation of housing
conflicts besides time	Forgiveness	Money valued ambivalently
CONFLICT progress (business)	Free time	Morality
vs. charity work	Freedom	Morality Important
CONFLICT resolution division of	Freedom in work valued, comes	Music
labor	with pressure	Mutual benefit
CONFLICT resolution through	Friendship	Mutual understanding
compensation	Fulfilment	Nature
CONFLICT response of apathy	Gambling negatively evaluated	Nature devalued
CONFLICT separating self from	Gender	Nepotism
the family	Goal orientation valued	Nepotism devalued
CONFLICT solution apathy	Golden rule	No Role Model
CONFLICT solution delegation of	Good hours important in work	Norms important
responsibility	Happiness	Obedience
CONFLICT the economy and the	Hard work value	Openness
individual	Hardness	Opinion on society
CONFLICT Time constraints	Harmony valued	Opportunity important
CONFLICT work and health	Health	Optimism
CONFLICT work and sociality	Helpfulness	Orientation valued
CONFLICT work thinking versus	Honesty	Other-centeredness
home thinking	Humaneness valued	Parenting

APPENDIX G. CONTEXTUAL CODES, CONTINUED, PAGE 3 OF 3

Parents as achieving less than children	Thrift
Parents valued	Time management
Parochialism	Tolerance
Passion	Traders honor
Peace	Travel
Perfectionism	Trust
Perseverance	Trustworthiness
Persistence in work	Uniqueness
Politeness important	Value change?
Politicians valued	Virtues
Politics	wife valued
Politics devalued	Willpower
Pragmatism	Wisdom
Pragmatism valued	Work
Profit	Work and Money
Rags to Riches influence	Work as a norm
Rationality	Work as a refuge
Reading	Work as Duty
Relationships a ensuring material gain	Work as escape
Relationships valued	Work as family
Religion	Work as mutual assistance, not exploitation
Religion devalued	Work as salvation
Respect parents	Work as success
Responsibility	Work environment
Rules of the game	Work for happiness
Satisfaction	Work for later leisure
Scrutiny vs. instinct	Work over family
Self-centeredness	Work until security established, then family
Self-confidence	
Self-critique valued	
Self-dependence	
Self-realization	
Self-sufficiency	
Selflessness	
Sincerity	
Social capitalism	
Social courtesy	
Social engagement	
Social networks important	
Social networks used instrumentally devalued	
Social recognition	
Social recognition through teaching materialism	
Social Skills	
Socialization important	
Socialization of Children as Economic Function	
Socialization unimportant	
Society devalued	
Society important	
Society valued to ensure personal success	
Spirituality	
Sports	
Spirituality	
Stability	
Strictness	
Striving	
Success as career	
Success as easing pressure of family	
Technical know-how	
Technical skills	
Technology	
Thick skin (taking criticism)	

APPENDIX H. DESCRIPTION OF DATASET

Table H.1 Description of WVS Dataset, Chinese Sample

	1990	1995	2001
number of informants	1000	1500	1000
female	39,9%	46,7%	50,6%
1902-1947 birth cohort	41,8%	23,9%	15,1%
1948-1958 birth cohort	22,1%	27,2%	27,9%
1957-1967 birth cohort	23,8%	25,2%	27,0%
1968-1983 birth cohort	12,3%	23,7%	31,0%
not employed*	14,3%	17,2%	16,5%
new occupations**	44,5%	16,9%	13,4%

* students, housewives, retired persons, unemployed

** employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers

Table H.2 Description of WVS Dataset, Russian Sample

	1990	1995	1999
number of informants	1961	2038	2500
female	57,3%	58,9%	58,5%
1902-1947 birth cohort	44,5%	43,9%	37,0%
1948-1958 birth cohort	27,1%	24,1%	23,4%
1957-1967 birth cohort	19,1%	17,6%	18,0%
1968-1983 birth cohort	9,2%	14,5%	21,6%
not employed*	31,2%	42,0%	46,7%
new occupations**	31,3%	38,8%	34,4%

* students, housewives, retired persons, unemployed

** employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers

Table H.3 Description of WVS Dataset, East German Sample

	1990	1997	1999
number of informants	1336	1003	999
female	54,1%	54,2%	57,0%
1902-1947 birth cohort	49,3%	40,3%	43,8%
1948-1958 birth cohort	22,4%	21,2%	18,7%
1957-1967 birth cohort	18,9%	21,2%	16,9%
1968-1983 birth cohort	9,4%	17,2%	20,5%
not employed*	26,5%	49,9%	58,0%
new occupations**	35,3%	29,3%	44,8%

* students, housewives, retired persons, unemployed

** employers, managers, professionals, supervisors, office workers

APPENDIX I. DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES, PAGE 1 OF 3

Table I.1 Description of Key WVS Variables, China

	wave	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min-Max possible
Importance of work	1990	1000	3,54	0,70	1-4
	1995	1468	3,58	0,65	1-4
	2001	986	3,41	0,66	1-4
Nonmaterial job expectations	1990	1000	97,48	50,47	26-195
	1995	1500	102,28	50,52	26-195
	2001	1000	86,80	49,87	26-195
Respect parents	1990	992	1,75	0,43	1-2
	1995	1474	1,80	0,40	1-2
	2001	963	1,94	0,23	1-2
Sacrifice for Children	1990	789	1,76	0,42	1-2
	1995	1323	1,61	0,49	1-2
	2001	867	1,74	0,44	1-2
Thrift for Children	1990	1000	0,56	0,50	0-1
	1995	1500	0,62	0,49	0-1
	2001	1000	0,57	0,50	0-1
Good pay in job	1990	1000	0,68	0,47	0-1
	1995	1500	0,76	0,43	0-1
	2001	1000	0,65	0,48	0-1
Good security in job	1990	1000	0,44	0,50	0-1
	1995	1500	0,68	0,47	0-1
	2001	1000	0,68	0,47	0-1
Friends important	1990	993	2,94	0,72	1-4
	1995	1471	3,15	0,67	1-4
	2001	978	3,02	0,65	1-4
Politics important	1990	986	2,80	0,95	1-4
	1995	1407	2,80	0,91	1-4
	2001	929	2,80	0,75	1-4
Religion important	1990	978	1,28	0,58	1-4
	1995	1334	1,71	0,84	1-4
	2001	940	1,48	0,74	1-4
Independence important	1990	1000	0,84	0,37	0-1
	1995	1500	0,50	0,50	0-1
	2001	1000	0,74	0,44	0-1
Believes in absolute morals	1990	975	0,35	0,48	0-1
	1995	1353	0,41	0,49	0-1
	2001	815	0,36	0,48	0-1

APPENDIX I. DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES, CONTINUED, PAGE 2 OF 3

Table I.2 Description of Key WVS Variables, Russia

	wave	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min-Max possible
Importance of work	1990	1899	3,25	0,83	1-4
	1995	2011	3,27	0,88	1-4
	1999	2461	3,34	0,90	1-4
Nonmaterial job expectations	1990	1961	89,15	46,85	26-195
	1995	2040	99,00	46,27	26-195
	1999	2500	96,52	51,40	26-195
Respect parents	1990	1829	1,76	0,43	1-2
	1995	2018	1,90	0,30	1-2
	1999	2423	1,85	0,36	1-2
Sacrifice for Children	1990	1578	1,59	0,49	1-2
	1995	1844	1,62	0,49	1-2
	1999	2160	1,63	0,48	1-2
Thrift for Children	1990	1961	0,61	0,49	0-1
	1995	2040	0,55	0,50	0-1
	1999	2500	0,52	0,50	0-1
Good pay in job	1990	1961	0,83	0,38	0-1
	1995	2040	0,90	0,29	0-1
	1999	2500	0,89	0,31	0-1
Good security in job	1990	1961	0,38	0,49	0-1
	1995	2040	0,66	0,47	0-1
	1999	2500	0,69	0,46	0-1
Friends important	1990	1912	3,04	0,77	1-4
	1995	2031	3,07	0,74	1-4
	1999	2487	3,04	0,74	1-4
Politics important	1990	1870	2,29	0,92	1-4
	1995	2023	2,07	0,90	1-4
	1999	2454	2,26	0,88	1-4
Religion important	1990	1835	2,12	1,01	1-4
	1995	1982	2,32	0,98	1-4
	1999	2407	2,39	0,94	1-4
Independence important	1990	1961	0,29	0,45	0-1
	1995	2040	0,28	0,45	0-1
	1999	2500	0,30	0,46	0-1
Believes in absolute morals	1990	1752	0,31	0,46	0-1
	1995	1885	0,45	0,50	0-1
	1999	2307	0,39	0,49	0-1

APPENDIX I. DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES, CONTINUED, PAGE 3 OF 3

Table I.3 Description of Key WVS Variables, Eastern Germany

	wave	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min-Max possible
Importance of work	1990	1325	3,52	0,69	1-4
	1997	998	3,47	0,76	1-4
	1999	989	3,36	0,92	1-4
Nonmaterial job expectations	1990	1336	125,40	50,17	26-195
	1997	1009	102,06	40,21	26-195
	1999	927	108,96	53,76	26-195
Respect parents	1990	1201	1,76	0,43	1-2
	1997	989	1,69	0,46	1-2
	1999	916	1,70	0,46	1-2
Sacrifice for Children	1990	1240	1,76	0,43	1-2
	1997	946	1,72	0,45	1-2
	1999	877	1,59	0,49	1-2
Thrift for Children	1990	1336	0,58	0,49	0-1
	1997	1009	0,65	0,48	0-1
	1999	1000	0,43	0,50	0-1
Good pay in job	1990	1336	0,71	0,45	0-1
	1997	1009	0,72	0,45	0-1
	1999	980	0,74	0,44	0-1
Good security in job	1990	1336	0,72	0,45	0-1
	1997	1009	0,76	0,43	0-1
	1999	984	0,79	0,40	0-1
Friends important	1990	1319	3,19	0,68	1-4
	1997	998	3,32	0,62	1-4
	1999	994	3,34	0,64	1-4
Politics important	1990	1309	2,64	0,88	1-4
	1997	994	2,46	0,82	1-4
	1999	990	2,26	0,82	1-4
Religion important	1990	1296	2,06	1,08	1-4
	1997	993	1,65	0,90	1-4
	1999	984	1,62	0,86	1-4
Independence important	1990	1336	0,66	0,47	0-1
	1997	1009	0,45	0,50	0-1
	1999	1000	0,69	0,46	0-1
Believes in absolute morals	1990	1276	0,23	0,42	0-1
	1997	993	0,15	0,35	0-1
	1999	961	0,38	0,49	0-1

APPENDIX J. T-TEST RESULTS, PAGE 1 OF 4

Table J.1 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables Measuring Work- and Family-Values

	comparison groups	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comparison	Significance
Importance of work	1990, Russia	1899	3,25	0,83	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2461	3,34	0,90		
Importance of work	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4278	3,46	0,76	N>O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6694	3,39	0,82		
nonmaterial job expectations	1990, E. Germany	1336	125,00	50,17	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	924	109,00	53,76		
nonmaterial job expectations	1995, China	1500	102,28	50,52	1995>2001	0,001
	2001, China	1000	86,80	49,87		
nonmaterial job expectations	1990, Russia	1961	89,15	46,85	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2500	96,65	51,40		
nonmaterial job expectations	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4283	109,79	48,65	N>O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6772	94,82	50,35		
Sacrifice for Children	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	7319	1,70	0,46	Older>Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	4297	1,58	0,49		
Sacrifice for Children	1990, E. Germany	1240	1,76	0,43	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	877	1,59	0,49		
Sacrifice for Children	1995, China	1323	1,61	0,49	1995<2001	0,001
	2001, China	867	1,74	0,44		
Sacrifice for Children	1990, Russia	1578	1,59	0,49	1990<1999	0,019
	1999, Russia	2160	1,63	0,48		
Sacrifice for Children	(n)ew occupations, China, all waves	676	1,60	0,49	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, China, all waves	2116	1,72	0,45		
respect parents	1990, E. Germany	1201	1,76	0,43	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	916	1,69	0,46		
respect parents	1995, China	1474	1,80	0,40	1995<2001	0,001
	2001, China	963	1,95	0,23		
respect parents	1990, Russia	1829	1,76	0,43	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2423	1,85	0,36		
respect parents	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4128	1,78	0,41	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6545	1,84	0,37		

n.s. not statistically significant.

APPENDIX J. T-TEST RESULTS, CONTINUED, PAGE 2 OF 4

Table J.2 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables Measuring Materialist Values

	comparison groups	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comparison	Significance
Thrift for Children	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	8324	0,60	0,49	Older>Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	5013	0,50	0,50		
Thrift for Children	1990, E. Germany	1336	0,58	0,49	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	1000	0,43	0,50		
Thrift for Children	1995, China	1500	0,62	0,49	1995>2001	0,013
	2001, China	1000	0,57	0,50		
Thrift for Children	1990, Russia	1961	0,61	0,49	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2500	0,52	0,50		
Thrift for Children	(n)ew occupations, E. Germany, all waves	1214	0,47	0,50	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, E. Germany, all waves	1306	0,61	0,49		
Thrift for Children	(n)ew occupations, China, all waves	833	0,50	0,50	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, China, all waves	2447	0,63	0,48		
Thrift for Children	(n)ew occupations, Russia, all waves	2263	0,52	0,50	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, Russia, all waves	3041	0,58	0,49		
Good pay in job	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	8310	0,78	0,42	Older<Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	5007	0,82	0,39		
Good pay in job	1990, E. Germany	1336	0,71	0,45	n.s.	n.s.
	1999, E. Germany	980	0,74	0,44		
Good pay in job	1995, China	1500	0,76	0,43	1995>2001	0,001
	2001, China	1000	0,65	0,48		
Good pay in job	1990, Russia	1961	0,83	0,38	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2500	0,89	0,31		
Good pay in job	(n)ew occupations, E. Germany, all waves	1204	0,66	0,48	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, E. Germany, all waves	1303	0,79	0,41		
Good security in job	1990, E. Germany	1336	0,72	0,45	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	984	0,79	0,40		
Good security in job	1995, China	1500	0,68	0,47	n.s.	n.s.
	2001, China	1000	0,68	0,47		
Good security in job	1990, Russia	1961	0,38	0,49	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2500	0,69	0,46		
Good security in job	(n)ew occupations, E. Germany, all waves	1207	0,71	0,46	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, E. Germany, all waves	1304	0,78	0,41		
Good security in job	(n)ew occupations, China, all waves	833	0,48	0,50	N<O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, China, all waves	2447	0,65	0,48		
Good security in job	(n)ew occupations, Russia, all waves	2263	0,59	0,49	N<O	0,023
	(o)ther occupations, Russia, all waves	3041	0,62	0,49		

n.s. not statistically significant.

APPENDIX J. T-TEST RESULTS, CONTINUED, PAGE 3 OF 4

Table J.3 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables Measuring Values of Friendship, Politics, and Independence

	comparison groups	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comparison	Significance
Friends important	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	8196	3,04	0,73	Older<Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	4978	3,22	0,67		
Friends important	1990, E. Germany	1319	3,19	0,68	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	994	3,34	0,64		
Friends important	1995, China	1471	3,15	0,67	1995>2001	0,001
	2001, China	978	3,02	0,65		
Friends important	1990, Russia	1912	3,04	0,77	n.s.	n.s.
	1999, Russia	2487	3,04	0,74		
Friends important	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4285	3,16	0,68	N>O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6695	3,04	0,72		
Politics important	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	8078	2,46	0,94	Older>Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	4875	2,37	0,88		
Politics important	1990, E. Germany	1309	2,64	0,88	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	990	2,26	0,82		
Politics important	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4247	2,51	0,90	N>O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6564	2,40	0,93		
Independence important	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	8324	0,42	0,49	Older<Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	5013	0,55	0,50		
Independence important	1990, E. Germany	1336	0,66	0,47	n.s.	n.s.
	1999, E. Germany	1000	0,69	0,46		
Independence important	1995, China	1500	0,50	0,50	1995<2001	0,001
	2001, China	1000	0,74	0,44		
Independence important	1990, Russia	1961	0,29	0,45	n.s.	n.s.
	1999, Russia	2500	0,30	0,46		
Independence important	(n)ew occupations, China, all waves	833	0,83	0,37	N>O	0,001
	(o)ther occupations, China, all waves	2447	0,61	0,49		

n.s. not statistically significant.

APPENDIX J. T-TEST RESULTS, CONTINUED, PAGE 4 OF 4

Table J.4 Two-tailed T-test Mean Comparisons of Key Variables Measuring Values of Religion and Morality

	comparison groups	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Comparison	Significance
Religion important	1902-1958 birth cohort, E. Germany/waves	2154	1,92	1,03	Older>Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 E. Germany/waves	1112	1,57	0,85		
Religion important	1902-1958 birth cohort, Russia/waves	4124	2,35	1,01	Older>Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 Russia/waves	2098	2,16	0,92		
Religion important	1990, E. Germany	1296	2,06	1,08	1990>1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	984	1,62	0,86		
Religion important	1995, China	1334	1,71	0,84	1995>2001	0,001
	2001, China	940	1,48	0,74		
Religion important	1990, Russia	1835	2,12	1,01	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2407	2,39	0,94		
Religion important	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4160	1,96	0,96	n.s.	n.s.
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6453	1,94	0,99		
Belief in absolute morals	1902-1958 birth cohort, all cases/waves	7579	0,38	0,48	Older>Younger	0,001
	1959-1983 all cases/waves	4730	0,30	0,46		
Belief in absolute morals	1990, E. Germany	1276	0,23	0,42	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, E. Germany	961	0,38	0,49		
Belief in absolute morals	1995, China	1353	0,41	0,49	1995>2001	0,029
	2001, China	815	0,36	0,48		
Belief in absolute morals	1990, Russia	1752	0,31	0,46	1990<1999	0,001
	1999, Russia	2307	0,39	0,49		
Belief in absolute morals	(n)ew occupations, all cases, all waves	4148	0,35	0,48	n.s.	n.s.
	(o)ther occupations, all cases, all waves	6102	0,36	0,48		
Belief in absolute morals	(e)mloyed persons, all cases, all waves	8058	0,34	0,47	E<NO	.001
	(no)t currently employed, all cases, all waves	4197	0,37	0,48		
Belief in absolute morals	(l)ower two-third income, all cases, 1999-00	2568	0,41	0,49	L>U	.001
	(u)pper third income, all cases, 1999-00	1122	0,33	0,47		

n.s. not statistically significant.

DECLARATION

I hereby certify that I have written this thesis without any unauthorized assistance. No other sources than those stated in the list of references were used. All quotations from and references to other texts are appropriately cited.

Christopher S. Swader

Bremen, June 23rd, 2008